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Abstract
Operators of the Autonomous Systems (ASes) composing the Internet must deal with constant
traffic growth, while striving to reduce the overall cost-per-bit and keep an acceptable quality of
service. These challenges have motivated ASes to evolve their infrastructure from basic intercon-
nectivity strategies, using a couple transit providers and a few settlement-free peers, to employ
geographical scoped transit services (e.g. partial transit) and multiplying their peering efforts.
Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), facilities allowing the establishment of sessions to multiple net-
works using the same infrastructure, have hence become central entities of the Internet. Although
the benefits of a diverse interconnection strategy are manifold, it also encumbers the inter-domain
Traffic Engineering process and potentially increases the effects of incompatible interests with
neighboring ASes. To efficiently manage the inter-domain traffic under such challenges, opera-
tors should rely on monitoring systems and computer supported decisions.
This thesis explores the IXP-centric inter-domain environment, the managing obstacles aris-
ing from it, and proposes mechanisms for operators to tackle them. The thesis is divided in two
parts. The first part examines and measures the global characteristics of the inter-domain ecosys-
tem. We characterize several IXPs around the world, comparing them in terms of their number
of members and the properties of the traffic they exchange. After highlighting the problems aris-
ing from the member overlapping among IXPs, we introduce remote peering, an interconnection
service that facilitates the connection to multiple IXPs. We describe this service and measure its
adoption in the Internet.
In the second part of the thesis, we take the position of the network operators. We detail the
challenges surrounding the control of inter-domain traffic, and introduce an operational frame-
work aimed at facilitating its management. Subsequently, we examine methods that peering co-
ordinators and network engineers can use to plan their infrastructure investments, by quantifying
the benefits of new interconnections. Finally, we delve into the effects of conflicting business ob-
jectives among ASes. These conflicts can result in traffic distributions that violate the (business)
interests of one or more ASes. We describe these interest violations, differentiating their impact
on the ingress and egress traffic of a single AS. Furthermore, we develop a warning system that
operators can use to detect and rank them. We test our warning system using data from two real
networks, where we discover a large number of interest violations. We thus stress the need for
operators to identify the ones having a larger impact on their network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet is formed by the interconnection of independently managed networks, referred
to as Autonomous Systems (ASes). Operators of each AS define, following their own business
interests, the interconnection infrastructure of their network, and the policy they apply to the
reachability information they exchange with other ASes. At the routing level, the Internet struc-
ture and dynamics derives from the interaction among these policies.
While content linkage in the Internet looked like a web [20], the routing topology supporting
it historically took the form of a hierarchical structure with various tiers [170] (Figure 1.1(a)).
With time, this pyramid structure has been altered, driven by evolving interconnection policies and
constantly changing business requirements. Namely, the appearance of new actors in the Internet
ecosystem impacted the amount of traffic delivered and the manner in which it was done, leading
to the establishment of many shortcuts in the original pyramid (i.e. direct connections among
ASes in lower hierarchies, Figure 1.1(b)), thus leading to a flatter structure [57]. In practice,
establishing new links to other ASes is easier said than done: Operators have to actually layout
the interconnections with other networks, which normally demands significant investments in
physical infrastructure and operations. These costs demotivate the extensive implementation of
private peering in ASes, that is, the use of exclusive infrastructure to connect to neighboring
networks.
Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) are a key piece of the interconnection infrastructure, allow-
ing for fast, flexible, and low-cost peering establishment. From a business point of view, when
multiple ASes connect to an IXP, the investment in physically reaching the location of that IXP
and the managing hardware at its facility opens the door to peering with any of its other members
(Figure 1.1(c)). Technically, an IXP “is just a switch” providing its members the infrastructure
needed to facilitate peering. It includes a Layer 2 backplane through which members exchange
traffic, but also often provides complementary services such as IXP route servers, which facilitate
the exchange of IP routes with its neighbors. Actually, IXPs transcend the mere technical aid,
as they also become important social and governmental entities in the overall Internet ecosys-
tem [166] [39] [184].
1
2 Introduction
Tier-1 
Tier-2 
Tier-3 
(a) Three tier Internet hierarchy.
Tier-1 
Tier-2 
Tier-3 
(b) Peering links between ASes
emerge. The structure becomes ﬂat-
ter.
Tier-1 
Tier-2 
Tier-3 

(c) IXPs provide the infrastructure
required to connect to multiple ASes
with a single link.
Figure 1.1: Evolution of the Internet structure.
The establishment of multiple peering sessions, facilitated by the proliferation of IXPs, offers
operators various advantages, such as: (I) Reduction of the transit bill, as the trafﬁc is delivered
directly to settlement-free peers. (II) Decrease in latency and internal transport costs, since, by
peering at multiple sites, trafﬁc can be delivered closer to its destination point. (III) Increase the
resiliency of the network, since the existence of multiple points of connectivity decreases the risk
of a single point of failure.
The aforementioned beneﬁts are certainly appealing to ASes; however, they come at a cost,
as operators must deal with several challenges to fully enjoy them. In order to correctly manage
their network in this environment, operators must be able to answer questions, such as:
Where to expand and with whom to peer? IXPs open the possibility of peering with
multiple ASes, but not all them are meaningful for the network. Many organizations have
introduced to their operation the role of “peering coordinator”. Their objective is to identify
and negotiate potential interconnections with other networks and IXPs, in order to exchange
trafﬁc at lower cost compared to traditional transit or with better Quality of Service (QoS).
To make decisions, peering coordinator and operators should be able to quantify the advan-
tages of joining new IXPs. The decrease of transit trafﬁc offers a direct way of justifying
3expansion, however, due to the high number of overlapping members among IXPs, this ad-
vantage marginally decreases after the network joins a few IXPs. As described above, other
valid advantages of peering with the same networks include an improved path diversity and
less internal transport cost. As business-driven companies, network operators must be able
to include all these other facts when planning any network expansion.
How to efficiently control the traffic exchanged through inter-domain links? The con-
nection with multiple peers increases the path diversity of the network. However, opera-
tors must actively tune their network to ensure that this diversity is utilized for the better.
Operators should ensure that their inter-domain traffic is balanced across their network in
the most cost-effective way (inter-domain traffic engineering). In addition, operators must
leverage diversity to increase the resiliency of the network by, for instance, implementing
the necessary mechanisms for back-up path propagation.
How to validate whether, and in which way, my neighbor’s behavior is affecting the
performance of my network? The freedom offered by the Internet has facilitated its success,
but complicates the overall operation of the network. Operators must be ready to detect and
deal with anomalous situations such as prefix hijacking [13]), path hiding [179] [104], or
route leaks [69]. Furthermore, policies of external ASes, even if considered correct, might
be affecting the state of the network at different levels. There are multiple examples of
the latter cases, such as “inconsistent advertisement” from neighbors connected at multiple
IXPs [71], or the existence of traffic from directed connected peers through transit providers
[147] [108]. Are operators ready to detect these problems and respond appropriately to
avoid / tackle them?
Albeit the large efforts from both the research community and the industry, most operators
do not have the necessary tools to answer these questions. Operators require the analysis of
different sources of data, including traffic statistics, inter-domain paths, IXPs members, external
AS policies, etc. The large size and nature of the data (which is incomplete and sometimes even
erroneous), makes it hard for operators to process it. The typical heterogeneous composition
of networks, which often consists of hardware from multiple vendors, and the lack of standard
interfaces for data collection exacerbate this problem. A few companies certainly possess the
internal developing capacity to deal with these issues and create inter-domain traffic management
tools [103], however, they only represent a small percentage of the around 50000 (and counting)
ASes forming the Internet.
The creation of tools for the management of inter-domain traffic can be boosted by introduc-
ing more powerful information analysis systems, as well as flexible interfaces for network data
collection. The former can be made possible with the emergence of architectures and IT systems
designed for big data analysis [4]. The latter could stem from the recent demand requirements
of networks supporting the Software Defined Networking (SDN) model [36]. Indeed, in recent
years, the demand for SDN has pressured manufacturers to implement into their systems more
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flexible protocols and Application Program Interfaces (APIs), such as NETCONF/YANG [18].
Additionally, the introduction of SDN-like features in the network design cycle can create an en-
vironment prone for the analysis of network data. Therefore, we believe that network operators
will have in the near future the necessary resources to analyze inter-domain traffic data.
The goal of this thesis is to define and implement a framework for the management of inter-
domain traffic in the complex and evolving environment previously described. Inter-domain traf-
fic management not only includes the techniques required to control the distribution of traffic, but
also the procedures needed to handle the network infrastructure and the interaction with neigh-
boring ASes. For instance, policies of external entities might actually be incompatible with those
from the operator, i.e. no inter-domain traffic distribution will satisfy all parties involved. This
problem is amplified in a network connecting with hundreds of peers (as would those joining
various IXPs). Our research focuses on analytic procedures that use automated processes to aid
operators and peering coordinators to make the best decisions for their network.
We divide the thesis in two main parts: First, in order to better understand the situation sur-
rounding the ASes, we assess the current IXP-centric environment of the inter-domain ecosystem.
We characterize and compare different IXPs around the world. Also, we examine the phenomena
of remote peering, which helps ASes to reach various IXPs using the same physical infrastructure.
Second, we focus on the specification of techniques that operators can use to improve their net-
work management and provide the design and implementation of tools to sustain such techniques.
We describe the contents of each of these two parts hereafter.
1.1. Part one: Characterizing the IXP-centric Internet ecosystem
In this part of the thesis, we assess several characteristics of the support of the Internet ecosys-
tem by IXP’s, relying on publicly accessible resources, or measurements performed in the context
of this Thesis. The objective is to understand the technical and behavioral aspects of Internet
traffic exchanged at IXP, in order to set the stage for our research on the definition of efficient
inter-domain traffic management procedures.
We start in Chapter 3 by examining overall characteristics of several IXPs. We first charac-
terize IXPs in terms of membership size and volume of exchanged traffic. We then examine the
effects of member overlapping in terms of ASes and control-plane information. Finally, we ex-
amine the variation of traffic volume exchanged at IXPs at daily and monthly time granularities,
notably focusing on the impact of weather on the traffic sustained by some national-scope IXPs.
Chapter 4 offers a detailed analysis of a regional IXP, the Slovakian IXP (SIX), from which
we obtained an exhaustive amount of inter-temporal data. In the chapter, we study the temporal
dynamics of SIX in terms of: membership size and composition (type of companies); the peering
density among the members; the traffic distribution; port capacity/utilization; and the local AS-
level traffic matrix. Our data revealed a number of invariant and dynamic properties of the studied
system, such as the stagnation of member growth over time, counter-balanced by the explosion of
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Content Providers traffic.
Chapter 5 focuses on remote peering. By using remote peering, an AS can peer at multiple
IXPs without requiring the installation of infrastructure on each site. In the chapter, we describe
this technique, and the benefits that it provides to both IXPs and companies. Also, the chapter
includes the description of a measurement campaign we undertook to evaluate the adoption of
remote peering. Concretely, we used looking glasses and active methods to measure the latency
of the peering IP of members to the IXP switching back-plane. Our measurement campaigns
reveal presence of remote peering at 20 IXPs worldwide, with remote peering members peaking
at 20% in one IXP.
1.2. Part two: Inter-domain Traffic Management
In the second part of the thesis, we take the perspective of network operators solving the inter-
domain traffic and peering engineering problem. We explain how different sources of data can
be used to manage inter-domain traffic in the environment that we describe in the first part of the
thesis. Moreover, we describe two applications that operators can use to evaluate the expansion
of their peering infrastructure, and detect conflicts with the policies of external ASes.
In Chapter 6, we introduce a general framework for inter-domain traffic management. We
describe each of the procedures of the framework, including several mechanisms to gather the
required inter-domain information. Furthermore, we highlight the difficulties that have hindered
the implementation of inter-domain management procedures in many networks in the last decade.
Chapter 7 describes a peering expansion study that we perform for the Spanish Academic
Network, RedIRIS. In this study, we leverage IXP information to enrich the peering management
process. Using real network data from RedIRIS, we illustrate the decreasing benefits of traffic
off-loading due to IXP member overlapping. We also discuss how Remote Peering can be used to
reduce the cost of peering, and how operators could quantify other direct advantages of peering
at multiple points.
In Chapter 8, we explain the effects of conflicting policies among different ASes. Conflicting
policies lead to situations in which the (business) interests of two or more ASes are incompatible,
thus driving to traffic states that eventually do not satisfy some of the networks involved. We
denominate each of the cases in which an AS is not satisfied with how some of inter-domain
traffic is routed as interest violation. In this chapter, we meticulously define the concept of interest
violations, differentiating those cases that affect outbound traffic to those affecting inbound traffic.
With the increasing number of peers and interconnection points with such peers, the possibility
of interest violations appearing increases. We thus provide means for operators to detect and
measure interest violations in their network. We define algorithms that can be used by operators to
detect these cases, and describe a prototype of a warning system that can signal to operators when
critical interest violations occur. Furthermore, we use data from two real networks to demonstrate
our tool and the frequency of interest violations in live networks.
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1.3. Thesis structure
Besides the two main parts described in the previous sections, the rest of this thesis is struc-
tured as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the Internet ecosystem, including
background in BGP, IXPs, and typical traffic engineering practices performed by operators. We
present ideas for future work, and conclude in Chapter 9. We provide relevant related work within
each of the main chapters of this thesis.
1.4. Summary of thesis contributions and publications
Characterization of the evolution of regional IXPs. Using publicly available data, we an-
alyzed several characteristics and practices of regional IXPs. Our study included traffic, peering,
and capacity characteristics, under both a technical and economical perspective. In addition, we
explored how the concentrated geographical footprint of regional IXPs could be leveraged to
analyze effects of human behavior. The next are the publications related to this contribution:
Juan Camilo Cardona, Rade Stanojevic. A History of an Internet eXchange Point.
ACM Computer Communication Review, 42 (2). pp. 58-64.
Juan Camilo Cardona, Rade Stanojevic, Ruben Cuevas. On Weather and Internet
Traffic Demand (Poster). The Passive and Active Measurement Conference (PAM 2013),
18-19 March 2013, Hong Kong, China.
Juan Camilo Cardona, Rade Stanojevic.IXP traffic: a macroscopic view (Paper). The
7th Latin American Networking Conference 2012, 4-5 October 2012, Medellin, Colombia.
Remote peering. We closely examine the concept of remote peering, and provide experi-
mental measures of its adoption on world wide IXPs. Also, by using real data, we explored the
economical and technical benefits of remote peering to Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The
publication related to this contribution is:
Ignacio Castro, Juan Camilo Cardona, Sergey Gorinsky, Pierre Francois. Remote
Peering: More Peering without Internet Flattening. The 10th ACM International Confer-
ence on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (ACM CoNEXT 2014), 2-5
December 2014, Sydney, Australia.
Analysis and detection of inter-domain traffic interest violations due to incompatible po-
lices. We identified scenarios in which incompatible interests lead to anomaly-free states affecting
one or more ASes. We defined methods for an operator to detect these violations using network
data and evaluate them using real network data. We analyzed one of these incompatible inter-
ests scenarios, in which the filtering of more-specific prefixes in one networks causes unexpected
transit flows at remote ASes. The publications related to this contribution are:
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Juan Camilo Cardona, Pierre Francois, Paolo Lucente. Impact of BGP filtering on
Inter-Domain Routing Policies. draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-08 (IETF Internet Draft).
Work in Progress. IETF GROW workign group Document. Under IESG Review. Novem-
ber 2015.
Juan Camilo Cardona, Stefano Vissichio, Paolo Lucente, Pierre Francois. Interest
violations in Inter-domain Routing with an Autonomous System Centric Perspective. In
publication process.
Inter-domain data collection and management. The difficulty of data collection is one of
the problems blocking an efficient inter-domain traffic management. We provide ideas in how
data could be more easily collected and processed it. The publications related to this contribution
are:
Juan Camilo Cardona, Pierre Francois, Paolo Lucente. Collection and Analysis of
data for Inter-domain Traffic Engineering (Paper). I Workshop Pre-IETF, in conjunction
with the 34th conference of the Brazilian Society of Computation (CSBC 2014), 28-31
July 2014, Brasilia, Brazil.
Pierre Francois, Juan Camilo Cardona, Adam Simpson, Jeffrey Haas ADD-PATH for
Route Servers. draft-francois-idr-rs-addpaths-01 (IETF Internet Draft). August 2014.
Pierre Francois, Juan Camilo Cardona, Adam Simpson, Jeffrey Haas (February 2014)
ADD-PATH limit capability. draft-francois-idr-addpath-limit-00 (IETF Internet Draft).
February 2014.
Juan Camilo Cardona, Pierre Francois, Saikat Ray, Keyur Patel, Paolo Lucente ,
Pradosh Mohapatra. BGP Path Marking. draft-bgp-path-marking-00. July 2013.
The next publications were also done and published during the development of this thesis:
Juan Camilo Cardona, Rade Stanojevic, Nikolaos Laoutaris. Collaborative Con-
sumption for Mobile Broadband: A Quantitative Study. The 10th ACM International Con-
ference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (ACM CoNEXT 2014),
2-5 December 2014, Sydney, Australia.
Juan Camilo Cardona, Pierre Francois, Bruno Decraene, John Scudder, Adam Simp-
son, Keyur Patel. Bringing High Availability to BGP: A Survey. Computer Networks 91,
788-803. 2015.
Clarence Filsfils, Nagendra Kumar Nainar, Carlos Pignataro, Juan Camilo Cardona,
Pierre Francois. The Segment Routing Architecture. IEEE GLOBECOMM: Next Genera-
tion Networking Symposium. 2015.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this section, we provide technical and economic fundamentals required to understand the
Internet ecosystem and the management of inter-domain traffic. We first describe the type of
relationships that ASes establish to achieve global connectivity in Section 2.1. After that, in
Section 2.2, we provide technical details of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), the protocol
used between ASes to exchange reachability information. We review traffic engineering practices
that operators use to control their inter-domain traffic in Section 2.3. We finish this chapter in
Section 2.4 by explaining basic concepts of Internet Exchange Points.
2.1. Economic relationships between ASes
ASes on the Internet establish connectivity between them (i.e. Layer-2 / physical links) based
on business-driven agreements. The relationships between ASes are characterized in economic
terms (i.e. which AS pays for service and infrastructure costs), and in the transport services that
each AS offers to the other (i.e. promise to exchange traffic to all the other networks, or just a
subset of them). The basic types of agreements are transit-customer and settlement-free peerings,
but other types of agreements are also possible. We extend the description of each of these below.
Transit-customer agreements are bilateral interconnections where the customer pays the
provider for connectivity to the global Internet. In a common setting, transit traffic is metered
at 5-minute intervals and billed on a monthly basis, with the charge computed by multiplying a
per-Mbps price and the 95th percentile of the 5-minute traffic rates [59, 168]. In the early com-
mercial Internet, traffic flowed mostly through a hierarchy of transit relationships, with a handful
of tier-1 networks forming a clique at the top of the hierarchy.
Settlement-free Peering is an arrangement where two networks exchange traffic directly,
rather than through a transit provider, and thereby reduce their transit costs. The exchange is
commonly limited to the traffic belonging to the peering networks and their customer cones, i.e.,
their direct and indirect transit customers. Networks differ in their policies for recognizing another
network as a potential peer. The peering policies are typically classified as open, selective, and
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restrictive [118] [145]. An open policy allows the network to peer with every network. A network
with a selective policy peers only if certain conditions are met. A restrictive policy has stringent
terms that are difficult to satisfy. Costs of peering and transit have different structures. Peering
involves a number of traffic-independent costs, e.g., collocation, IXP membership fees, etc. Peer-
ing might also have traffic-dependent costs, e.g., back-haul rates are more expensive. Over the
years, peering relationships have proven themselves as cost-effective alternatives to transit.
Other peering types, such as paid-peering or partial-transit, are also possible between net-
works [66]. In paid-peering, a company pays the other to reach their IP prefixes and the one of its
customers (similar to settlement-free peering with a cost). In partial-transit, a company provides
transit services to a customer only to a subset of the Internet, normally for a lower rate than typical
transit services.
Network managers decide how to control their inter-domain traffic based on technical and
economic aspects. It is not economically convenient for operators to transport traffic from non-
customer ASes (transit providers or settlement-free peers) to other non-customer ASes [83]. Op-
erators selectively propagate reachability information to neighboring ASes in order to avoid these
flows. The protocol used to exchange reachability information is BGP, which we explain in the
next section. Afterwards, we describe the technical aspects of inter-domain traffic control in
Section 2.3.
2.2. Introduction to BGP
BGP is used by an AS to inform neighboring ASes of the prefixes that can be reachable
through it, and the characteristics of the path towards those prefixes. The characteristics of the
path are denominated path attributes, and include information such as the sequence of ASes on
the way to the origin, the preference of the local AS for each path (Local-preference), or the
preference of the external AS to specific links (MED). BGP defines the best path algorithm, in
which routers select the best routes from the ones available, based on their path attributes (Figure
2.3). The BGP version 4 is the base specification that an Internet router implementing BGP
should support, which is specified in the RFC 4271 [153]1. This section provides an overview of
this version of the protocol. We divide the explanation in two different parts:
BGP Sessions. BGP speakers connect with each other using BGP sessions, in order
to exchange paths towards destinations, encoded as Network Layer Reachability Informa-
tion (NLRI). BGP does not only convey routing information among Autonomous System
(eBGP). The protocol is also used to exchange paths within Autonomous Systems (iBGP).
We provide details on how BGP sessions are formed between peers, as well as the differ-
ences between eBGP and iBGP, in Section 2.2.1.
1RFCs 6286, 6608, and 6793 update the specifications of RFC 4271 and are thus also considered part of the base
version of the protocol
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Figure 2.1: BGP Finite State Machine. [153] describes each state and the conditions for transition
between states.
BGP Policy and Decision Process. Each BGP speaker selects the best path for each
destination, among the set of received paths through what is called the BGP decision pro-
cess. This process uses the information included in BGP paths, referred to as BGP Path
Attributes, to compare the known paths to the same NLRI. Since any BGP speaker can
modify path attributes upon processing, ASes can inﬂuence the selection process to im-
plement their policies, in order, for instance, to prefer settlement-free routes from those of
transit providers. Such aspects of BGP are presented in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.1. BGP sessions
The BGP session between two peers is maintained over a TCP connection through which the
peers exchange routing information, using different types of messages [16] [48]. The rules that
govern the behavior of BGP speakers are described by the Finite State Machine (FSM) of the
BGP standard (Figure 2.1) [153]. The BGP FSM deﬁnes six session states and the events that
trigger state changes. The original BGP FSM was designed to be simple and did not differentiate
disruptive events (e.g. node failure) from events that only partially interrupt the connection (e.g.
a planned node restart). With the years, new features have been introduced into BGP sessions to
preserve availability in cases where a less radical session recovery procedure can be applied. [26].
BGP deﬁnes different behaviors for external or internal BGP peers; these are refereed to as
eBGP and iBGP respectively. While eBGP can be considered as the mechanism to exchange
paths among ASes, iBGP is used to distribute external paths among the routers of an AS.
BGP deﬁnes several path propagation rules for iBGP sessions, such as the constraint of only
announcing to iBGP peers routes received from eBGP peers. This rule would require the estab-
lishment of a full mesh of BGP sessions for path dissemination. As this approach can create
scalability and operational issues in large networks, operators typically base the iBGP topology
on route reﬂection [15] [142]. Route reﬂectors help controlling scalability in terms of number of
BGP sessions to be maintained by each speaker. A route reﬂector is a BGP router that relays paths
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Figure 2.2: BGP RIBs.
received from iBGP peers to other iBGP peers. The set of routers to which the route reﬂector can
announce iBGP routes are their clients. Operators can conﬁgure different route reﬂectors in their
network and connect them using a full iBGP mesh or other route reﬂectors. [15] describes the
rules governing the behavior of route reﬂectors.
Route reﬂectors are key components in today’s iBGP networks. However, the inclusion of
route reﬂectors in a network can reduce route diversity and lead to slow convergence in some
situations [130] [95]. These problems arise from the fact that route reﬂectors must still obey the
rule of only propagating a single best route for a given NLRI. The knowledge of multiple paths
for each destination, at each node of the network, is critical for BGP high availability, as it can
reduce convergence after failures for multiple seconds [177] [76].
2.2.2. BGP Policy and decision process
Each BGP router processes path updates received from neighboring BGP peers. Speciﬁcally,
the router must decide whether paths should be ﬁltered out on reception or its attributes modiﬁed;
which paths should be selected as best and installed in the routing table; and which paths should
be announced to other BGP peers. BGP deﬁnes three different conceptual types of Routing In-
formation Base (RIB) that model this process inside a router. An illustration of the RIBs and
their relationships is provided in Figure 2.2. Note that this description of the RIBs and their rela-
tionship are abstract concepts that model the management of routes in a BGP router. The actual
implementation of the RIBs and their operation in a system depends on the router manufacturer.
1. Adj-RIBs-In. A BGP speaker maintains the routes received from its BGP peers in the
Adj-RIBs-In and applies the locally conﬁgured policy to them. The policies applied to the
received paths aim at rejecting incoming routes or modifying their attributes in order to
tweak the selection of the best-path, according to the needs of the ISP. For example, paths
received from customers tend to be preferred over paths received from transit providers [93]
[83]. This policy is reﬂected by setting the local preference attribute of customer paths to a
higher value than what is set for provider paths.
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BGP best-path selection algorithm
1. Prefer path with highest Local preference.
2. Prefer path originated by local router.
3. Prefer path with shorter AS-path length.
4. Prefer path with lowest origin code.
5. Prefer path with lower MED (Only done if neighboring AS is the same)
6. Prefer EBGP to IBGP.
7. Prefer path with closest next-hop.
8. Prefer oldest path, if EBGP.
9. Prefer path in which the Router ID of NH is lowest.
Figure 2.3: BGP Algorithm [153].
2. Loc-RIB. After applying the policies, the BGP speaker selects the set of best paths using
the best path selection algorithm (Figure 2.3) and stores them in the Loc-RIB. A router
processes the Loc-RIB, together with other routes available to the router, to select its best
path for each destination NLRI, and ultimately store them in the router’s main RIB. The
RIB is then further translated into a Forwarding Information Base (FIB) that is used by
the router to forward packets. Note that as routes from other routing protocols might be
preferred over BGP routes, not all routes in the Loc-RIB find their way into the FIB.
3. Adj-RIBs-Out. Finally, the router maintains RIBs aimed at tracking which paths were
announced over which BGP session. These RIBs are denominated Adj-RIBs-Out and are
populated after applying the policies to the routes present in the Loc-RIB. BGP outbound
policies are necessary, as not all paths are to be propagated to neighboring ASes. For
example, a path from a settlement-free peer should not be propagated to transit providers,
since this will generate connectivity costs that would not provide any benefit for the ISP.
2.3. Inter-domain Traffic Engineering
One of the tasks of network operators is to control how inter-domain traffic flows through
their network. This process is normally refereed to as traffic engineering. Networks are usually
connected through a large number of links, each with different characteristics in terms of cost,
capacity, or latency. In such environment, traffic engineering not only implies the management of
link congestion, but also the reduction of expenses and the control of network performance. The
distributed nature of the Internet makes it difficult for operators to perform traffic engineering
on inter-domain traffic, since operators do not have complete control and knowledge over the
policies of external networks. Moreover, the continuous stream of events affecting inter-domain
traffic, such as network failures, traffic demand fluctuations, or new commercial agreements,
forces operators to continually adjust their routing configurations to fit their policies.
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Operators need to control outbound and inbound inter-domain traffic, both of them requiring
different strategies. For outbound traffic, operators have certain control on the preference among
the paths that they receive from external networks, even if these change in time. For inbound traf-
fic, operators can only try to influence the decisions of external networks, thus driving operators
to implement trial-and-error strategies: operators implement different techniques until finding one
which fulfills their objective. We briefly expand on the techniques used for each type of traffic
engineering.
Outbound Traffic engineering consists in selecting the paths that internal routers should use
to forward traffic to external destinations. This is normally achieved by tweaking the attributes
of the incoming paths to give priority to the ones they prefer. Operators can, for instance, change
the local preference to achieve their goal [176] [90]. Some operators also use MED tweaking for
this purpose, although it was initially designed for inbound TE. Other strategies rely on special
communities to achieve more granular control [181].
With Inbound Traffic engineering, operators try to influence the routing decision of external
ASes, in order to control where traffic for certain destination enters the network.Initially, oper-
ators should prevent incoming traffic that they are not willing to transport to other neighboring
ASes, which normally means avoiding the existence of traffic flows between non-customer ASes.
This is performed by not announcing (filtering) the prefixes of non-customer ASes to other non-
customer ASes. The use of BGP communities to mark routes as non-customers and customer
can be very useful to automatically implement this policy [60]. In addition, operator should con-
trol the amount of traffic arriving at ingress links, in order to avoid saturation. This objective is
challenging. Since each AS selects its preferred path based on its private policy, it is difficult to
estimate how each AS would react to changes. Therefore, ingress traffic engineering is a trial-and-
error process [150]. Operators usually use AS-prepending or prefix deaggregation to influence the
path selection of others AS [87] [70] [150]. Operators can also try to use MED tuning or append
pre-arranged communities to influence the decision of adjacent ASes [151].
The control of the inter-domain traffic is only one of the tasks that operators must fulfill to
manage their networks. The distribution of outbound and inbound inter-domain traffic depends
not only on the policy of the operators, but also on the policy of external ASes. Networks operators
must also be able to analyze external policies, detect when they are conflicting to their own, and
make decisions on what to do if this occurs. In addition, operators must manage their network
infrastructure and peering connections. In this thesis, we denominate as traffic engineering the
process of controlling traffic in an existent network infrastructure. Complementary, we refer to
as traffic management the overall process of controlling traffic, governing network infrastructure,
and handling the policies of external peers.
2.4 Internet Exchange Points and Internet flattening 15
2.4. Internet Exchange Points and Internet flattening
ASes benefit from establishing settlement-free relations because it reduces the traffic load of
transit providers and can increase connectivity performance. Nevertheless, the cost of establishing
direct peering links is non-negligible. Namely, each peering session can represent to the operator
a high installation costs (including new router or switches) and considerable monthly costs (col-
location in a common PoP, back-haul, operation, etc.). Normally, these high costs would prevent
network to establish more than a handful of settlement-free peering sessions.
IXPs are facilities that provide ASes with the infrastructure required to establish intercon-
nection agreements with multiple networks. IXPs offer ASes the opportunity to use the same
back-haul, equipment, and operation personnel to support more than one interconnection, thus
reducing the overall cost per individual peering.
Technically, an IXP offers a layer-2 domain that members use to establish BGP sessions and
exchange traffic. An IXP can be implemented in different ways, from the installation of a few
simple switches to more elaborated architectures that can include resiliency mechanism supported
by recent technologies such as Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), TRILL [63] or SDN [12].
By supporting communication and negotiation among ASes in many regions, IXPs have also
become key players in the social and governmental aspects of the Internet ecosystem.
Partly due to the lower costs, peering has spread widely, with the IXPs growing into major
hubs for Internet traffic. Since peering relationships bypass layer-3 transit providers, they have
created a “flatter” Internet, at least on layer 3. Internet flattening refers to a reduction in the
number of intermediary organizations on Internet paths [25, 57, 88]. For example, the Internet
becomes flatter when a major content provider expands its own network to bypass transit providers
and connect directly with eyeball networks, which primarily serve residential users.
There are more than 200 IXPs around the world [9]. IXPs can span one or multiple Point
of Presence (PoP), all covered by the same layer-2 switching fabric. For instance, AMS-IX has
collocation points in more than 10 sites in the Amsterdam area. In general, IXPs are different
depending on their size, member composition. We examine various characteristics of IXPs in
Chapters 3 and 4.
The large number of potential peers at some IXP can cause scalability problems with the
respect to the number of BGP sessions on members’ routers. Some IXPs offer route servers
[104], which were designed to help network operators reduce the difficulties associated with
maintaining a large number of sessions. Every route server client can receive paths from multiple
ASes using a single eBGP session with the route server (similar to a route reflector for eBGP
sessions). Note that in some cases, usually when there are many members in the IXP, multiple
clients might announce a path to the same NLRI. Path diversity is an advantage for IXPs, as
members can choose the path that better suits their policy. However, as a normal eBGP speaker,
route servers can only advertise a single path per NLRI to each client. This limitation causes the
route server to potentially hide paths that would be useful to their clients.
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Chapter 3
Overview of IXP characteristics
Establishing settlement-free peering sessions provides network managers with a way to lower
transit cost and increase network resiliency [66]. IXPs membership is a cost-effective option to
reach multiple ASes and, thus, IXPs have become key players in the modern Internet environment.
Currently, there are more than 200 IXPs around the world. This chapter provides an overview of
the IXP landscape, by comparing characteristics of different IXPs. We start in Section 3.1 by
characterizing the size and evolution of several IXPs in terms of membership and traffic. Next,
in Section 3.2, we measure and analyze the overlap across different IXPs based on their members
and inter-domain routing data.For operators, the overlapping across different IXPs plays a role in
technical and economic levels, which we will continue examining in Chapters 5 and 7. We then
discuss the common effects of human behavior on IXP traffic, and analyze the effect of weather
on daily and yearly traffic trends.
3.1. Comparing number of members and maximum traffic
In this section, we make a basic comparison of the number of members and total traffic of
several IXPs across the world. This study will provide an overview of the different types of IXPs
and their evolution over the last years. To gather the data, we combined information from Euro-
IX, and the official websites of each of the IXPs. In order to obtain the data of previous years,
we use the WayBackMachine [7], a project dedicated to storing the history of Internet websites.
Table 3.1 lists the IXPs included in this analysis, together with some of their characteristics.
Figure 3.1 compares the maximum traffic and number of members for the analyzed IXPs.
In the top-right corner of this figure, we find the three largest European IXPs: LINX, AMS-IX,
and DE-CIX. These three IXPs could be considered pioneers in many different aspects of IXP
management. In fact, they are not only similar in terms of traffic and number of members, but
also in governmental and marketing strategies [92]. The top left case is PTT, the largest IXP in
South America. Although PTT is similar in membership size to the three top European IXPs, their
level of traffic is still under 1Tbps. At the time of this writing, PTT is still growing at a dramatic
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IXP acronym IXP name
Location Number Peak
City Country
of traffic
members (Gbps)
AMS-IX Amsterdam Internet Exchange Amsterdam Netherlands 722 3283
BCIX Berlin Commercial Internet Exchange e.V. Berlin Germany 60 74
BIX Budapest Internet eXchange Budapest Hungary 49 199
BIX.BG Bulgarian Internet eXchange Sofia Bulgaria 60 109
BNIX Belgian National Internet Exchange Brussels Belgium 45 109
DE-CIX German Commercial Internet Exchange Frankfurt Germany 626 3980
DIX Danish Internet eXchange point Lyngby Denmark 44 44
FRANCE-IX France-IX Paris France 255 414
GR-IX Greek Internet Exchange Athens Greece 18 23
INEX Internet Neutral Exchange Association Dublin Ireland 74 89
INTERLAN InterLAN - Internet Exchange Bucharest Romania 55 51
JPIX Japan Internet Exchange Tokyo Japan 136 317
JPNAP Japan Network Access Point Tokyo Japan 93 428
LINX London Internet Exchange London UK 638 2489
LONAP London Network Access Point London UK 152 114
LU-CIX Luxembourg Commercial Internet Exchange Luxembourg Luxembourg 53 0
MIX-IT Milan Internet Exchange Milan Italy 155 208
MSK-IX Moscow Internet eXchange Moscow Russia 377 1446
NAMEX Nautilus Mediterranean eXchange Point Rome Italy 54 24
NAPAFRICA NAPAfrica Johannesburg South Africa 115 23
NETNOD Netnod Internet Exchange Stockholm Sweden 119 892
NIX Norwegian Internet eXchange Oslo Norway 68 74
NIX.CZ Neutral Internet eXchange of the Czech Republic Prague Czech Republic 128 304
NIXI National Internet Exchange of India Delhi India 38 39
NL-IX Neutral Internet Exchange The Hague Netherlands 332 991
PLIX Polish Internet Exchange Warsaw Poland 204 433
PTT PTTMetro Sao Paolo Sao Paolo Brazil 637 888
RIX Reykjavik Internet Exchange Reykjavik Iceland 19 9
SIX Slovenian Internet Exchange Ljubljana Slovenia 20 39
SIX-SK The Slovak Internet eXchange Bratislava Slovakia 53 53
SWISSIX Swiss Internet Exchange Zurich Switzerland 161 63
TOP-IX Torino Piemonte Internet Exchange Turin Italy 79 34
TORIX Toronto Internet Exchange Toronto Canada 186 121
VIX Vienna Internet Exchange Vienna Austria 121 228
Table 3.1: Properties of several IXPs in June 2015
pace, as we will show next. MSK-IX, the largest Russian IXP, and NL-IX, another large IXP
from Netherlands, populate the middle part of the figure. The rest of IXPs are mostly conformed
by regional IXPs that serve individual countries, or larger domains.
Let us now look into the progression of member count and traffic for the IXPs. These are
depicted, for some of the largest IXPs, in Figure 3.2. The growth of the last three years (2012-
2015) for both characteristics is depicted for all IXPs in Figure 3.3. In the latter figure, we observe
how the three top IXPs show a similar and consistent growth in the last years both in terms of
member count and traffic. Namely, they increased close to 50% and 100% for member count and
traffic size, respectively, in the last 3 years (from 2012 to 2015). PTT highlights as the IXP with
the largest growth over this period. The member count growth of France-IX is also high among
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Figure 3.1: Maximum traffic versus number of members for the analyzed IXPs.
Figure 3.2: Evolution of maximum traffic and number of members for some of the large IXPs.
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Figure 3.3: Maximum traffic growth versus number of members growth for the analyzed IXPs.
the studied IXPs. Several IXPs, including MS-IX, seem to be stagnating in terms of membership
size, although their traffic growth has been steady.
The next two sections take a deeper look at common points across the IXPs for both member
composition and traffic. First, in Section 3.2 we delve into the membership overlapping among
IXPs, in terms of common members and IP prefix covering. Afterwards, in Section 3.3, we
examine the common influence of human behavior in the traffic profile of IXPs, and, specifically,
the effects of weather in daily and yearly time scales.
3.2. Overlapping among IXPs
The member composition of an IXP influences its potential to attract new members [136].
Since joining an IXP requires a non-negligible cost for a company, operators need to evaluate the
benefits that this will provide to their network. Estimating the potential peers at the new IXP,
and with them, the traffic the network would offload from the transit providers, is one direct way
of quantifying the benefits. A more complicated situation arises when the interested company
already peers with many of the ASes present at the IXP. Although there are technical advantages
of peering with the same networks at multiple points, they are not as easily quantifiable and,
therefore, networks might feel discourage to join a new IXP composed by many members with
which they already peer.
The objective of this section is to provide a basic characterization of membership overlapping,
and their effects, among our studied IXPs. We first look at this dimension using the number of
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Figure 3.4: Unique members vs total number of members for the analyzed IXPs.
unique ASes of each IXP. We then perform a more detailed study of overlapping analysis using
BGP information (control-plane).
3.2.1. Number of unique members
We start the analysis of member overlapping by looking at the number of ASes that are only
present at each particular IXPs.
Figure 3.4 compares the amount of unique ASes (relative to the total) against the total number
of members. This graph helps us find characteristics of the IXPs, which where not feasible to
obtain using the figures of the previous section. Hereafter, we analyze this figure, and provide
some observations that might explain the location of each IXP therein.
Figure 3.4 locates LINX, DE-CIX and AMS-IX in a similar region of the figure since 20%
of their members peer exclusively there. MSK-IK and PTT are the main IXPs of a large, and
relatively disconnected region, which can explain their position at the upper-right part of the
figure. NL-IX is an interesting case. Its size and unique member composition places it close to
MSK-IX and PTT, yet, this IXP is in a well connected geographical area (Netherlands) and close
to AMS-IX. The left side of the figure (less than 200 members) contains the rest of the IXPs.
Torix (Toronto) and NapAfrica (South Africa) serve similar regions than MSK-IX and PTT, but
they still show a relative small size compared to the latter. One wonders whether there is still
growth potential for these IXPs, although we might need more information on other IXPs of their
regions, or even the social / political behavior of the companies operating on them, to understand
the reason for this (for an example, please refer to [65]). The other IXPs in the upper-left side
of the Figure (SwissIX, BIX, GR-IX, INEX, etc.) are IXPs serving smaller regions. We take a
24 Overview of IXP characteristics
detailed look at the characterization and evolution of one these IXPs, the Slovakian IX (SIX.SK),
in Chapter 4. Finally, France-IX, NETNOD, LONAP, and LU-CIX stand out at the bottom left
part of the figure. These IXPs could be located in regions in which companies can easily reach
other IXPs, but still provide a valuable service. That is, they might not be the top of choice for
companies only peering at single exchange, but they might be appropriate for companies that want
to have back-up connectivity (e.g. LONAP at London), or want to exchange traffic locally (e.g.
exchange the traffic in Paris, instead of Amsterdam).
3.2.2. Inter-domain routing reachability
Studying the unique ASes and common member base of IXPs provides information that can
help us characterize IXPs in social or governmental dimensions. Nevertheless, the amount of
unique networks does not offer an exact estimate of the technical benefits of joining a new IXP,
since they do not directly reflect the traffic offload potential. In this Section, we study the member
overlapping from the control-plane perspective, that is, based on the IP prefix reachability of each
of the members of the IXPs.
Analyzing the control plane overlapping among IXPs is not a trivial task due to the large
number of variables involved. First, it is unrealistic to only perform an analysis based on all
members of each IXP. Many members have restrictive peering policies (e.g. Tier-1s) and, would
never peer with small networks (in other words, for many companies, joining IXPs with many
restrictive members is not beneficial). Therefore, a complete analysis would require the inclusion
of the peering policy of the members. In addition, we would like to not restrict the analysis to
pairs of IXPs (AMS-IX with LINX; SIX-SK with NETNOD, etc.), but a methodology that covers
all IXPs.
In order to provide a short, but insightful analysis of control-plane overlapping comparison,
we follow an approach similar to those of a company making decisions on IXP expansion: (I) We
calculate the set of new hosts (/32 addresses) reachable through each individual IXP. (II) We then
choose the IXP that provides the maximum number of new hosts. (III) We repeat the process until
all IXPs are selected. At iteration N of the algorithm, we will get an approximation of the control
plane covering obtained by joining N IXPs. We note that this greedy algorithm might yield sub-
optimal results, however, it is much simpler to implement than an optimal one that would look for
the N IXPs that maximize the covering IP space [119].
We repeat the experiment assuming that the company can only peer with members with four
different types of peering policy, which we describe next. (1) all IXP members excluding Tier-1s.
(2) members with polices publicly declared at the site Peeringdb [145] as open or selective. (3)
Top ten members (in terms of number of hosts) with open and selective policies. (4) Members
with open policy. We include for this study all IXPs described in the Euro-IX website on June
2014 [8]. We use the Prefix to AS mappings [23] and customer-cone data [24] from CAIDA to
perform the analysis.
The results of this experiment are illustrated in Figure 3.5. The X-axis of the graph represents
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Figure 3.5: Generalized additional value of reaching an extra IXP.
Policy First iteration Second iteration Third iteration
Open AMS-IX Terremark DEC-IX
Top 10 open and selective AMS-IX Terremark CoreSite Any2
Open and selective LINX JNAP Terremark
All except Tier-1 Terremark JNAP CoreSite Any2
Table 3.2: IXPs corresponding to the first three iterations of control-plane offloading for different
peering policies.
each iteration of the process. The Y-axis represents the amount of remaining reachable hosts after
each iteration. Note that the IXP order depends on the type of policy selected. Table 3.2 includes
the first 3 IXPs for all types of policies.
We observe that after the first iteration, the amount of new hosts quickly becomes marginal
(around 5% additional covered hosts in the best case). In summary, we can see how member
overlapping reduces the benefits in terms of new covered hosts after peering at one large IXP.
If joining a large IXP already covers most of the hosts that can be reached, why should a
company join new ones? Peering at various IXPs delivers other types of benefit such as better
resiliency in case the first one fails, or reducing of the internal network transport (bit-mile cost
[148]). The problem is that joining each new IXP can be expensive. In Chapter 5 we analyze
remote peering, a simple technique that can be used by operators to peer in various IXPs and
reduce infrastructure / operational costs.
Remark 1. Note that the number of hosts is an inaccurate way of measuring the benefits of
enrolling at an IXP. To calculate the real advantages (in terms of offload traffic), the egress traffic
demand of the company is needed. The control-plane study, however, is globally valid, as it does
not require the use of data from any company. In Chapter 7, we perform a specific peering analysis
using data from the Spanish Network RedIRIS.
Remark 2. This study assumes that ASes announce all prefixes at each IXP where they peer.
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This is not always the case. In Chapter 8, we examine the methods that allow an IXP to assess
whether other companies are announcing all prefixes that they are expected to announce at each
BGP session.
3.3. Short and long term trends in IXP traffic: A weather impact
study
In Section 3.1, we compared the different IXPs in terms of the maximum total traffic, and
their growth over various years. In this section, we examine IXP traffic at more granular time
levels, by looking at the dynamics of this traffic over months or days.
Figure 3.6 contains the daily and yearly traffic for four different IXPs. These graphs allow us
to observe shared characteristics of traffic among them. Concerning daily traffic (left column),
we can see the periodic behavior related to a residential demand cycle, resembling those of the
same type for utilities such as energy [143] [120] or mobile data consumption [110] [32]. The
daily profiles for MIX, PTT, and SIX-SK also show the peaks related to the demand profile of
commercial entities (i.e. two peaks around 11am and 5pm) [110]. In the yearly traffic (right
column), we also observe common effects. All four IXPs show a drop of traffic around the end
of the year. In addition, AMS-IX, MIX-IT and, in less effect, SIX-SK, show a smoother drop of
traffic in the middle part of the year. One could argue that these drops correspond to new years
holidays and the summer period on those countries, respectively. These daily and yearly patterns
are common among many IXPs, which arguments that Internet traffic (at least on IXPs) is human
driven1.
As shown in the above figures, external factors affecting human behavior can have an impact
on IXP traffic, yet, their effect has been overlooked. Previous studies have extensively leveraged
the periodic behavior of Internet traffic for the analysis, modeling and forecasting of Internet
traffic [141] [30, 41], but have not modeled the dependence of traffic with external factors, which
are typically accounted as noise [45, 134, 141]. Curious about this effect, in this section we
measure the direct impact in IXP traffic of one of the most important external factors affecting
human behavior: the weather. While it has been known that the weather has a significant impact
on the demand of utilities [73] or TV ratings [156], their relationship with the Internet traffic
demand is not well understood. Next, we show that, in monthly periods, the traffic of IXPs has
variations correlated to the temperature of the regions they are located. Also, we show the short-
term effects caused by precipitation in three different regional IXPs. In these three IXPs, the
effects of precipitation were similar, peaking at summer months and in the period between 16h
and 18h. Our work complements other empirical approaches that have analyzed the effects of
other external events, such as sport events [2], to Internet traffic.
We take a empirical approach to study the effects of weather on IXP traffic, and compare its
1Some reports, like [192], claim that a large percentage of Internet traffic comes from bots. If this were the case,
one would expect a much lower effect of human related activities on the overall traffic of IXPs.
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(a) AMS-IX daily (b) AMS-IX yearly
(c) SIX-SK daily (d) SIX-SK yearly
(e) PTT daily (f) PTT yearly
(g) MIX-IT daily (h) MIX-IT yearly
Figure 3.6: Weekly and yearly trafﬁc for four IXPs.
inﬂuence among the different IXPs [33]. We obtain granular data for IXP trafﬁc and the weather
at the geographical domains they cover, and study short-term and long-term effects. Short-term
weather events, like thunderstorms, snow or heavy wind, impact the accessibility/importance of
the Internet access, and have direct, short-term, effect on the trafﬁc demand. Longer-term effects
reﬂected through seasonal changes in temperature and daylight duration, have slower and not so
direct and immediate inﬂuence on the way the Internet trafﬁc is generated.
Short-term effects. An example of a short-time effect is rainfall or other form of precipita-
tion, typically lasting less than a few hours. We ﬁnd that the precipitation periods have a tendency
of increased trafﬁc demand. However, this tendency is dependent on the time of the day and is
most noticeable in the late afternoon, when precipitation tends to increase the trafﬁc demand for
around 6%.
Long-term effects. The periodicity due to end-user temporal cycles is a widely known prop-
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erty of the Internet traffic demand. While the daily and weekly periodicity have been studied
extensively [45, 134, 141], and applied in various domains from bulk-traffic transfer schedul-
ing [113] to energy management [45], the seasonal variability over 12-month periods is not well
understood. this is partly because the Internet traffic demand has been dominated by exponential
growth, on top of which seasonal changes may be hard to observe and quantify. Using six IXPs as
vantage points, geographically spread across the globe, allows us to study the season-dependent
traffic variability in various climates. Our data suggests that seasonal traffic variability is strongly
tied with temperature variability over the year: the regions far from the equator exhibiting strong
seasonal traffic variation while the regions close to the equator show no such seasonal traffic
changes.
3.3.1. Datasets description
To understand the interaction between the traffic demand and weather conditions we collect
and use a number of datasets, which we describe below.
3.3.1.1. Traffic data
We use the traffic from several IXPs to perform our analysis. IXP traffic could be influenced
by the weather, due to their tendency of transporting regional traffic [169] [9]. Many IXPs publish
the traffic data aggregated across all members. We use this information for our analysis in short
and long terms.
To analyze the short-term weather impact on IXP traffic, we have to focus on IXPs with
a limited geographical area. A large IXP can carry traffic from a larger regional footprint and
should, therefore, be avoided because it is difficult for the weather to be consistent over large
geographies. Instead, for this purpose, we use the data from three, relatively small, regional IXPs:
the Slovak-IX, FICIX and INEX. We obtained 5-minute granular traffic from each IXP by storing
and processing their publicly available mrtg images textsfmrtg/rrdtool. Our Internet traffic dataset
includes 8 months of data from INEX and 18 months of data from Slovak-IX and FICIX. FICIX
was not included in the analysis of previous sections, due to the lack of historical data for more
than 3 years. FICIX, however, provided the APIs to easily the traffic data automatically at low
granularity levels, thus making it suitable for the weather study.
Concerning long-term effects, we need traffic demand trends over larger time intervals (12
months or more). We argue that the traffic over time scale is correlated with seasonal changes. We
use the yearly graphs of mrtg output from several IXPs around the world: the largest European
(AMS-IX), Northern American (TORIX), Southern American (PTT), Australian (WAIX), and
Indian (NIXI) IXP that report their traffic information publicly. In addition to those 5 IXPs, we
also utilize one medium sized IXP from central Europe, Slovak-IX (SIX). We did not include
WAIX in our previous example due to its lack of historical data, but, in this section, it allows us
to show the influence of the long-term trend in that part of the world.
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IXP name City Duration (months) Granularity Peak traffic # of ISPs
AMS-IX Amsterdam 16 24h 1.4Tbps 463
TORIX Toronto 13 24h 70Gbps 144
PTT Sao Paolo 13 24h 60Gbps 243
WAIX Perth 13 24h 2Gbps 64
NIXI Mumbai 13 24h 8Gbps 31
SIX-SK Bratislava 24 24h 40Gbps 52
SIX-SK Bratislava 18 5min 54Gbps 52
FICIX Helsinki 18 5min 35Gbps 28
INEX Dublin 8 5min 31Gbps 56
Table 3.3: The traffic datasets and details of corresponding IXPs. The data was collected in 2012,
corresponding traffic levels of that year.
Table 3.3 contains the details about the entire traffic dataset (duration, granularity) and the
IXPs: the peak traffic, the number of ISPs participating at the IXP and the annual growth rate
(AGR)2.
3.3.1.2. Weather data
There are several online sources of free historical weather datasets. Since they report quan-
tities that are easily measurable, they are very similar between each other. Some inconsistencies
may exist between different datasets, but they are typically very small (e.g. the measurement
point at the city center and the airport are likely to have slightly different weather conditions.).
In this section, we use the weather data provided by the Weather Underground, easily accessible
database available at http://www.wunderground.com/.
We queried the database for the cities that host the IXPs listed in Table 3.3, for the period
that covers our traffic data. The arguments for a single query are the location and day. The
output is a table that specifies the weather conditions in the given location and on the given
day with the granularity of 30 minutes; i.e. every 30 minutes weather parameters are reported.
The wunderground.com publishes a number of weather parameters including temperature,
dew point, humidity, pressure, and precipitation. Granularity of 30 minutes allows fine analysis
of the relationship between the weather and traffic, though some very short events such as hail or
short storms, may be missed in the 30-minute sampling.
3.3.2. Short-term effects: Traffic vs. precipitation
We start the analysis by examining the dependence between the traffic demand and the pre-
cipitation. For that purpose we use the fine grain traffic data described in Section 3.3.1. Such data
allows us to notice changes that happen on short-time scales (hourly) and compare them against
the weather conditions. As we explain above, we focus on precipitation as the parameter that is
most likely to affect the instantaneous human behavior towards the Internet usage.
2AGR is defined as the ratio between the traffic in the same month(s) in 2011 and 2010; see Eq (3.1).
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Figure 3.7: Normalized daily SIX demand with and without precipitation.
For that purpose we split the time into 2-hour time-slots. For the ISP A, uA(t) and dA(t)
denote the average upstream and downstream traffic (in Mbps) at time slot t. With
u(t) = d(t) =
∑
for all members A of SIX
uA(t)
We will denote the aggregate traffic exchanged at the IXP with u(t). Finally, in order to
smooth-out the seasonal effects (e.g. Yearly graphs can show that March traffic is higher than the
July traffic; see Section 3.3.3 for more details) we normalize u(t) with the average traffic over a
two week period centered at t:
u¯(t) =
u(t)
average(u(t− 84), . . . , u(t+ 84)) .
For each time-slot t there are 4 weather reports (sometimes more than 4, depending on report-
ing system configuration) in our weather dataset, and we set a binary variable wetα(t) to be 1 if
the fraction of the weather reports from time slot t that report precipitation (snow, shower, rain,
storm...) is not smaller than α, otherwise wetα(t) = 0, where α ∈ (0, 1] is a parameter. In other
words if the fraction of the time it precipitates during the time slot is greater than or equal to α,
we declare that the time slot to be wet, otherwise we declare it non-wet. We use α = 0.15 unless
we specify a different value, thus announcing a slot ‘wet’ if it receives precipitation for at least
15% of the time. Furthermore, we also declare a slot to be wet if any of the two preceding time
slots presented an alpha of at least 15%.
Our goal is to observe whether time series wetα(t) and u¯(t) are correlated. To that end, we
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Figure 3.8: The relative change with precipitation during the 16h− 18h slot over the year.
split the day in twelve 2-hour intervals, and calculate average normalized traffic with and without
precipitation for each of the twelve intervals:
A(i) =
∑
mod (s,12)=i
u¯(s)wetα(s)∑
mod (s,12)=i
wetα(s)
i = 0..11
B(i) =
∑
mod (s,12)=i
u¯(s)(1− wetα(s))∑
mod (s,12)=i
(1− wetα(s)) i = 0..11
thus for the twelve time intervals 0h− 2h, 2h− 4h, . . . , 22h− 24h, A(i) and B(i) represent the
average normalized load in the interval [2ih, (2i + 2)h] with and without precipitation, respec-
tively.
In Figure 3.7(top) we depict the values of A(i) and B(i) together with the relative difference
between B(i) and A(i) for the three IXPs. To determine if the difference between A(i) and B(i)
is statistically significant to claim that the means of the samples with and without precipitation are
different, we use Welch’s t-test [188], which is well-suited for this case as the number of samples
for each random variable is different and relatively large3. Figure 3.7(bottom) also includes the
interval outside of which Welch’s t-test rejects the null-hypothesis for a significance level of
0.05. Thus from early afternoon to early evening, with 95% of confidence we can affirm for
all IXPs that the mean normalized traffic is larger in timeslots with precipitation than in timeslots
without precipitation. For the other periods of the day (except for a couple of time period in the
early morning), the difference between the means is not statistically significant to support that
precipitation impacts the traffic.
Finally, we observe that the impact of precipitation is not uniform across the year. Namely,
in Figure 3.8 we depict the relative increment of precipitation during the 16h − 18h interval for
the 6 two-month periods and observe that the impact of precipitation is most pronounced in the
3In all cases the number of samples obtained is larger than 40.
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Figure 3.9: The real and inflation adjusted demand at TORIX (top). Average daily temperature at
Toronto (bottom).
summer months, while it is insignificant over the winter.
3.3.3. Long-term effects: Demand vs. temperature
Yearly seasonality of the Internet traffic has been poorly understood phenomenon for a num-
ber of reasons. Firstly, the data on the traffic over long-time periods is rarely available. Secondly,
since the early days of the commercial Internet, the traffic dynamics have been dominated by an
exponential growth, which makes the characterization of the seasonal effects challenging. Finally,
seasonal effects may not be present at all in some geographical regions.
In this section, we examine the (yearly) seasonality trends of IXP traffic for several geograph-
ically diverse set of IXPs. The data used here covers 6 regions, from 5 continents and is described
in detail in Section 3.3.1.1. The traffic demand datasets we collected cover over 1 year time span,
which is a minimal duration for inferring basic characteristics of the yearly seasonality.
To extract the seasonal effects from the exponential growth of the traffic demand, we utilize
the following procedure. For the traffic time series covering a time period of 365+∆ days4, we
calculate the annual growth rate (AGR) as the ratio between the traffic in the last ∆ and the first
∆ days:
AGR =
total traffic in days 366 to 365 + ∆
total traffic in days 1 to ∆
. (3.1)
. Then, we calculate the inflation adjusted demand (IAD) at day t as:
4In different datasets, the number of days on top of a full year, ∆, varies from 30 to 180 days, see Table 3.3.
3.3 Short and long term trends in IXP traffic: A weather impact study 33
10 20 30
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Perth − Australia
 
 
10 20 30
5
10
15
20
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Sao Paolo
 
 
22 24 26 28 30 32
1
2
3
4
5
6
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Mumbai − India
 
 
−20 0 20
14
16
18
20
22
24
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Slovakia
 
 
−20 0 20
15
20
25
30
35
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Toronto
 
 
−10 0 10 20 30
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
IA
D
 (G
pb
s)
temperature (C)
Amsterdam
 
 
corr = −0.75 corr = −0.83 corr = −0.73
corr = 0.08corr = −0.15corr = 0.05
Figure 3.10: Correlation between the average daily temperature and the inflation adjusted demand
(IAD).
IAD(t) =
D(t)
AGR
t
365
,
where D(t) is the average demand (in Mbps) at day t. Intuitively, the inflation adjusted demand,
filters out the exponential growth of the Internet demand and allows us to focus on seasonal
effects.
To illustrate the inflation adjustment operation we depict both the real and the inflation ad-
justed demand for the TORIX in Figure 3.9. We can see that the traffic demand, after inflation
adjustment, appears to follow a sin-wave pattern that is out-of-phase with the average daily tem-
perature observed in Toronto.
To visualize the correlation between the time series of average daily inflation adjusted demand
IAD(t) and the average daily temperature Y (t), we use the scatter graphs in Figure 3.10. There
we depict the scatter graphs for six IXPs listed in Table 3.3. One can observe that the IXPs located
close to the equator (WAIX, PTT.br, NIXI) show no visually obvious dependence between the
IAD and the temperature, while the dependence between the IAD and the temperature is visually
observable from the Figure 3.10 for those IXPs that lie in the regions with large temperature
variation. In order to quantify the correlation between IAD(·) and Y (·) we also calculate the
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Pearson correlation coefficient:
corr =
∑N
t=1(Y (t)− Y¯ )(IAD(t)− IAD)√∑N
t=1(Y (t)− Y¯ )2
√∑N
t=1(IAD(t)− IAD)2
,
where we used the notation X¯ for the sample mean of the time series X . The Pearson coefficient
is a metric that ranges between [-1,1]. The closer the value is to 0 the less correlated are the
variables, whereas positive and negative values closer to 1 and -1 indicate strong positive and
negative correlation, respectively.
The Pearson correlation coefficient is reported in the same figure, for all of the six studied
IXPs. For the three IXPs close to the equator, the corr value is very close to zero, indicating
nonexistence of any significant correlation. For the other three IXPs, the corr value is relatively
high indicating strong negative correlation between the temperature and the demand.
From Figure 3.10 we can also observe relatively high variability of the daily traffic averages.
While the correlation with the temperature may explain some of this variability, there are still
many external factors (eg. social events) with unknown influence on the Internet traffic load.
3.4. Related Work
IXP characterization and analysis. [9] presents a measurement study of the peering relation-
ships at IXPs worldwide, in which they report around 200 operational IXPs, and rich topological
data on the peering relationships happening at these IXPs. [92] studies the community forma-
tion across the member composition of different IXPs. [166] performs a bottom-up analysis of
network participation across IXPs from governance perspective.
Effects of human behavior and weather in the Internet. Aben [2] has analyzed the fluc-
tuations of the traffic at different IXPs during major football events. Concerning the weather,
Shulman and Spring [160] observe a strong correlation between the IP network failures and the
weather conditions. Such failures are likely to be the consequence of direct impact of the weather
on the ISP infrastructure (such as equipment damage by lightning strikes or degradation of satel-
lite link quality due to high humidity) and are independent of the human behavior. More recently,
Kondor et al. collected and provide visualization of the mobile traffic consumption for granular
regions of different cities [110].
3.5. Summary
In this chapter, we provide an overview of several characteristics of IXPs. We first compare
the IXPs in terms of their member number and maximum total traffic. We then investigated
the membership overlapping across different IXPs. Finally, we examined the daily and monthly
variations of traffic of IXPs, and their relationship to the weather and temperature at the regions
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they serve. We describe hereafter the main conclusions of this section, and their relations with
other parts of this thesis.
Different types of IXPs. The three large European IXPs (LINX, AMS-IX and DE-CIX) are
similar in terms of size, traffic, and member compositions. Besides these cases, and other few
large exceptions, most other IXPs serve medium to small regions, providing operators with sites
in which local traffic can be exchanged. [3] contains a detailed description of one of the large
IXPs. Complementary, in Chapter 4, we provide a complete characterization and evolution of
SIX-SK, one of the regional IXPs.
High overlapping across IXPs. Member overlapping reduces the potential traffic offload,
after a network establishes presence in one or two (large) IXPs. Peering at multiple IXPs is also
valuable for resiliency and diversity purposes [26], but it is harder for operators to (economically)
quantify the value of these benefits. Operators thus require methods to reduce the IXP entry costs,
allowing them to scale their presence to multiple IXPs. Remote peering is one technique that can
be used for that purpose. We examine remote peering with detail in Chapter 5.
Relationships between IXP traffic and weather. For IXPs located in regions with calendar
seasons, we discovered an inverse relation between temperature and traffic. Regarding short-scale
variations, we found significant influence of weather in the daily traffic profile of three regional
IXPs, peaking in the period between 16h and 18h. In networks, capacity acquisition and network
planning is performed using peak traffic values. SDN technologies could drive to flexible models,
similar to those of energy [132], in which traffic is billed based on shorter time periods [46]. The
relationship between traffic and weather can be useful in those scenarios to enhance the prediction
models used for optimal capacity acquisition.
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Chapter 4
History of an IXP
The previous chapter examines and compares overall characteristics of IXPs around the world.
We illustrated some of the differences between large European IXPs to the regional ones. In this
chapter, we study with detail the evolution of one regional IXP: the Slovak IX (SIX)1. Like other
regional IXPs, SIX aggregates most ISPs operating in the country/region, thus allowing us to
accurate characterize the ecosystem of the local ISPs. The detailed data on the SIX operation
has been published on the SIX website since its inception. It offers an unique opportunity to
understand the dynamics over a long (on the Internet timescale) time horizon of several structures
including: the low-tier ISP peering, inter-AS link utilization, port capacity upgrade practices
and the local AS-level traffic matrix. In particular, we observe high stability of IXP peering
sessions; a pronounced imbalance of inbound/outbound traffic; and skewness of the amount of
traffic exchanged among peering pairs.
We start this chapter by describing the data-set we use to perform our study in Section 4.1. We
then illustrate the evolution of various characteristics of SIX in Section 4.2. We discuss several
of our observations and their potential impact in Section 4.3. We describe related work in Section
4.4 and conclude in Section 4.5.
4.1. The dataset
IXPs sometimes publish data on their operation. Among IXPs that publish (or published) the
peering matrix2 and per-member traffic data, we choose to study the one that has done so from
its beginning till today: the Slovak IX3. SIX hosted in 2011 52 ISPs, which exchange around
50Gbps of traffic in the peak hour. At each instance of time from 1997 onwards, SIX has pub-
lished two sources of data that we use in our work: (1) the peering matrix and (2) Multi Router
1We refer to the Slovak IX as SIX in this chapter. We used SIX-SK in the previous chapter to differentiate it from
the Slovenian IX.
2Boolean matrix indicating which ASes peer with each other.
3We study SIX in depth because it offers complete data in terms of peering and traffic since its inception to the
present day. Studying incomplete data from few other IXPs leads to very similar qualitative findings, omitted here for
brevity.
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Figure 4.1: Number of members at SIX since 1997.
Traffic Grapher (mrtg) [140] data, described in detail below. While the snapshots of SIX web-
page http://www.six.sk/, does provide some data on the traffic-stats over the previous 12
months, it does not store historic data for public use. In order to study the evolution of SIX, we
take advantage of the Internet archive project [7], which stores 155 snapshots of the SIX website
since 1997. In what follows, we will give more details on the data format and the data collection.
Additionally, we continually monitor SIX since 03/2011 until the beginning of 2012, by taking
a snapshot of the whole SIX website every day. In our analysis we use 3 of these snapshots
from the months of March, June and September of 2011. With 155 snapshots obtained from the
waybackmachine.org, we have in total 158 snapshots covering years from 1997 to 2011.
The data used in this chapter can be conveniently found at [31].
Peering matrix is a matrix that indicates whether two members (ISPs) of the IXP peer be-
tween each other or not. There could be many reasons for peering (or not) between two ISPs,
and typically two ISPs would peer if and only if such peering provides (financial) benefits to both
ISPs [8, 9, 52, 91]. At each snapshot4 of the SIX website, we have the peering matrix, indicat-
ing who peers with whom at that time. Each participating ISP is identified by its name and AS
number. In several cases, either name or AS number of an ISP change at some point, and for the
purpose of our study we consider that ISP to be the same as the one before the change. However,
some ISPs stopped peering at SIX. We found 32 ISPs since 1997 that used to peer at SIX that do
not peer any more. With 52 ISPs that peer at SIX today, it brings the total number of ISPs that
have participated in SIX to 84.
In addition to mapping SIX members to the ISPs, we classified each ISP based on the type of
business they are involved with: access, content and network service providers (NSP). We used
peeringDB [145] to map ISPs to their type, and in few cases in which no type info was found in
peeringDB, we manually inspected the ISP type by checking its business offering. In Figure 4.1
we depict the evolution of the number and type of SIX participants.
Per-member traffic demands and port capacity are extracted from the mrtg data [140]
4155 historic snapshots from the waybackmachine.org and daily snapshots from 03/2011.
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Figure 4.2: Snapshot of mrtg data.
available for each member at the SIX webpage. Figure 4.2 shows a (partial) snapshot of a webpage
generated using the mrtg tool. It contains the data from UPC (large access provider), time-
stamped on 12/4/2006, with the port capacity5 of 1Gbps (value Max Speed in the graph), listing
the average, max and current demand for both the inbound and outbound traffic, on daily (shown),
weekly, monthly and yearly (not shown in Figure 4.2) basis. The mrtg tool also produces visual
images depicting the daily/weekly/monthly/yearly traffic trends, and we designed a script that
transforms these visual images into numeric data. However, for the purpose of this thesis, we
exclusively work with the numeric data provided directly by mrtg: max and average.
Compared to peering matrix data that is stored each of the 155 times, the
waybackmachine.org crawler hit http://www.six.sk/, the mrtg data is not archived
every time, we believe because of the limitations of the waybackmachine.org in terms of
bandwidth/storage and perhaps other implementation reasons. However, most ISPs do have at
least one mrtg sample data point per year, which is enough for (relatively accurate) capturing dy-
namics on the yearly timescale. In the intervals between the available information, we use simple
linear interpolation, to estimate the traffic at any point in time.
4.2. Evolution of SIX
In this section we examine various dynamic and invariant properties of the Slovak IXP. We
want to stress that several properties observed here (the exponential traffic growth, the rise of the
5Some members lease more than one port, in which case the sum of all port capacities is shown as the port capacity.
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Figure 4.3: The evolution of peering density of SIX (aggregate) and per ISP type.
content providers and log-normality of the traffic matrix entry distribution) have been observed in
other vantage points before, using confidential data [49,112,139]. However, we establish them in
the IXP context using public-domain data, and report them here for the sake of completeness.
4.2.1. Peering matrix
Due to its importance, the AS-level topology of the Internet has been one of the most com-
prehensively studied topic in the networks research community. In spite of a tremendous amount
of work on this topic, the existing measurement tools have very low accuracy in measuring (in-
ferring) the AS-level topology in the lower tiers of the AS ecosystem [9,91,99]. For example, the
most complete IXP-peering dataset [9] infers only 30% of the SIX peering links. The IXP data
we use here, offer unique opportunity to accurately examine not only the state AS-level topology
among a subset of low-tier ISPs, but also to evaluate its dynamics.
Peering density dynamics. A major difference between the AS-level topology at the IXP
level and the global AS-level graph is in the density of interconnections. Namely an ‘average’
ISP typically peers with a large fraction of other ISPs from the IXP. To quantify how likely the
two IXP members are to peer, we use the peering density, a common metric defined as the ratio
between the number of peering links and the number of all possible pairs of ISPs participating at
the IXP [9]. In Figure 4.3 we plot the density of SIX across the 14 years of operation and observe
that this quantity has been fairly stable over the time and is in the range around 70% which is
‘normal’ for European standards. The peering densities in the US-based IXPs are reportedly
lower than of the European IXPs, while the IXPs in Australia, New Zealand and far-east are
slightly denser in terms of peering [9]. In the same figure we also plot, per-type peering density
of content, access and network service providers, and observe no significant dependance between
the type of an ISP and the peering density.
Peering link creation. Throughout the history of SIX until 2011, there have been 1711 pairs
of ISPs peering between each other. For those pairs of ISPs that eventually start peering, how long
does it take from the moment the newer of them appears at SIX until they engage into the peering
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Figure 4.4: The histogram of link creation times for 1711 peering pairs in the history of SIX.
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Figure 4.5: SIX aggregated traffic and the traffic of top-5 members in 2012.
(we call this value the link creation time - LCT)? In Figure 4.4 we depict the distribution of LCT
for the 1711 peering pairs. We can observe that when the peering happens, it is usually created
within a year from the appearance of the newer ISP, yet there is a dozen of pairs, that required
more than 5 years of simultaneous existence before peering was established.
Peering link removal. Dhamdhere and Dovrolis [56], analyzed AS-level customer-provider
(CP) links over a 10-year period, and showed that these links appear and disappear frequently,
citing as a major reason the cost optimization process customers perform during the search for
the most cost-effective provider. The peering links, on the other hand, have a different business
objective and, thus, one may guess that peering links are less likely to be broken once they are
created. Our data shows that this is indeed the case. Out of 1711 links, existing in SIX, only
20 link pairs de-peered. The other reason for the peering link removal is the disappearance of
one of the ISPs from the IXP. As we mentioned earlier, 32 ISPs6 that participated in SIX do not
participate anymore and indeed peering links they were engaged with are not longer present.
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ISP Name (ASN) Type AGR
aggregated N/A 103.2%
t-com (AS6855) Access 137.2%
gts (AS5578) NSP 77.88%
vnet (AS29405) Content 189.8%
orange (AS15962) Access 143.4%
datacamp (AS39392) Content 99.26%
Table 4.1: Type and Annualized Growth Rate (AGR) for aggregated traffic and Top-5 ISPs.
4.2.2. Traffic dynamics
Traffic growth. The growth of the Internet traffic has been shown to follow an exponential
pattern at many vantage points: the residential broadband networks [49], the transpacific traffic
[19], the global inter-domain traffic [112], etc. We observe a similar pattern in SIX as can be seen
in Figure 4.5, which depicts the traffic growth for SIX and top-5 (in terms of traffic volume) ISPs
of our data-set. In contrast to residential and global inter-domain traffic that grow with annual
growth rate (AGR) of around 40-50% [49,112,172], the AGR of the SIX traffic both in aggregate
and individual ISP terms is much higher: around 100% or even more for some ISPs. This hints
at the growth of the relative fraction of the inter-domain traffic that is exchanged via peering
at the IXP, and therefore a decay of the relative fraction of the inter-domain traffic that reaches
end-customers via transit, a phenomenon consistent with the widely observed flattening-of-the-
Internet trend [112].
Another interesting property of the growth is that it is not uniform among involved ISPs: the
traffic of some ISPs grows quicker than for the others. Table 4.1 contains the AGR for top-5 active
ISPs and the total SIX aggregate. Relatively wide range of AGR reveals significant differences in
the growth of different ISPs.
Remark: The annualized growth rates are obtained using the linear least-square fitting of the
traffic growth curves in log scale. This process is described in Section 3.3.3.
Traffic per ISP type. As the Internet ecosystem matures, we are likely to expect the emer-
gence of the specialized ISPs that target specific customer groups. By looking in our data, we can
see the emergence of one such class: content ISPs. Namely, until 2006, the content ISPs carried
a very small fraction of SIX’s traffic: under 10% in both directions. Since mid-2006 until 2011,
the number of specialized content ISPs doubled from 5 to today’s 10; see Figure 4.1. The relative
outbound traffic of those members, however, grew for an order of magnitude, from under 5% to
over 40%.
Traffic imbalance. From Figure 4.6 one can notice that inbound to outbound traffic ratios
vary significantly for different ISP types. For example, a fully residential ISP traffic is likely
to be heavily inbound, while the traffic of an ISP serving only content is likely to be heavily
outbound. Additionally, balanced traffic is explicitly required in many peering contracts between
tier-1 or tier-2 ISPs and the traffic imbalance has been cited as the main reason for de-peering in a
number of recent de-peering incidents [21]. Here we look at the evolution over time of the traffic
6Most of these ISPs either do not exist anymore, or were merged/purchased with some of the existing SIX members.
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Figure 4.6: The percentage of total inbound/outbound traffic per ISP type.
imbalance, which we define for ISP X at time t as:
IB(X, t) = max
(
Tinbound(X, t)
Toutbound(X, t)
,
Toutbound(X, t)
Tinbound(X, t)
)
Where Tinbound(X, t) and Toutbound(X, t) is the inbound and outbound traffic of the ISP X at
time t, respectively. In Figure 4.7 we depict the evolution of the median ISP IB, as well as the
10th and the 90th percentile. We also plot the (traffic) weighted average of the imbalance across
all ISPs present in SIX at time t:
WA−IB(t) =
∑
X∈Activet T (X, t) · IB(X, t)∑
X∈Activet T (X, t)
, (4.1)
where T (X, t) = Tinbound(X, t) + Toutbound(X, t) is the total traffic of ISP X at time t. From
Figure 4.7 we can see a growing trend in the traffic imbalance, indicating the increasing focus
of the ISPs in particular end-customer groups. The fact that the weighted average is close to
the 90th-percentile indicates that the large ISPs are more pronounced in such traffic imbalance,
compared to the small and medium ISPs.
4.2.3. Capacity and utilization dynamics
In order to exchange traffic at SIX and most other IXPs, each member needs to pay a monthly
fee for each port it uses for traffic exchange. The price of a port increases with the port capacity,
but are sub-additive, with price per Mbps decreasing as a higher port capacity is purchased. The
reasons for upgrading from lower port capacity to a higher one can be different, but roughly
speaking most of the upgrades happen because the member’s traffic reaches a port-utilization that
is above some threshold.
Information on network utilization and upgrades by commercial ISPs are notoriously hard
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Figure 4.7: The evolution of ISP traffic imbalance (IB), median, 10th-, 90-th percentile and the
weighted average.
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Figure 4.8: Per member port(s) utilization of SIX since 1998: median, 10th, 90th-percentile and
weighted average.
to obtain. Literature often cites 50% rule-of-thumb for net upgrades [129, 174], but we are not
aware on any empiric study across a set of diverse ISPs that evaluates such statements. The data
we study here offers an unique opportunity to shed light on the upgrade practice and the port
utilization in dozens of operational ISPs.
Port utilization. In Figure 4.8 we depict the median, the 10th and the 90th-percentile of peak
utilization among all members of SIX at each time instance for which we have a SIX snapshot. We
used the peak utilization as the maximum monthly utilization averaged in 2-hour slots, available
in mrtg data. In the first couple of years, the SIX ports were very highly utilized with median
members’ peak utilization being greater than 50%. In the early 2000’s, a significant increase in
the port capacities occurred and brought the utilization of many members down. From mid-2000’s
until the end of our dataset we observe the increase in the utilization levels, yet still 90% of the
members have the peak utilization of their port(s) under 65%. We also depict the evolution of the
weighted average of the utilization, weighted with the traffic of the ISP, similarly to Eq. (4.1). We
can see that, since 2004, most of the heavy ISPs are running their ports at a higher utilization than
the median.
Port upgrades. In any ISP, increasing capacity of its networks is the most important mecha-
nism for ensuring the high level of quality of service. Typically, the capacity upgrades in op-
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Figure 4.9: The estimated utilization at the time of port upgrade.
erational networks require a lot of planning and serious implementation efforts. In contrast,
upgrading the port capacity at the IXP level is rather straightforward and can be done almost
instantaneously. Hence, the data from SIX can offer insights on the operational practices of the
involved ISPs. Figure 4.9 contains two histograms on the peak utilization at the moments of
capacity-upgrades, one for the period from 1997-2004, and another for the period since 2004. In
the earlier period, majority of upgrades happened because of the port overload. However since
2004, most ISPs upgrade their capacity early to avoid congestion of their SIX port. While most
of the upgrades happen when the utilization reaches the range [30%-60%], there is still a non-
negligible fraction of upgrades that happen outside of this range.
Comment. We analyzed the impact that port upgrades have on the traffic growth, and observed
no statistically significant difference on the growth of the traffic before and after the upgrades.
4.2.4. Traffic matrix dynamics
Even though we do not have the exact traffic matrix (TM) between the pairs of ISPs peering
at any instance of time, we can utilize the standard tools to estimate TM entries with reasonable
accuracy. Here we choose to use the tomogravity method [193], that has been extensively de-
ployed in operational ISPs and is simple to implement. The expected errors of any TM estimation
tool can be relatively large for a single origin-destination (O-D) pair. However, we do not analyze
specific O-D pairs, but rather focus on aggregate statistics of the TM entry distribution, to draw
the relevant conclusions.
Per-peering traffic distribution is skewed. An invariant property of the SIX traffic ma-
trix is the variability of its entries. Namely, the distribution of per-peering traffic appears to be
log-normal with the exponentially growing mean (and variance), which is consistent with the
previously observed property of intra-domain traffic matrix snapshots [139]. In Figure 4.10 we
depict the histogram of per-peering traffic of peering pairs present in the years 1999, 2003, 2007
and 2011. Consequently, several heaviest pairs carry most of the traffic (e.g. top-1% and top-10%
of the pairs carry 40% and 85% of the traffic, respectively) and majority of the peering pairs carry
very little traffic.
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Figure 4.10: Histograms of traffic per peering pair in 4 points in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011.
Peering: cost-reduction or performance? The most widely cited reason for creating a
peering relationship between two ISPs is cost reduction: if the traffic between ISP A and ISP B is
exchanged directly via peering, there is no need to be delivered via transit provider(s), hence the
transit cost for both ISPs is expected to reduce. While such reasoning is indeed valid when the
traffic volume between ISPs A and B is large, it becomes questionable when the traffic is small,
since engaging into a peering relationship has a non-zero monetary cost (for legal agreements,
staff, maintenance, etc.) associated with it. In Figure 4.11 (top) we depict the (estimated) median
traffic volume among all peering pairs at SIX present at any instance of time, as well as the
corresponding wholesale price of IP transit per Mbps per month7 [135]. In spite of two-order-
of-magnitude change in these two quantities, the value of the median peering (calculated as the
product of the median peering volume and the wholesale IP transit price) remains stable and under
10 USD per month; see Figure 4.11 (bottom). Such low median peering value suggests that a
majority of the peering links carry very low monetary savings and would not be economically
viable outside Internet eXchange Points.
4.3. Discussion
Diurnal (daily) traffic dynamics. Most of the analysis we performed in this chapter treats
the (traffic) dynamics on the yearly time-scale. The diurnal dynamic properties (such as the peak-
to-valley ratio, peak-hour, etc.) is critical for the success of several recent proposals [45, 114,
128], and can be derived from the visual mrtg images. For example we observe that the peak-
hour has shifted from early afternoon (1-2pm) in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s to late evening
(9pm) nowadays. This probably is the result of residential traffic dominating that of commercial
companies, as described in Section 3.3. Furthermore, the ratio between the peak hour and off-peak
hour from 10:1 in the late 1990’s, to 3:1 in the mid 2000’s (coinciding with the p2p revolution),
to 10:1 nowadays. These changes could be related to human-behavior effects, similar to the ones
7The wholesale price used here is for the ports in EU/USA hubs. In other continents, the price per Mbps can be 5
to 10 times greater.
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Figure 4.11: Median per-peering traffic and wholesale IP transit price (top) and peering value
(bottom)
we described in Chapter 3. We however omit the detailed discussion of these properties due to
space limitation.
Matching large shifts in traffic with external events. The historical traffic evolution of
companies can be used to observe important external events (not necessarily human-driven), such
as large-scale DDOS attacks, capacity upgrades or port blocking/throttling in an ISP. For example
in 2003 a significant drop in SANET-AS26078 traffic happened (60% reduction in the traffic
without any change in the peering) for which we speculate that is caused by sudden p2p port
blocking by the SANET.
Effects of private peering. Public peering, via IXPs, offers many benefits to the ISPs in-
terested in peering, by allowing inexpensive and convenient peering with many peers. However,
some ISPs may choose to peer privately, in which case such those relationships may be invisible
to the IXP. In context of the Slovak ISPs, it appears that only a small fraction of local peerings are
private. Namely, the existing AS-level topology datasets [175] reports circa of 34 private peering
links among Slovak ISPs, which is under 4% of the number peering relationships that we found
at SIX.
4.4. Related work
Obtaining high-fidelity data for studying the Internet properties is notoriously hard for various
reasons ranging from confidentiality concerns to the lack of measurement infrastructure. In addi-
tion, analyzing the evolution of the Internet properties requires not only capturing a single snap-
8Slovak academic network, acting as the access ISP to all Slovak universities.
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shot of the data but also the system for continuous data collection and archiving. Consequently,
the data that allows such longitudinal studies of the Internet properties is extremely scarce.
AS-level graph evolution. Dhamdhere and Dovrolis [56] use available historic data collected
by RouteViews and RIPE to study the evolution of the customer-provider links in the AS-level
graph, and the stability of such links. As they point out, these datasets have very poor accuracy in
inferring the AS-peering links, and our work complements [56] by offering new insights on the
evolution of the AS-level connectivity between the lower tier ISPs.
Longitudinal Internet traffic evolution. The data that involves IP traffic measurements
is often kept confidential, for obvious business concerns. Several studies have appeared in the
literature reporting the properties of traffic evolution in certain vantage points [19, 49, 82], with
the caveat that such longitudinal data is typically collected at a single ISP and not available for
public use. The analyzed traffic (and link capacity) data represent the 14-year evolution of the
inter-domain traffic of dozens of ISPs, and is fully available for public use, which allows the
analysis of the properties beyond those examined here.
Peering links over the Internet. The economics factors are believed to be the dominant force
in the link creation (both the fee-based or settlement-free links) process at the AS-level [9, 57].
In this study we show that in fact a large fraction of peering links is (and has been) virtually
valueless. In other words, majority of AS-level links9 would not be economically viable without
IXPs and the link bundling in which high-value peerings are bundled with low-value peering links
over the same physical port.
4.5. Summary
With the trend of flattening-the-Internet [57,112], the relative importance of IXPs, and peering
in general, is likely to increase. In this chapter, we study one regional IXP, Slovak IX, for which
we acquired detailed peering and traffic data for 14 years of its existence. Such data allows us
to characterize not only the state of the IXP at one particular moment, but also its dynamic and
invariant properties.
Examining the evolution of SIX revealed a number of interesting facts in regards to the peering
and traffic trends at the IXP. We summarize them next.
Stagnation of SIX’s membership size. After almost a decade of steady growth, the number
of members of SIX has been stable in recent years. As described in Chapter 3, this effect occurs
on other regional IXPs an might be explained by the difficulties for IXPs to attract networks
from other regions, after the local ones join, due to the relatively high cost of transport cost and
the average low potential exchanged traffic. One potential way of reducing the cost of reaching
multiple IXPs, thus favoring both IXPs and ASes, is the use of remote peering. Using remote
peering, a company can share the connection infrastructure (e.g. interconnection, router, etc.)
9The number of peering links in the Internet dominates the number of customer-provider links in the Internet [9].
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to connect to various IXPs. We explain remote peering, and describe our assessment of use at
several IXPs, in Chapter 5.
IXP peerings are stable. We discovered that once it has been created, a peering between
two ISPs is very unlikely to disappear unless one of the members leaves the IXP. This happens in
contrast to customer-provider links that have been shown to change relatively frequently [56].
Evolution of port capacity and link utilization. We characterized the utilization of links
among the members of SIX. While most of the upgrades happen when the utilization are within
the rule of thumb range of [30%-60%], there is still a non-negligible fraction of upgrades that
happen outside of this range.
Low monetary value for most peering sessions. By estimating SIX’s traffic matrix, we ob-
serve that the distribution of traffic per peering-link has been skewed since the beginning of SIX.
This property indicates that the majority of peering links carry very low amounts of traffic (and
consequently have very low monetary value), which challenges the presumption that promotes
financial gain as the main cause for peering. Our observations on SIX match those of [3] , which
also observes a high skewed distribution of traffic on peering links, and traffic ratios that would
not normally be allowed in private peering connections.
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Chapter 5
Remote Peering
In Chapter 3, we showed how member overlapping among IXPs can quickly decrease the
benefits of transit off-loading, even after peering only at one IXPs. Due to the non-negligible
operational and infrastructural costs, this effect limits the number of IXPs that ASes can cost-
effectively reach, which poses a problem for both operators and IXPs: On the one hand, by
restricting to a few IXPs, operators lose the opportunity of increasing path diversity, and connect-
ing directly to smaller networks. On the other hand, attracting only a smaller set of companies
(usually the regional companies) restricts the growth potential of IXPs. This is a potentially rea-
son for the halt, in terms of member size, experienced by SIX and other regional IXPs, as seen in
Chapters 3 and 4.
Remote peering is a service in which an AS reaches an IXP via a Layer-2 (L2) intermediary
(or remote-peering provider) and becomes a member of it without extending its own infrastruc-
ture or operational force. Remote-peering providers include companies specialized in this type
of business and traditional transit providers that leverage their traffic-delivery expertise to act as
remote-peering intermediaries [37]. A remote-peering provider can offer its customers connec-
tivity with multiple IXPs using the same infrastructure.
Remote peering provides a solution for operators to profitable reach multiple IXPs, and for
IXPs to attract a larger set of networks. In this chapter, we describe remote peering, provide the
results of measuring its adoption across multiple IXPs, and discuss their Internet structure impli-
cations. For our adoption study, we develop a ping-based method that conservatively estimates
the spread of remote peering. We apply the method in 22 IXPs worldwide and detect remote peers
in more than 90% of the studied IXPs, with remote peering used by up to 20% of the members at
an IXP.
Remote peering separates the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening. At layer-3,
remote peering is not distinguishable from direct peering. When a network buys a remote-peering
service to establish new paths around a transit provider, the Internet becomes flatter at layer-3
because the new paths bypass the layer-3 transit provider. However, the layer-3 perspective is
misleading because the new paths replace the transit provider with the layer-2 remote-peering
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Figure 5.1: Directly and remotely peering networks, and probing of their IP interfaces from an
LG server.
provider. When one broadens the layer-3 perspective to include the organizations that provide
layer-2 services, remote peering does not necessarily reduce the number of intermediary organi-
zations on Internet paths in spite of the enabled additional peering relationships. Hence, remote
peering means more peering without Internet flattening. The wide spread of remote peering also
has broader implications for Internet research. When a provider offers transit and remote peering,
buying both might not yield reliable multihoming. The presence of intermediaries that are invisi-
ble to layer-3 protocols adds to existing security concerns, e.g., the invisible layer-2 intermediaries
can monitor traffic or deliver it through undesired geographies. For Internet accountability, it is a
challenge to associate an action with the responsible invisible entity. As a new economic option,
remote peering opens a whole new ballgame for connectivity, routing, and traffic distribution,
e.g., via newly enabled IXPs [138]. We further discuss the structural effects of remote peering in
Section 5.3.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides background on the tech-
nical details of remote peering. Section 5.2 empirically studies the spread of remote peering.
Section 5.3 discusses broader implications of remote peering on the Internet infrastructure. Sec-
tion 5.4 presents related work. Finally, section 5.5 presents a summary of the chapter.
5.1. Introduction to remote peering
5.1.1. Technical aspects
Remote peering constitutes an emerging type of interconnection where an AS reaches and
peers at a distant IXP via a layer-2 provider [17]. The remote-peering provider delivers traffic
between the switching infrastructure of the IXP and the remote interface of the customer. On
the customer’s behalf, the remote-peering provider also maintains networking equipment at the
IXP to enable the remote network to peer with other IXP members, saving the customer from
acquiring any new devices and hiring any operational support at the remote IXP (e.g. remote
hands). Figure 5.1 depicts a typical setting for the remote-peering relationship.
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Technologically, from the provider point of view, remote peering can be implemented with
standard methods, such as those used in L2 MPLS (MultiProtocol Label Switching) VPNs (Vir-
tual Private Networks). The remote peering provider can install devices with a large number of
ports at the IXP or connect to the IXP infrastructure using VLANs. For ASes, a remote peering
service is seen as a L2 service, differentiating the connectivity to different IXPs either logically
via various VLANs or physical links. Operators connect the L2 service to a BGP router and use
an IP of the IXP to establish peerings to other IXP members.
The L2 segment of the remote peering provider becomes an extension of the IXP backplane.
This has deep operational repercussions, since the loss of connectivity of a member might be due
to failures in the customer, remote peering provider, or IXP domain. Operators of the three parties
should be aware of this aspect, in order to provide efficient troubleshooting procedures.
5.1.2. Economical aspects
A remote peering providing connectivity to the same IXP for multiple customers can save
transport costs by avoiding traffic tromboning. That is, it can switch directly the traffic between
two customers (in case they peer) without moving the traffic to the IXPs. This can be done, for
instance, by levering multipoint-to-multipoint technologies such as Virtual Private LAN Service
(VPLS)1.
Remote peering has both traffic-dependent and traffic-independent costs. In comparison to
direct peering, the traffic-independent cost is lower, and the traffic-dependent cost is higher: the
remote-peering provider has multiple customers and reduces its per-unit costs due to traffic aggre-
gation and acquisition of IXP resources in bulk. Compared to transit, remote peering has lower
traffic-dependent costs. Thus, from the cost perspective, remote peering represents a trade-off
between direct peering and transit.
IXPs and remote peering are highly symbiotic. IXPs benefit from remote peering because
the latter brings extra traffic to IXPs, enriches geographical diversity of IXP memberships, and
strengthens the position of IXPs in the Internet economic structure. To promote remote peering,
AMS-IX (Amsterdam Internet Exchange), DE-CIX (German Commercial Internet Exchange),
LINX (London Internet Exchange), and many other IXPs establish partnership programs that
incentivize distant networks to peer remotely at the IXP. For example, some IXPs reduce mem-
bership fees for remotely peering networks. AMS-IX started its partnership program around year
2003. According to our personal communications with AMS-IX staff, about one fifth of the
AMS-IX members were remote peers at the time of our study.
Implications of remote peering for transit providers are mixed. On the one hand, remote
peering gives transit customers alternative means for reaching distant networks. On the other
hand, remote peering is a new business niche where transit providers can leverage their traffic-
delivery expertise.
1Note that this traffic would not appear at the traffic statistics of the IXP.
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IXP acronym IXP name
Location Peak Number Number of
City Country
traffic of analyzed
(Tbps) members interfaces
AMS-IX Amsterdam Internet Exchange Amsterdam Netherlands 2.72 638 665
DE-CIX German Commercial Internet Exchange Frankfurt Germany 3.21 463 535
LINX London Internet Exchange London UK 2.60 497 521
HKIX Hong Kong Internet Exchange Hong Kong China 0.48 213 278
NYIIX New York International Internet Exchange New York USA 0.46 132 239
MSK-IX Moscow Internet eXchange Moscow Russia 1.32 367 218
PLIX Polish Internet Exchange Warsaw Poland 0.63 235 207
France-IX France-IX Paris France 0.23 230 201
PTT PTTMetro Sa˜o Paolo Sa˜o Paolo Brazil 0.30 482 180
SIX Seattle Internet Exchange Seattle USA 0.53 177 175
LoNAP London Network Access Point London UK 0.10 142 166
JPIX Japan Internet Exchange Tokyo Japan 0.43 131 163
TorIX Toronto Internet Exchange Toronto Canada 0.28 177 161
VIX Vienna Internet Exchange Vienna Austria 0.19 121 134
MIX Milan Internet Exchange Milan Italy 0.16 133 131
TOP-IX Torino Piemonte Internet Exchange Turin Italy 0.05 80 91
Netnod Netnod Internet Exchange Stockholm Sweden 1.34 89 71
KINX Korea Internet Neutral Exchange Seoul South Korea 0.15 46 71
CABASE Argentine Chamber of Internet Buenos Aires Argentina 0.02 101 68
INEX Internet Neutral Exchange Dublin Ireland 0.13 63 66
DIX-IE Distributed Internet Exchange in Edo Tokyo Japan N/A 36 56
TIE Telx Internet Exchange New York USA 0.02 149 54
Table 5.1: Properties of the 22 IXPs in our measurement study on the spread of remote peering
(values for 2014)
According to anecdotal evidence, remote peering successfully gains ground and satisfies di-
verse needs in the Internet ecosystem. We focus on usages where remote peering at IXPs is
purchased by distant networks or other IXPs. For example, AMS-IX Hong Kong and AMS-IX
interconnect their infrastructures via remote peering to create additional peering opportunities for
their members [166]. We do not consider an alternative usage where remote peering at an IXP is
bought by a local network to benefit from cost reductions that remote peering provides even over
short distances [44].
5.2. Spread of remote peering
In this section, we report measurements that conservatively estimate the spread of remote
peering in the Internet.
5.2.1. Measurement methodology
Because remote peering is provided on layer 2, conventional layer-3 methods for Internet
topology inference are unsuitable for the detection of remote peering. For instance, traceroute
and BGP data do not reveal IP addresses or ASNs (AS Numbers) of remote-peering providers,
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since the underlay L2 service is transparent to them.
The idea of our methodology for detecting a remotely peering network at an IXP is to mea-
sure propagation delay between the network and IXP. Specifically, we use the ping utility to
estimate the minimum Round-Trip Time (RTT) between the IXP location and the IP interface of
the network in the IXP subnet. If the minimum RTT estimate exceeds a threshold, we classify the
network as remotely peering at the IXP.
While our ping-based method is intuitive, the main challenges lie in its careful implementation
and include: identification of probed interfaces, selection of vantage points, adherence to straight
routes, sensitivity to traffic conditions, identification of networks, choice of IXPs, threshold for
remoteness, IXPs with multiple locations, impact of blackholing, and measurement overhead. We
discuss these challenges below.
Identification of probed interfaces: The targets of our ping probes are the IP interfaces of
the IXP members in the IXP subnet. IXP members do not typically announce the IP addresses of
these interfaces via BGP. To determine the IP addresses of the targeted interfaces, we look up the
addresses on the websites of PeeringDB [145], PCH (Packet Clearing House) [144], and the IXP
itself.
Selection of vantage points: The ping requests need be launched into the IXP subnet from
within the IXP location so that the requests take the direct route from the IXP location to the
probed interface. We send the ping requests from Looking Glass (LG) servers that PCH and RIPE
NCC (Re´seaux IP Europe´ens Network Coordination Centre) [133] maintain at IXP locations.
Figure 5.1 depicts our probing of IP network interfaces from an LG server at an IXP.
Adherence to straight routes: With our choice of the vantage points, the ping requests
and ping replies are expected to stay within the IXP subnet. It is important to keep the probe
routes straight because otherwise the RTT measurements might be high even for a directly peering
network. Potential dangers include an unexpected situation where the device of a probed IP
interface replies from one of its other IP interfaces and thereby sends the ping reply through an
indirect route with multiple IP hops. A more realistic risk is that some of our targeted IP addresses
are actually not in the IXP subnet because the respective website information is incorrect. To
protect our method from such dangers, we examine the TTL (Time To Live) field in the received
ping replies. When ping replies stay within the layer-2 subnet, their TTL values stay at the
maximum set by the replying interface [185]. When the path of a ping reply includes an extra IP
hop, the TTL value in the reply decreases. Therefore, we discard the ping replies with different
TTL values than an expected maximum. We refer to this discard rule as a TTL-match filter. For the
expected maximum TTL, our experiments accept two typical values of 64 and 255 hops. Although
ping software might set the maximum TTL to other values (e.g., 32 or 128 hops), these alternative
settings are relatively infrequent, and ignoring them does not significantly increase the number
of discarded ping replies in our experiments. Also, different ping replies from the same interface
might arrive with different TTL values, e.g., because the replying interface changes its maximum
TTL. Whereas we are interested in a conservative estimate for the extent of remote peering, we
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discard all replies from an IP interface if their TTL value changes during the measurement period.
We call this rule a TTL-switch filter.
Sensitivity to traffic conditions: Even if a probe stays within the IXP subnet, RTT might
be high due to congestion. To deal with transient congestion, we repeat the measurements at
different times of the day and different days of the week for each probed IP interface, and record
the minimum RTT observed for the interface during the measurement period. This minimum RTT
serves as a basis for deciding whether the interface is remote. Again to be on the conservative side,
we exclude an IP interface from further consideration if we do not get at least 8 TTL-accepted
ping replies from this interface for each probing LG server. We call this rule a sample-size filter.
The limit of 8 replies and other parameter values in our study are empirically chosen to obtain
reliable results while keeping the measurement overhead low. If less than 4 of the collected ping
replies have RTT values within the maximum of 5 ms and 10% of the minimum RTT, i.e., below
RTTmin + max{5 ms, 0.1 ·RTTmin}, we apply an RTT-consistent filter to disregard the interface.
For an IXP that has both PCH and RIPE NCC servers, we probe each IP interface from both LG
servers and exclude the interface from further consideration if the larger of the two respective
minimum RTTs is not within the maximum of 5 ms and 10% of the smaller one. We refer to this
rule as an LG-consistent filter.
Identification of networks: To identify the network that owns a probed IP interface, we
use the network’s ASN. We map the IP addresses to ASNs through a combination of looking up
PeeringDB, using the IXPs’ websites and LG servers, and issuing reverse DNS (Domain Name
System) queries. If the ASN of an IP interface changes during the measurement period, we
exclude the IP interface from further consideration. This exclusion rule is called an ASN-change
filter.
Choice of IXPs: In choosing IXPs, we strive for a global scope surpassing the regional
focuses of prior IXP studies. Our choice is constrained to those IXPs that have at least one
LG server. Under the above constraints, we select and experiment at 22 IXPs in the following
4 continents: Asia, Europe, North America, and South America. After manually crawling the
websites of the IXPs in January 2014, we collect data on their location, peak traffic, and number
of members. Table 5.1 sums up these data. While information at IXP websites is often incomplete,
out of date, or inconsistent in presenting a property (e.g., peak traffic), our measurement method
does not rely on these data. We report this information just to give the reader a rough idea about
the geography and size of the studied IXPs. For each studied IXP, table 5.1 also includes the
number of analyzed interfaces, i.e., interfaces that stay in our analyzed dataset after applying
all 6 aforementioned filters. Across all the 22 IXPs, we apply the filters in the following order:
sample-size, TTL-switch, TTL-match, RTT-consistent, LG-consistent, and ASN-change. After
the filters discard 20, 82, 20, 100, 28, and 5 interfaces respectively, we have a total of 4,451
analyzed interfaces. The high count of TTL-switch discards is likely due to operating system
changes during our measurements.
Threshold for remoteness: We classify a network as remotely peering at an IXP if the mini-
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Figure 5.2: Cumulative distribution of the minimum RTTs for all the analyzed interfaces
mum RTT observed for its IP interface at the IXP exceeds a threshold. Despite the redundancy of
our RTT measurements, the minimum RTT might still include non-propagation delays, e.g., due
to persistent congestion of the IXP subnet or probe processing in the network devices. To mini-
mize the possibility that such extra delays trigger an erroneous classification of a directly peering
network as remote, the threshold should be sufficiently high. Figure 5.2 plots the cumulative dis-
tribution of the minimum RTTs for all the 4,451 analyzed interfaces. A majority of the analyzed
interfaces have minimum RTTs distributed almost uniformly between 0.3 and 2 ms. This is a
pattern expected for directly peering networks. The likelihood of a network being a direct peer
declines as the minimum RTT increases. Our manual checks do not detect any directly peering
network with the minimum RTT exceeding 10 ms. Thus, we set the remoteness threshold in our
study to 10 ms. While this relatively high threshold value comes with a failure to recognize some
remotely peering networks as remote peers, the false negatives do not constitute a significant con-
cern because we mostly strive to avoid false positives in estimating the spread of remote peering
conservatively.
IXPs with multiple locations: If an IXP operates interconnected switches in multiple loca-
tions, probes from an LG server at one location to an IP interface at another location might have a
large RTT. The chosen remoteness threshold of 10 ms is sufficiently high to avoid false positives
in cases where all locations of the IXP are in the same metropolitan area. False positives are possi-
ble if the geographic footprint of the IXP is significantly larger, e.g., spans multiple countries. We
do not observe such situations in our experiments. In a more common scenario, two partner IXPs
from different regions, e.g., AMS-IX Hong Kong and AMS-IX, interconnect by buying layer-2
connectivity from a third party. Our methodology correctly classifies such scenarios as remote
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Figure 5.3: Classiﬁcation of the analyzed interfaces with respect to 4 ranges of minimum RTTs
peering.
Impact of blackholing: If a probed interface intentionally blackholes or accidentally fails to
respond to ping requests, the IP interface might be excluded from our analyzed data due to a low
number of ping replies for the interface, as discussed above. In a hypothetical (not observed in
our experiments) scenario where the probed interface forwards the probe to another machine that
sends a ping reply on the interface’s behalf, the ping reply is discarded by our TTL-match ﬁlter
and does not affect accuracy of our RTT measurements.
Measurement overhead: While our method relies on probing from public LG servers, it
is important to keep the measurement overhead low. The probes are launched through HTML
(HyperText Markup Language) queries to the servers. The LG servers belonging to RIPE NCC
and PCH react to an HTML query by issuing respectively 3 and 5 ping requests. For any LG
server, we submit at most one HTML query per minute and spread the measurements over 4
months. The maximum number of ping replies received from any probed IP interface is 21 and
54 for respectively RIPE NCC and PCH servers.
We conducted the measurements during the 4 months from October 2013 to January 2014.
The measurement data are available at [27].
5.2.2. Experimental results
Figure 5.3 classiﬁes all the 4,451 analyzed interfaces across the 22 IXPs according to the
minimum RTT measured for each interface. Our conservative estimate ﬁnds remote peering in
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(b) Interfaces of all the 285 remotely peering networks
Figure 5.4: IXP-count distributions and interface classiﬁcations for identiﬁed networks
91% of the studied IXPs. While the numbers of remote interfaces are large in the 3 biggest IXPs
(AMS-IX, DE-CIX, and LINX), these numbers are also large at smaller IXPs such as France-IX
in France, PTT in Brazil, JPIX in Japan, and TOP-IX in Italy. Despite using the high remoteness
threshold of 10 ms, the classiﬁcation does not reveal remote interfaces in only two IXPs (DIX-IE
and CABASE). Hence, our method independently conﬁrms wide presence of remote peering in
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the Internet economic structure.
The classification in figure 5.3 looks at the remote interfaces in greater detail by considering
the following 3 ranges for the minimum RTT: [10 ms; 20 ms), [20 ms; 50 ms), and [50 ms; ∞)
which roughly correspond to intercity, intercountry, and intercontinental distances respectively.
We detect the intercontinental-range peering at 12 IXPs, i.e., a majority of the studied IXPs. For
example, the Italian AS E4A remotely peers at both TIE and TorIX, based in the USA and Canada
respectively. Brazilian ASes comprise most of the remote peers at PTT, the largest among the 21
IXPs of the PTTMetro project in Brazil. The high fraction of remote interfaces at the Turin-
based TOP-IX likely results from the IXP’s interconnections with VSIX and LyonIX, two other
Southern European IXPs located in Padua and Lyon respectively.
Switching the perspective from the interfaces to the networks that own them, we apply our
network identification method (described in section 5.2.1) to determine ASNs for 3,242 out of the
4,451 analyzed interfaces. While a network might have interfaces at multiple IXPs, we identify a
total of 1,904 networks. We refer to the number of the studied IXPs where a network peers as an
IXP count of the network. Figure 5.4a presents the distribution of the IXP counts for all the 1,904
identified networks. While a majority of the networks connect to only one IXP, some networks
peer at as many as eighteen IXPs.
285 of the identified networks have a remote interface at a studied IXP. Business services
offered by the remotely peering networks are diverse and include transit (e.g., Tu¨rk Telecom),
access (e.g., E4A and Invitel), and hosting (e.g., Trunk Networks). Figure 5.4a also plots the
distribution of the IXP counts for all the 285 remotely peering networks. Both distributions in
figure 5.4a are qualitatively similar, suggesting that the choice of IXPs for a network to peer is
relatively independent of whether the network peers directly or remotely.
We also examine the remotely peering networks with respect to the minimum RTTs of their
analyzed interfaces. For each IXP count, we consider all the analyzed interfaces of the remotely
peering networks with this IXP count and classify the interfaces in regard to the following 4
ranges of minimum RTTs: [0 ms; 10 ms), [10 ms; 20 ms), [20 ms; 50 ms), and [50 ms; ∞).
Figure 5.4b depicts the fractions of these 4 categories. While our study sets the remoteness
threshold to 10 ms, the remotely peering networks with the IXP count of 1 have no interfaces
with the minimum RTT below 10 ms. As the IXP count increases, the fraction of the remote
interfaces tends to decline because some interfaces of the remotely peering networks are used for
direct peering. E4A exemplifies networks with a large number of remote interfaces: 6 of its 9
analyzed interfaces are classified as remote.
5.2.3. Method validation
While our methodology employs a series of filters and high remoteness threshold of 10 ms
to avoid false positives, this section reports how we validate the method and its conservative
estimates of remote peering.
First, we use ground truth from TorIX, an IXP located in Toronto. TorIX staff confirmed that
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their members classified as remotely peering networks in our study are indeed remote peers. In
one case, the TorIX staff initially thought that a network identified as a remote peer by our method
was rather a local member with a direct peering connection. Nevertheless, a closer examination
showed that throughout our measurement period this local member conducted maintenance of its
Toronto PoP (Point of Presence) and connected to TorIX from its remote PoP via a contracted
layer-2 facility.
Then, we take a network-centric perspective and focus on E4A and Invitel. Both networks
specialize in providing Internet access. Based on the measurements, our method classifies the
E4A interfaces at DE-CIX, France-IX, LoNAP, TorIX, and TlE as remote. Using public informa-
tion on IXP websites [6,116] and insights from private conversations, we confirm that E4A indeed
peers remotely at these 6 IXPs. Our method also identifies Invitel as a remote peer at AMS-IX and
DE-CIX, with the minimum RTTs of 22 and 18 ms respectively. Our private inquiries indicate
that Invitel uses remote-peering services of Atrato IP Networks to reach and peer at AMS-IX and
DE-CIX.
Finally, we receive an independent confirmation that our RTT measurement methodology is
accurate. On our request, the TorIX staff measured minimum RTTs between the TorIX route
server and member interfaces. Their results for our analyzed interfaces closely match our RTT
measurements from the local PCH LG server. The mean and variance of the differences are
respectively 0.3 and 1.6 ms.
5.3. Discussion: Remote peering repercussions in the Internet in-
frastructure
The Internet economic structure is important for reliability, security, and other aspects of In-
ternet design and operation. In spite of its importance, the economic structure remains poorly
understood. It is typically modeled on layer 3 of Internet protocols because economic relation-
ships can be inferred from BGP [153] and IP measurements. In particular, BGP identifies ASes on
announced paths, enabling inference of layer-3 structures where ASes act as economic entities in-
terconnected by transit or peering relationships [84]. ASes are imperfect proxies of organizations,
e.g., multiple ASes can be owned by a single organization and act as a single unit. Nevertheless,
AS-level topologies [43, 170] have proved themselves useful for reasoning about Internet con-
nectivity, routing, and traffic delivery. While being useful, layer-3 models struggle to detect and
correctly classify a significant portion of all economic relationships in the dynamic Internet.
As discussed in previous chapters, validated evolutionary changes in the economic structure
of the Internet include a trend toward more peering. The proliferation of peering relationships
is caused partly by their cost advantages over transit. Internet flattening refers to a reduction
in the number of intermediary organizations on Internet paths [25, 57, 88]. For example, the
Internet becomes flatter when a major content provider expands its own network to bypass transit
providers and connect directly with eyeball networks, which primarily serve residential users.
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Internet flattening is routinely conflated with the trend towards more peering. Indeed, peering
relationships are commonly established to bypass transit providers and thus reduce the number of
organizations on end-to-end paths.
The trends toward more peering and Internet flattening are typically conflated because direct
peering interconnections bypass transit providers and thereby reduce the number of intermediary
organizations on Internet paths. Complementing direct peering, remote peering enables additional
peering as well. However, this increase in peering involves a remote-peering provider that acts
as an intermediary. Furthermore, the intermediary that sells the remote-peering service can be
the same company that provided the bypassed transit services. Hence, remote peering increases
peering without necessarily flattening the Internet economic structure.
The observed separation of the two trends questions the usage of AS-level topologies for
representing the Internet economic structure. With remote-peering services provided on layer 2,
layer-3 modeling of the Internet structure fails to distinguish remote peering from direct peer-
ing and ignores the intermediary presence of remote-peering providers. Below, we elaborate on
various risks posed by this omission of the intermediary economic entities.
Layer-3 topologies can make the Internet structure look more reliable than it is. When a com-
pany employs the same physical infrastructure to provide transit and remote-peering services,
buying both might not translate the redundancy into higher reliability for the multihomed cus-
tomers.
The emergence of remote peering makes AS-level paths even less representative of the un-
derlying physical paths. The hidden presence of layer-2 remote-peering infrastructures in layer-3
paths creates an additional reason why a path with the smallest number of ASes does not necessary
provide the shortest delay of data delivery.
While it is common to use AS-level models for reasoning about Internet security, the hidden
presence of layer-2 intermediaries adds to existing security concerns. The invisible intermedi-
aries might be unwanted entities, e.g., those associated with problematic governments. The risks
include monitoring or modification of traffic by the intermediaries and exposure of traffic to other
parties, e.g., by delivering it through undesired geographies.
The reliance on layer-3 models also compromises accountability. Whereas a layer-2 interme-
diary might delay or discard traffic, attribution of responsibility for such performance disruptions
is complicated because the middleman is invisible on layer 3.
Because remote peering has different economics than transit and direct peering, the omission
of the layer-2 intermediaries from layer-3 models weakens economic understanding of the Inter-
net. In developing markets such as Africa, remote peering becomes a cost-effective alternative for
reaching well-connected areas in Europe and North America. Since remote peering has a smaller
connectivity scope than transit, adoption of remote peering necessitates new strategies for traf-
fic distribution. IXPs greatly benefit from remote peering: existing IXPs gain members, and new
IXPs are enabled by bringing together a critical mass of traffic [138]. Ignoring the remote-peering
providers distorts substantially the Internet economic landscape.
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Thus, the increase use of remote peering demonstrated by our study calls for alternative mod-
els of the Internet structure that explicitly represent layer-2 entities. The relevant additions include
not only remote-peering providers but also other layer-2 economic entities such as IXPs. With
the growing prominence of IXPs and remote-peering connectivity to them, integrated modeling
of the Internet structure on layers 2 and 3 becomes increasingly important for understanding the
Internet. The refined mapping of the Internet economic structure will likely require novel methods
for inference of economic entities and their relationships [62].
5.4. Related work
Internet structure. The Internet structure is highly important for multihoming [5], routing
security [89], and various problems in content delivery via overlay systems [105,109]. By clarify-
ing the Internet structure, our study of remote peering enables further advances in these and other
significant practical domains. Because network operators do not publicly disclose connectivity
of their networks, the research community relies on measurements and inference to characterize
the Internet structure [96]. A prominent means for the topology discovery is the traceroute tool
that exposes routers on IP delivery paths [47]. For example, Hubble [107] use traceroute to gen-
erate and maintain annotated Internet maps. Paris traceroute enhances traceroute with the ability
to discover multiple paths [10]. A complementary approach is to utilize BGP traces [84, 167].
Our work employs active probing in the data plane to understand the role of remote peering in
the Internet structure. Delay measurements are common in Internet studies, e.g., to understand
evolution of Internet delay properties [115] or Internet penetration into developing regions. We
use delay measurements to investigate how geography affects peering of networks.
Remote peering and interconnection arrangements. While previous research studies only
mention remote peering [3, 44, 166], the measurement study of this chapter is the first to closely
examine this emerging type of network interconnection. Our results show wide spread, significant
traffic offload potential, and conditions for economic viability of remote peering. The Internet
structural evolution [126] changes the dominant sources of traffic [49] and diversifies network
types and their interconnection arrangements [38]. For example, partial transit [178] and paid
peering [57] complement the dominant relationships of transit and peering. Our study of remote
peering confirms the trend toward diversification of interconnection types.
Flattening of the Internet. The arguments that the Internet structure becomes flatter are
multifaceted [57,112], with the continued growth of IXPs [3,35,166] cited in support of this trend.
Our work reveals separation between the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening.
Also, while analyses of interconnection options are typically restricted to networks that share a
location [163], our work exhibits remote peering as a cost-effective solution that enables distant
networks to peer over a layer-2 intermediary. With our results showing the increasing opaqueness
of the Internet structure from layer-3 perspectives, the opaqueness is likely to increase further
with adoption of software-defined networking [12]. The large reach of remote peering illustrated
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in this chapter calls for new approaches to mapping the Internet economic structure on both layers
2 and 3.
5.5. Summary
This chapter described remote peering, a technique in which ASes connect to various IXP
remotely using the same infrastructure. The remote peering provider provides layer-2 connectivity
to the various IXPs and manages the required equipment to connect them to the IXP back-plane.
Remote peering helps IXPs to expand their geographical footprint and maintain growth. We
describe the technical details of remote peering, show the results of measuring remote peering in
various IXPs across the world, and discuss its implications in the Internet structure. The main
conclusions of this chapter are:
Remote peering adoption. Using careful measurements of RTTs at 22 IXPs worldwide, our
ping-based method exposed wide spread of remote peering, with remote peering in more than
90% of the examined IXPs and peering on the intercontinental scale in a majority of them. Up to
20% of the members of AMS-IX were found to be using remote peering.
Remote peering implications for network operators. Remote peering represents a valid
option for operators to reach multiple IXPs at a moderate cost. In Chapter 7, we leverage this
opportunity and provide an example of how operators can study the benefits for their networks
of joining a large number of IXPs, either simultaneously or incrementally. Operators should
consider that remote-peering providers represent a potential single point of failure, and should
perform their network planning accordingly.
Impact of remote peering in the Internet infrastructure. By demonstrating the wide spread
and significant traffic offload potential of remote peering, our results challenge the research com-
munity’s reliance on layer-3 topologies in representing the Internet economic structure. Although
the layer-3 Internet topology sees a more flattening structure, remote peering is reflected into a
hierarchical layer-2 structure, with remote-peering providers playing a central role. Due to the
failure to include the organizations that provide layer-2 remote-peering services, layer-3 models
substantially distort the economic structure and can lead to incorrect conclusions about its prop-
erties, e.g., by conflating the trends of increasing peering and Internet flattening. Thus, the omis-
sion of remote-peering providers from traditional layer-3 representations of the Internet topology
compromises research on Internet reliability, security, accountability, and economics. Our find-
ings call for new topological models to represent the prominent role of layer-2 organizations in
the Internet economic structure.
Part II
Inter-domain Traffic Management
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Chapter 6
Framework for Inter-domain traffic
Management
In the first part of the thesis, we explored and characterized the inter-domain environment.
In this second part, we take the perspective of network operators, introducing models and tools
that they can use to manage the inter-domain aspects of their networks under this environment.
We start, in this chapter, by describing a general framework for the management of inter-domain
traffic, and the difficulties that hinder their implementation across ASes. In the two consequent
chapters, we provide details of two applications for inter-domain traffic management. Concretely,
we describe methodology for IXP infrastructure extension in Chapter 7, and provide a system for
warnings on policy violations in Chapter 8.
6.1. Introduction
For operators, inter-domain traffic management consists on imposing their policies into their
inter-domain traffic distribution by monitoring, characterizing, optimizing, and controlling it [11].
The policy of each AS is the result of the business requirements driving the enterprise in charge of
the network (e.g. SLAs fulfillment, cost constrains, etc.). Unfortunately, the imposition of policy
into the traffic distribution is not simple. There are various reasons for this difficulty. First,
operators control inter-domain traffic using exclusively the reachability information exchanged to
other ASes; therefore, policies must be translated to inter-domain route management using device
configurations and the BGP protocol, as illustrated in Figure 6.1 [69]. This task is not trivial and
prone to errors. Second, in a distributed system such as the Internet, the policy of an AS can
conflict with those of others. Operators must thus not only know how to steer the traffic, but also
know how to assess the efficiency of their strategies and the impact of the policies of external
ASes on them. Third, the process and techniques required to control ingress traffic vastly differ
from those used to control the egress traffic. For outbound, operators are able to modify and
select among all paths received from neighbors. For inbound, operators are limited to influence
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Figure 6.1: Process of imposing policy onto inter-domain trafﬁc.
the decision process of others.
Operators can boost the cost-effectiveness and performance of their networks by increasing
their number of peering links, employing caches, or using special transport services such as re-
mote peering or partial-transit. The Internet environment depicted in the ﬁrst part of this thesis
shows that ASes are using these strategies in practice. These beneﬁts, however, are not free. Op-
erators must ensure that they are able to manage the interaction of their networks with the policy
of multiple peers, and that they receive all the beneﬁts from the services they acquire. Operators
should manage their inter-domain trafﬁc using procedures adapted to an environment in which
their networks interact with external ASes who possess dynamic policies and networks that can
fail at multiple levels.
A general framework for inter-domain network management is depicted in Figure 6.2. which
is based on the model found in [174] [77]. The framework consists of a cycle of four proce-
dures: data-collection; validation and veriﬁcation; optimization; and operation. These blocks are
supported by a simulation procedure. In the data collection phase, operators use various tools
to obtain the data of the network. The validation and veriﬁcation procedure warns operators
against situations (in deployment or in planning) that should be tackled by operators. These sit-
uations include: (1) performance degradation (link overload, dangerous failure cases, etc.); (2)
potential conﬁguration errors (e.g. Route-leaks); (3) divergence of the simulation model of the
network (model veriﬁcation); (4) or, prominently, the functions that ensure that internal policies
are not violated by external ones. Using information coming from the validation and data col-
lection blocks, operators decide on the actions required to optimize the network. Finally, the
operation block contains all functions necessary to implement the decisions formulated in the
optimization process. In the next sections, we extend the description of each of these procedures.
6.2. Data Collection
Data-collection functions gather the data required for a proper inter-domain management.
This includes not only data from the own network, but also control-plane and policies from ex-
ternal ASes. The collection of network data for inter-domain management is usually considered
complex for network operators due to its large and frequently incomplete nature, which limits
the efﬁciency that trafﬁc management methods can achieve. The introduction of SDN and big
data management technologies may change this rigid context, as it is pushing operators to request
ﬂexible routing system architectures. In the future, the network operation team might have the
resources to obtain, maintain, and analyze a rich variety of data from within and outside their net-
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Figure 6.2: Inter-domain management framework.
works. Without the need to change many of their routing devices, such data can be leveraged to
implement more complete inter-domain management applications. In this section, we overview
different methods to obtain this data, their limitations, and brieﬂy provide recent techniques and
protocols, proposed in the last few years, to facilitate data collection.
6.2.1. Collecting received BGP paths and paths installed in FIB
BGP feeds describing inter-domain paths reaching the border of an ISP are necessary for
analyzing the different route alternatives available at each router in the network. In order to
perform a complete network analysis, ISPs need to collect every path received from external
neighbors. The simplest architecture for BGP data collection consists of a centralized collector,
which communicates with all edge BGP devices. The completeness of the data collection depends
on the approach / protocol followed to convey the data to the collector. We describe some of the
options next.
CLI Scraping. The usage of custom scripts, e.g., based on router Command Lan-
guage Interpreter (CLI) commands and screen scraping.
iBGP. The conﬁguration of iBGP sessions with add-path [179] (or similar features to
propagate all BGP routes) between edge routers and a route collector (such as [121]) [50];
BMP. BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) is a simple protocol that provides access to
the information stored in the Adj-RIB-in tables of BGP devices [161]. The BMP speciﬁ-
cations support the signaling of paths before and after the application of inbound policies.
Nevertheless, some manufacturers might opt to only support one of these modes.
I2RS (Future). The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is working on a stan-
dardized interface to the routing system of network devices denominated Interface to the
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Routing System (I2RS) [98]. I2RS should provide the necessary interface for a central-
ized controller to fetch all paths received by edge devices from external ASes, including
information of the state of the path in the Routing Information Base (RIB) and Forward-
ing Information Base (FIB) of the routers. The time of availability of such technology is
however not yet known.
Some applications must be aware of the paths installed in the FIB of the routers. A BGP
collector can learn them by connecting to all routers in the network (since each router would
announce the best path). This is not always feasible, since some providers might opt to collect
BGP information from route reflectors. Moreover, this technique would not function under cases
where multi-path is required. Applications could simulate the extended BGP decision process
under all paths received to estimate the paths installed in the FIB by the routers, although this
process might be slightly different depending on the BGP implementation of each device. Another
alternative is to transmit all paths available by each router and signal the paths installed in the FIB
using a community, this idea is described in [29].
6.2.2. Collecting traffic data
Typically, ISPs collect traffic statistics to perform a variety of business-critical activities, rang-
ing from accounting and billing to intra-domain traffic engineering. For inter-domain manage-
ment purposes, an ISP should be able to monitor the traffic per prefix at every interface connect-
ing the network to external ASes. More granular information, such as traffic per application or
transport protocol, can also be very useful in specific cases. Netflow and sFlow are the two most
popular technologies for collecting this data [55, 146]. The traffic data generated by ISP net-
works can be quite large. To cope with this overhead, operators can decide to focus only on the
traffic observed in peak networking hour times. Likewise, operators could simplify many traffic
management techniques by considering the prefixes that drive most of the network traffic [70].
6.2.3. Collecting external AS policies
Every Autonomous system in the Internet has the freedom of filtering, redistributing, and
altering the paths it receives from neighbor ASes (“misbehaving” actions can only be identified
by other ASes). ISPs might need to evaluate the impact of the policies of external ASes in their
networks. The estimation of external polices is extremely complex, but, some data can be used to
obtain a starting approximation of them. We summarize some of them in the following:
AS relationships. The knowledge of the relationships among the AS conforming the
close AS neighborhood of an ISP can be useful for different inter-domain traffic manage-
ment applications (as the ones we will describe in Chapters 7 and 8). The estimation of the
relationship is difficult, and requires a high level of analysis of BGP data [123]. An ISP can
obtain this information through some commercial companies, through public data [123], or
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thanks to social interaction, since operators usually know the relationships of many of their
peers.
External BGP data. Some public Internet projects, such as route views or RIPE,
release the BGP data of devices located in different points of the Internet [131] [155]. This
information can be used to obtain a partial view of the policies of external AS. For instance,
it can help determine if some ASes filter prefixes or modify their path attributes [124] [60].
Also, as described in [191], the absence of events provides valuable of information for the
analysis of distributed systems. For egress inter-domain traffic, using external BGP data
to find missing paths that the network should be receiving, but are not, provides guidelines
on how the policy of external ASes affects the network. We provide details on how to find
missing paths from external ASes in Section 8.3.2.4.
The described data is a good starting point for the analysis of policies of external ASes.
Nonetheless, ISPs must understand that it is unfeasible to obtain a complete view of the policies of
the ASes in the Internet. Hence, this data can include some inaccurate information, and operators
must consider this fact at the time of the analysis. In general, network operators still require tools
for the conversion of large amounts of data (routing, traffic, etc.) into exploitable data that can be
easily understood by their management, design, and architecture teams.
6.2.4. Collecting network infrastructure and Shared Risk Link Groups
An inventory of the physical devices of the network is useful for troubleshooting and network
management. For network design, a summary of the physical location and the groups of devices
that can fail simultaneously, also referred to as Shared Risk Link Group (SRLG), can provide
engineers with information necessary for network failure analysis. The automatic discovery of
SRLGs has been extensively explored in optical networks [162]. For the case of IP networks,
operators must still rely on proprietary applications or protocols to perform network inventory
and SRLG knowledge construction. For the specific case of inter-domain routing, SRLGs could
group elements performing various inter-domain network functions such as route reflection or
heavy BGP sessions nodes, which could fail simultaneously. IXP connections using the same
remote peering provider should also be included in a single SRLG, even when the service to
different IXPs is delivered via distinct physical ports (as explained in chapter 5).
6.2.5. Collecting path performance details
Content provider networks or other ASes that offer real-time applications might need to obtain
data on the performance characteristics of the paths received by their neighboring ASes. Delay
or packet loss can be used by these companies to select the path that their packets should take
to reach an end user. This type of companies might prefer good performance paths over paths
traversing cheaper links. This can push them, for example, to send packets through a transit
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provider, instead of a peering link, when the latter suffers from high delay or packet loss due
to link congestion [159] [61]. The collection of performance data requires the measurement of
packet statistics, which can be obtained using probes, or taken directly from user applications.
Operators still face the challenge of correlating this data with control-plane information (BGP
paths). These can be facilitated if the respective data is stored in information systems with flexible
and standard interfaces [122].
6.2.6. Collecting internal Policies
Each autonomous system decides how to manage the routing information received from exter-
nal ASes. The routing policy of each AS defines what to do with the paths it receives from their
neighboring ASes: to which other ASes it can propagate the routes, how to modify the paths,
whether to filter them or not, etc. This policy is reflected in the configuration of edge devices.
Maintaining the policy information not only at the edge devices, but also in a centralized loca-
tion can help operators to match which network states and events conflict with the local policy. A
collector could extract policy information from the configuration of edge devices, but this would
require it to parse and simulate the policy descriptions for a large diversity of vendors and net-
work operative systems (e.g. route maps / routing policy language in Cisco, Policy Framework
for Junos). New network applications and devices are increasingly supporting protocols such as
NETCONF/YANG [18], which provide a flexible interface for network configuration. Also, ex-
ternal policies can be obtained via the Internet Routing Registries (IRR), when available, although
this has been proven to be inaccurate. These protocols could be leveraged to build centralized net-
work management solutions, which would allow operators to maintain policy related information
in a single database.
6.3. Simulation
Simulation tools estimate the full or partial state of the network under different scenarios.
Optimization and validation applications rely on these tools to evaluate network performance
under specific circumstances. Simulation tools designed for estimation of outbound traffic differ
from the ones used for inbound traffic. In this section, we provide an overview of the each of
them, and describe the difficulties that arise when developing tools for these purposes.
6.3.1. Simulation for inter-domain outbound traffic
For outbound traffic, an AS uses the reachability information (BGP paths) received from
external networks to decide, from all available paths, the ones that the network can use for sending
their traffic. Any tool used to estimate the egress inter-domain traffic should be able to simulate
(i) the transformations performed on incoming paths (policy), (ii) the BGP decision process of the
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network to define the paths that are selected, and (iii) the behavior of nodes with multiple paths
installed in their FIB. Each of these steps carries significant technical challenges.
Concerning the simulation of inbound policies (i), difficulties arise when trying to express
and simulate all possible policy logic options offered by router vendors, which can even involve
algorithmic type of behaviors (e.g. defining policies with linked conditionals and priorities).
The network-wide BGP decision process (ii) is intrinsically complex to simulate. The BGP
decision process is not always deterministic. It might converge differently depending on the order
of the updates, or might even not converge at all [94]. This is exacerbated if internal iBGP policies
are employed [182]. Also, simulation tools should also support different features of BGP such as
ADD-PATH. Event-driven tools are powerful for simulating the BGP decision process under these
characteristics, but they are more complex to build and maintain. Network operators can design
their networks to be deterministic in the BGP sense, thus facilitating the simulation process [72].
Although the Internet routing table consists of more than 500k prefixes, simulation tools can
employ techniques such as grouping the prefixes with the same policy [68] or analyzing only the
prefixes with more traffic demand in order to speed up the simulation process. These simulation
tools should also account for any architectural design, such as the use of different route reflector
hierarchies, or the use of technologies like segment routing [75] to select a specific path for some
prefixes.
Finally, simulation tools should include the load balancing behavior of routing nodes (iii).
Vendors apply their own mechanism for traffic balancing when multiple paths are installed in the
FIBs of routers. That is, not always the outbound traffic when N paths are available is equally
shared among the N paths. Simulation tools should be able to provide acceptable estimations of
the load balancing for the conditions of the network.
6.3.2. Simulation for inter-domain Inbound traffic
For inbound traffic, since each AS is free to choose the paths it uses for its outbound traffic,
an AS can only try to influence the path selection of external ASes. A proper simulation of
inbound traffic should estimate how external ASes would react to announcements made by the
AS (i.e. which paths the other ASes would select). A perfect simulation of the decisions and
policies of external ASes is intractable, due to difficulty of obtaining reliable or complete data on
their policies. Processes relying on simulations of inter-domain inbound traffic should account
for these difficulties, and provide methods to tune the models and deal with possible errors.
6.4. Validation and verification
The validation and verification block encompass tests for different levels of the network de-
sign phase, such as evaluating network performance, verifying the simulation models used for
planning, or checking the influence of policies from external ASes. These methods not only
involve checks at the technical level, but also at the economical level.
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Validation and verification are functions used in system or model testing [158]. Verification
functions check the internal operation of the model or system. Unit-testing or static analysis are
typical verification tests. Validation functions check that the system fulfills the requirements of
their users.
We classify the validation and verification functions according to the component / object they
test. We explain each of them next.
Data collection. Operators should verify that the data collected by their network is
reliable, since this data supports the whole inter-domain management process. Controlled
tests environments or comparison of different measurement systems can be useful for this.
Also, since some of the data required might be prone to errors (such as the policies or rela-
tionships of external ASes), operators would need to validate them when they are important
for the overall process.
Network state. The network state should be verified and validated against the expec-
tations and requirements of operators. Verification processes should ensure that the routers
operate correctly and according to the protocols ruling them1. Validation processes for this
component cover all tests required to ensure that the network offers the performance meet-
ing the policy of the operators. For instance, making sure that links are not saturated, or that
the company is not paying too much to its providers. Validation tests are not only limited to
the current state of the network, but also the network state in hypothetical situations, such
as the one created when traffic grows, or after some disruptive event (e.g. link failures).
External networks. The performance and policies of external ASes influence the op-
eration of the network. In terms of performance, operators often agree with their neighbor-
ing networks to SLAs, which can be verified using several metrics, which include latency,
jitter, or packet loss. Operators must ensure that these values are within the agreed ones.
The policy of external ASes are reflected in the reachability information they exchange and
the traffic they sent to the network. Verification and validation of these policies encompass
different tests. For instance, operators can use prefix filtering or Resource Public Key In-
frastructure (RPKI) systems to detect routes that should not be announced by neighboring
network. Operators can also analyze how external ASes propagate and modify the prefixes
originated by them. Validation functions can also evaluate the state of the network if the
policy of the external ASes were different, thus motivating network managers to try to per-
suade changes in policy to their counter-parts. In Chapter 8, we delve into the problem
of policy verification and validation, and describe with detail several validation tests that
operators can use to assess their impact in their network.
Simulation and optimization. The simulation and optimization block supports the
1We refer here to the inter-domain related infrastructure of the network. Nevertheless, the correct operation of the
inter-domain traffic depends on its intra-domain counterpart and should also be tested.
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framework by evaluating the inter-domain network state under different scenarios and se-
lecting the changes that would lead to a better state. Operators might in some cases be able
to run labs [164], or configuration tests [81] to verify the simulation models and potential
configuration before they are applied (this is symbolized by the feedback arrow between
the optimization and validation process in Figure 6.2). Nevertheless, the nature of the inter-
domain environment difficulties the implementation of these tests, forcing the use of the
operative network data to check and tune simulation and provisioning components. Sim-
ulation models can fail, for instance, by not correctly inferring the internal propagation of
paths, or the traffic distribution in a multi-path scenario. The optimization block can fail by
not providing solutions that are sufficient for the requirements of the operators, or by not
reflecting correctly the policies of the operators into router configuration and BGP changes
(Figure 6.1). We stress that these processes are not necessarily implemented in automatic
systems, but can be performed in the organization by the operators themselves.
The aforementioned tests could, in theory, be separated in the framework. We joined them
under the same block due to different reasons. First, labs or testing facilities for the inter-domain
environment are seldom available or reliable. Thus, operators can only use the data of the network
itself to validate and verify all components. Second, many of these tests are entangled, in the sense
that all of them should be run in order to test the overall system. For instance, a divergence of the
inter-domain traffic to the calculations of a what-if scenario from the simulation process might
be caused due to malfunctioning of the model, incorrect data obtained by the data-acquisition
system, or conflicting policy from a neighboring ASes. Third, some tests can apply to many of
these functions. For instance, testing whether traffic from a settlement-free neighbor appears at a
transit link can be a test for the correctness of the simulation/optimization model, to validate the
policy of external ASes, or to validate network state. In practice, operators run different tests and
correlate the information provided by them to find problems, root causes, and opportunities for
improvement.
6.5. Optimization
The optimization process encompasses all changes in traffic control or infrastructure to im-
prove the performance and profitability of the network, either in the current state or in potential
future scenarios.
Traffic control mechanisms include all techniques focused at steering the inter-domain traffic
under the same infrastructure. This implies, in outbound traffic, for operators to decide the priority
of the paths received [176]. For inbound traffic, operators can use different techniques for this end,
such as selective advertisement, path prepending, or MED tuning to influence the path selection
of external ASes [70].
Infrastructure optimizations extend or modify the structure of the network. For inter-domain
routing, this can apply both to physical (e.g. expanding capacity, or connecting to a new IXP), or
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logical resources (e.g. new peering sessions). Expanding the network to reach new neighboring
ASes requires operators to evaluate the benefits that they would obtain. One could, for instance,
use external data to estimate which prefixes can be exchanged with other ASes.
The optimization of traffic on ISP network is a multi-objective optimization process, in which
operators should make decisions based on various techno and economical aspects, often selecting
solutions that sacrifice some aspects. For instance, in case of saturation with a settlement-free
peer, should the network steer some traffic exchanged with this peer to a transit provider? Is the
operator willing to have a less optimal solution by limiting the number of configuration changes?
Due to these conditions, optimization procedures might better be implemented using a hybrid
solution between calculation systems, to explore potential changes, and human input accepting
the best changes.
The granularity of the traffic flows that operators can steer affects the optimization model for
both traffic directions. For outbound traffic, operators are limited to only modifying the attributes
of received paths at the edge routers. In those cases, changes in the path attributes are propa-
gated through the whole network, thus making it complex for optimization systems to distribute
the traffic for a single prefix across possible exit points. This level of granularity might not be
sufficient to achieve traffic balance in certain topologies. The use of iBGP policies (changing
path attributes over iBGP sessions) can help increase the granularity of traffic changes, but they
are discouraged as they can create control-plane instabilities [182]. A BGP controller could also
inject artificial more specifics for this objective (i.e. prefix deaggregation), although operators
must be careful on not propagate them into other neighbors (this was the source of one route-leak
problem in 2015 [117]). Other option is to use a controller to signal the router to steer a sub-set
of traffic through one of the exit points. Segment Routing , for instance, offers an Egress Peering
Engineering option for this purpose [75]. Inbound traffic also suffers from problems related to the
capacity of operators of steering granular amounts of traffic. Prefix deaggregation is the more the
straightforward solution for this problem, but has caused the increase of the routing table [125].
Selective scoping communities [60] offer another option to deaggregate the traffic, but they are
harder to manage.
6.6. Operation
The operational component includes all actions aimed at applying the changes outputted from
the optimization process. This component contains elements like provisioning systems (either au-
tomatic or human based), acquisition processes, or new peering negotiation. The peering manager
is an important figure in this component (and in the whole framework), as this one is in charge of
negotiating with other companies any peering relationship.
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6.7. Related Work
Network planning frameworks. The framework described in this section is based on the
ones discussed in [174] and [77]. We extended this framework to emphasize the validation and
verification process, which is particularly important for the inter-domain environment. Other
network planning frameworks exists, such as the one portrayed in [180]. Different from individual
networks, the inter-domain planning requires knowledge of the policies of external ASes. Some
authors provide methods to estimate these policies, but their complex essence forces operators to
use manual and automatic procedures, and probably many tests, to figure them out. In this regard,
the discovery of external policies can resemble Knowledge Discovery Systems (KDSs) [51] or
Decision Support Systems (DSSs) [149], which are cited more frequently in Business Intelligence
literature.
Inter-domain traffic engineering. Several authors have proposed optimization techniques
for outbound [176] [72] [150], and inbound traffic [151] [87]. These proposals differ on the em-
ployed optimization techniques; their metrics; or whether they prepare the network for different
traffic states and disruptive events (e.g. link failures). Some authors have also looked at the
global optimization of inter- and intra-domain traffic [14] [186]; however, these can become very
complex. Operators can isolate the inter-domain traffic from the intra-domain traffic by using
technologies such as MPLS.
Validation of the Inter-domain operation. The RPKI system was developed with the pur-
pose of avoiding forged or invalid routes in BGP [22]. Static analysis techniques have been pro-
posed for validation of device configuration, thus preventing, for instance, the creation of route
leaks [69]. Other tools examine policies of external ASes such as their compliance of consistent
advertisement [71], or disruptive prefix filtering [124]. In Chapter 8, we discuss techniques to
detect and classify policy conflicts with external ASes. We provide a further description of the
literature related to this topic in that chapter.
6.8. Summary
This chapter introduces a framework for the management of inter-domain traffic. We ex-
plained the steps forming the framework, including data collection, validation procedures, and
optimization techniques. In addition, we provided examples of procedures and tools fitting each
one of these steps. We stress that not all inter-domain management processes might fit perfectly
into the framework. However, the framework highlights the needs of validation, what-if scenario
capabilities, and optimization functions that are important in practice.
In the next chapters, we provide details of inter-domain management applications dealing
with peering infrastructure extension (Chapter 7) and external policy validation (Chapter 8). We
expose next the main conclusions from this chapter.
Difficulties for data collection. Inter-domain traffic management requires the collection and
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correlation of data from different systems. Also, operators might only be able to acquire partial or
estimated data, such as the policy of neighboring ASes. Operators should thus include processes
that can function with large, incomplete, or partially wrong data.
On the importance of validation. The infeasibility of simulating the Internet environment
forces operators to use the running network data to validate the results of their inter-domain man-
agement procedures. These functions should provide operators with the feedback require to trig-
ger tune the simulation models, launch new optimizations, perform internal configuration checks
or deal with conflicting policies of external ASes. In Chapter 8, we illustrate how incompatible
interest can result in interest violations for an AS. We present in that chapter a validation system
that operators can use to detect these interest violations and highlight those that have a larger
impact in the network.
Chapter 7
Peering expansion using remote peering
Recognizing the benefits of enriching the interconnections of their networks, many operators
constantly evaluate the expansion of their peering infrastructure. The IXP based peering environ-
ment, described in Part I of this thesis, facilitates this operation. Although peering management
is a social-centric process1, operators and peering coordinators can use tools to help them find
the best peering strategies, and the best IXPs to expand. These tools should consider scenarios in
which the network potentially joins different IXPs, or peers with companies with different peering
policies.
In this chapter, we provide an example of a peering expansion study leveraging the large
IXP offer and remote peering services. Using the data of a real network, we first perform a
typical peering study, analyzing the top potential ASes, to which the company should directly
peer. Subsequently, we evaluate the potential for the company to go to single IXPs under different
peering policy scenarios. We show how the overlapping of IP space diminishes the marginal gain
of transit off-loading when peering at more than one IXP. However, thanks to remote peering,
ASes can reduce the operative costs of joining more than one IXP and we calculate the potential
off-loading traffic for extensively using this service. Finally, we discuss other advantages of
improving peering and partially illustrate them using RedIRIS data.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We describe the traffic data we use for our
study in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 describes and evaluates the peering study based on transit off-
load traffic. We discuss about other potential gains of peering at multiple IXPs in Section 7.3. We
present related work in 7.4, and conclude in Section 7.3.
7.1. Traffic data
We collect and use traffic data from RedIRIS, the NREN (National Research and Education
Network) in Spain. This network interconnects with GE´ANT (backbone for European NRENs),
buys transit from two tier-1 providers, peers with major Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), and
1As reported in [190] a large percentages of settlement-free peering arrangements are performed informally.
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Figure 7.1: Network contributions to the transit-provider traffic and offload potential with peer
group 4
has memberships in two IXPs: CATNIX in Barcelona and ESpanix in Madrid. In February 2013,
we used NetFlow to collect one month of traffic data at the 5-minute granularity in the ASBRs
(Autonomous System Border Routers) of RedIRIS.
Among all the inter-domain traffic, only the traffic between RedIRIS and its transit providers
might contribute to the offload potential. Depending on whether RedIRIS receives the traffic from
its transit providers or sends the traffic to them, we respectively classify the transit-provider traffic
as inbound or outbound. The collected dataset identifies networks by their ASNs and contains
records for 29,570 networks that are origins of the inbound traffic or destinations of the outbound
traffic.
To illustrate the contributions of the 29,570 networks to the transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS,
we report how much traffic each individual network contributes as an origin of the inbound traffic
and destination of the outbound traffic. Figure 7.1a plots the average traffic rates for the respective
inbound and outbound contributions by the individual networks during the measurement period.
The figure ranks the networks in the decreasing order of the contributions. While a few networks
make huge contributions close to the Gbps mark, most networks contribute little. In the range
where the networks are ranked about 20,000 and contribute average traffic rates around 100 bps,
the distributions of the inbound and outbound traffic exhibit a similar change in the qualitative
profile of the decreasing individual contributions: a bend toward a faster decline. While the raw
data exhibit the bend as well, reasons for the bend constitute an interesting topic for future work.
Figure 7.1b reveals daily and weekly fluctuations in the transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS, with
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Figure 7.2: Origin and destination traffic vs. transient traffic for top contributors to the offload
potential
periodic fluctuations being clearly pronounced for the inbound traffic.
7.2. Offload scenarios and evaluation
RedIRIS cannot offload all of its transit-provider traffic. The offload potential depends on the
set of IXPs that the network is able to reach via remote peering. Also, the set of members of
the reached IXPs do not include all the networks that contribute to the transit-provider traffic of
RedIRIS. Finally, not all the members of the reached IXPs are likely to peer with RedIRIS.
For the set of IXPs that RedIRIS might be able to reach, we consider the Euro-IX association
formed, as of February 2013, by 65 IXPs from all the continents [8]. Based on Euro-IX data from
February 2013, we limit potential peers of RedIRIS to the members of these 65 IXPs.
We further trim the group of potential peers by excluding the networks that are highly unlikely
to peer with RedIRIS. First, we do not consider the transit providers of RedIRIS as its potential
peers because transit providers typically do not peer with their customers. It is worth noting
that no network sells transit to these two tier-1 providers, and thus no such network needs to be
excluded due to its transitive transit relation with RedIRIS. Second, since RedIRIS already has
memberships in CATNIX and ESpanix, the other members of these two IXPs are disregarded as
candidates for remote peering with RedIRIS. In particular, we exclude all the other tier-1 networks
because they have memberships in ESpanix. Third, due to the cost-effective interconnectivity
that comes with the GE´ANT membership, we do not consider the other GE´ANT members as
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potential peers of RedIRIS. After applying the above three rules, the group of potential remote
peers of RedIRIS reduces to 2,192 networks. Even after eliminating the highly unlikely peers,
there remains a significant uncertainty as to which of the 2,192 networks might actually peer with
RedIRIS.
To deal with the remaining uncertainty about potential peers, we examine a range of peer
groups, i.e., groups of networks that might peer with RedIRIS. Using PeeringDB which reports
peering policies of IXP members [118, 145], we compose the following 4 peer groups so that the
peering policies of their members comprise:
[peer group 1] all open policies;
[peer group 2] all open and top 10 selective policies,
which adds to peer group 1 the 10 networks that have the largest offload potentials among
the networks with selective policies;
[peer group 3] all open and selective policies;
[peer group 4] all policies, i.e., all open, selective, and restrictive policies.
Peer group 4 constitutes our upper bound on the likely peers of RedIRIS. When RedIRIS
reaches all the 65 IXPs, this peer group 4 includes all the aforementioned 2,192 networks. Peer
group 1 represents a lower bound on the networks that might actually peer with RedIRIS. It is
common for such open-policy networks to automatically peer with any interested IXP member
via the IXP route server [154].
For each peer group, we determine the offload potential of RedIRIS by fully shifting to remote
peering the traffic that the networks of this peer group, and their customer cones, contribute to
the transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS. The customer cone corresponds to all ASes that an AS can
reach using customer links.
In addition to studying sensitivity of the offload potential to the peer groups, we also evaluate
its sensitivity to the choice of reached IXPs. Specifically, our evaluation explores the set of
reached IXPs from a single IXP to all the 65 IXPs in the Euro-IX data.
7.2.1. Offload evaluation results
We start by estimating the maximal offload potential with peer group 4 (all policies) when
RedIRIS reaches all the 65 IXPs. In this scenario, RedIRIS offloads traffic of 12,238 networks
which represent the joint customer cone of the 2,192 companies included in the peer group 4.
Figure 7.1a shows how much traffic these 12,238 networks contribute to the offload potential in
the inbound and outbound directions. The plot ranks the networks in the decreasing order of
their traffic contributions. The results suggest that the maximal offload potential is substantial:
RedIRIS offloads around 27% and 33% of its transit-provider traffic in the inbound and outbound
directions respectively. While the inbound traffic dominates the outbound traffic, figure 7.1b
reveals that the peaks of the transit-provider traffic and offload potential of RedIRIS consistently
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Figure 7.3: Offload potential at a single IXP
coincide, implying that the traffic offload can reduce transit bills, which are typically determined
by traffic peaks.
Figure 7.2 zooms in on the top 30 contributors to the maximal offload potential. These 30
networks make the largest traffic contributions to the combined inbound and outbound offload
potential and are the main candidates for private peering, in case the traffic exchanged fits their
peering policies. The top contributors include Microsoft, Yahoo, and CDNs, suggesting that
content-eyeball traffic features heavily in the offload potential. For a majority of the top contrib-
utors, the origin and destination traffic dominates the transient traffic.
Switching to the sensitivity analyses, we first evaluate the offload potential for all peer groups
when RedIRIS reaches a single IXP. This single IXP is chosen among the 10 IXPs where
RedIRIS has the largest offload potential. Figure 7.3 reports the offload potential of RedIRIS
at each of the 10 IXPs. The top 4 of the IXPs include the big European trio (AMS-IX, LINX,
and DE-CIX) and Terremark from Miami, USA. For any of the peer groups, the offload potential
is similar across the 3 largest European IXPs because these IXPs have many common members
(see Chapter 3). On the other hand, the offload potential at Terremark is significantly different
due to its different membership: numerous members of Terremark from South and Central Amer-
ica [127] contribute significantly to the transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS and are not present in
Europe.
We now assess the additional value of reaching a second IXP after RedIRIS fully realizes
its offload potential at a single IXP. When the two reached IXPs have common members that
contribute to the transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS, realizing the offload potential at the first IXP
reduces the amount of traffic that RedIRIS can offload at the second IXP. For peer group 4 (all
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Figure 7.4: Additional value of reaching a second IXP after realizing the offload potential at a
single IXP
policies), figure 7.4 illustrates this effect when AMS-IX, LINX, DE-CIX, and Terremark act as
either first or second IXP. When LINX and AMS-IX act as the first and second IXPs respectively,
the offload potential remaining at AMS-IX after fully realizing the offload potential at LINX is
0.2 Gbps, which is much lower than the full potential of 1.6 Gbps at AMS-IX. When Terremark
acts as the second IXP, the decrease in its offload potential is less pronounced because Terremark
shares only about 50 of its 267 members with either of the 3 largest European IXPs.
Generalizing the above, we examine the additional value for RedIRIS to reach extra IXPs
using remote peering. We iteratively expand the set of reached IXPs by adding the IXP with the
largest remaining offload potential. For peer group 4, the first 4 reached IXPs are added in the
following order: AMS-IX, Terremark, DE-CIX, and CoreSite. For all the 4 peer groups, figure 7.5
plots the remaining transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS as the number of reached IXPs increases.
The overall reduction in transit-provider traffic of RedIRIS varies from 8% for peer group 1 (all
open policies) to 25% for peer group 4 (all policies). Figure 7.5 shows that the marginal utility of
reaching an extra IXP diminishes exponentially and that reaching only 5 IXPs enables RedIRIS
to realize most of its overall offload potential.
In Chapter 3, we calculated the number of hosts that could be reached by any company after
joining different IXPs. Figure 7.5 reflects the specific case of RedIRIS using a similar procedure,
but in terms of traffic. We re-plot the control-plane results in Figure 7.6, in order to be able to
compare it with the results of RedIRIS. The two figures resemble a similar exponential dimin-
ishing shape (one in the control-plane, the other on the data-plane). In [37], we formulate an
economic model evaluating the benefits of remote peering using this generalized pattern.
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7.3. Quantifying other benefits
Transit traffic offloading provides a direct estimation of the savings that a company can obtain
by peering at external IXPs, thus facilitating network managers to prepare a business case for
peering expansion. Other advantages of establishing multiple peering links are the reduction of
transport, or increasing resiliency bounding economic cost. The former is related to hot-potato
routing, as by adding more peering links companies can potentially deliver traffic closer to the
source. The latter advantage relates to the opportunity of still relying on peering links, even when
other peering links fail.
Peering at multiple IXPs would not decrease the overall transport distance of packets on our
case, since RedIRIS already peers at the two IXPs that are close to their networks and customers.
In fact, in case RedIRIS does peer at other distant IXPs, its network managers should be careful
to not send traffic to these if closer exit points exist.
To study the resiliency advantages of extending to new IXP, we first look at the peering traffic
from the network. Figure 7.7 depicts the inbound and outbound traffic exchanges with the largest
IXP the network uses (ESpanix). The traffic over this link is comparable to the the transit traf-
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Figure 7.7: Trafﬁc over link to main IXP.
ﬁc, and would cause a potential bill increase in case there is a failure at the IXP or on the link
connecting with it, driving this trafﬁc to the transit provider links.
Figure 7.8 show the top 30 ASes contributing to this trafﬁc (values based on the 95-percentile).
The top peer is causing around 50% of the inbound trafﬁc, and 14% of the outbound. The top
5 ASes contribute 65% and 80% of the inbound and outbound trafﬁc, respectively. The top 8
peering ASes are connecting directly at ESpanix. The reminding ASes either connect at ESpanix
or are reached via one AS connecting there.
Operators can evaluate the beneﬁts of peering at other IXP in terms of redundant peering
links, by simulating the trafﬁc that would go to them in case of failure of the main IXP, and
comparing the costs of this to the costs of exchanging this trafﬁc with transit providers. Figure
7.9 illustrate for the top 30 ASes whether they peer or not at 10 large IXPs. This provides a
guideline to the IXPs where top contributing ASes are present. From the ﬁgure, we observe
that the top contributor AS (top row) is present at many other IXPs, and the third contributor is
present at both LINX and AMS-IX. There should be no reason for one of these ASes to not peer
with RedIRIS at other IXPs, as a peering relationship already exists. Finally, Figure 7.10 shows
the potential trafﬁc exchanged to individual IXPs in case the connection with the ESpanix fails.
The comparable trafﬁc levels with most of these IXPs are explained by the presence of the top
contributor AS in many of them.
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Figure 7.8: Top ASes contributing to IXP peering trafﬁc.
Figure 7.9: IXP membership for top contributing peering ASes.
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Figure 7.10: Potential back-up trafﬁc after failure of main IXP.
7.4. Related Work
Peering selection and optimization. The data required to perform peering studies is difﬁcult
to obtain, therefore, previous work has focus on creating analytic frameworks that offer generic
conclusions. [86] formulates the peering study as an optimization problem determining a limited
set of ASes to which the network should peer and the peering agreement type used to do it.
[119] studies the complications involving peering selection due to the inaccurate trafﬁc prediction,
involved pricing structure, and optimization complexity. The work in this chapter relaxes some
of these assumptions to provide guidelines to operators and peering coordinators.
Peering modeling. Several authors have worked toward modeling the peering strategies of
ASes in the Internet [42] [126]. Paid-peering agreements have received special attention from
researchers, which have built frameworks to quantify the value involved in them [58], or analyze
models for revenue distribution [126].
7.5. Summary
This chapter presents a peering study using real network data. This analysis can serve as a
guideline for tools that operators can use to estimate the beneﬁts of direct connections with other
ASes, or peering at multiple IXPs. The main study uses transit off-load potential to measure the
advantages of peering. We also discuss other beneﬁts of peering, and provide a discussion on how
operators can do to quantify them.
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Using data to assist Peering management. A large part of the peering management process
is social-centric. Operator and peering coordinators engage frequently with their peers at other
companies to informally set up settlement-free peering agreements [190]. Nonetheless, business-
intelligence and planning type of tools reporting information similar to the one exposed in this
chapter, can aid network managements to focus their efforts to the IXPs and companies that pro-
vide larger returning benefits. The potential transit traffic off-loading offers a direct way of quan-
tifying the savings. Network resiliency or internal transport offer additional benefits. Managers
can use business impact analysis, or detailed bit-mile calculations to quantity these advantages
and justify network expansions.
External policies should be assumed, validated later. Peering study tools must assume the
policies of external ASes, reflected in the prefixes that they advertise, and the traffic that can be
attracted from them and their customers. As seen in Chapter 6, the policies of ASes are dynamic
and hard to estimate. After the actual peering sessions are established, the exchanged traffic might
not be exactly as network managers planned. Operators and peering coordinators could use more
insight information to tune the estimation process in order to avoid bad surprises. They can, for
instance, obtain a priory the prefixes advertised in IXP route server, or use social contact to inquire
the conditions of potential peering agreements. In Chapter 8, we describe several techniques that
operators can use to validate the policy of external networks after the peering links have been
provisioned.
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Chapter 8
Detecting inter-domain policy conflicts
The inter-domain traffic of a network depends not only on the policy imposed by network
managers, but also on its interaction with the policy of external ASes. In some cases, the policy
of external ASes can lead to traffic distributions that violate the policy of a network. In this
chapter, we explain how these violations can occur, even when external ASes do not intend to
cause them. Also, we describe a set of techniques that operators can employ in the validation
steps of the management process (Chapter 6) to detect these violations, and employ data from
two European networks to test them.
Due to the nature of inter-domain routing and the lack of global coordination between ASes,
the interest (or policies) of ASes may be incompatible. Consider, for instance, Fig. 8.1. In this
example, AS4 has an interest to receive incoming traffic destined to its prefix 1/8 from AS2.
However, AS3 prefers to send traffic directly to AS4, and AS1 favors the link to AS3 to forward
this traffic. Unfortunately, those interests are actually incompatible, that is, no valid distribution
of traffic will realize the interests of all the ASes involved. In this scenario, depending on the
specific policies configured by AS4, AS3 and AS1, we have three possible cases, which we
detail in Figure 8.2. In the first case (shown in Fig. 8.2(a)), AS1 forwards traffic to AS2. This
configuration realizes the interests of AS4 but neither those of AS1 nor of AS3. In the second
case (illustrated in Fig. 8.2(b)), AS1 forwards traffic to AS3, which subsequently transmits it
to AS2, thus sacrificing its own interests. In the last case (see Fig. 8.2(c)), both AS1 and AS3
realize their respective interests, at the expenses of AS4.
The interests and policy interactions of the example from Figure 8.1 can realistically occur
in the Internet, if (I) AS4 is a customer of AS3 and AS2, (II) AS1, AS3, and AS4 are all cus-
tomers of AS2, and (III) AS1 and AS3 are settlement-free peers. Also, the scenarios depicted
in Figure 8.2 reflect policy decisions and router configurations that can be found in operational
networks [28] [111]. BGP does not provide any guarantee in the presence of incompatible inter-
ests. Actually, incompatible interests may result in so-called policy disputes, which can trigger
routing (i.e., control-plane instabilities) and forwarding (i.e., inter-domain loops) anomalies [94].
Policy disputes have been the target of numerous research efforts, covering the full range be-
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Figure 8.1: Network topology and inter-domain trafﬁc interests for four different ASes.
tween theoretical (e.g., [53, 157, 171]) and practical (e.g., [54, 80]) contributions. Nevertheless,
much less work has been done on the class of incompatible interests that are anomaly-free (as any
conﬁguration in Fig. 8.2).
In this work, we complement previous research by focusing on incompatible policies1 that do
not result in routing or forwarding anomalies. Incompatible policies can trigger trafﬁc ﬂows not
respecting the original preference of one or more ASes. We show how these interest violations,
as we denominate them, can theoretically and practically lead to signiﬁcant economic losses for
individual ASes.
For example, in Fig. 8.2(a), AS1may be forced to pay for the trafﬁc forwarded toAS2, while
its (violated) interest to send trafﬁc to AS3 could have led to no expenses. Similar economic
losses can occur forAS3 andAS4, as explained Fig. 8.2(b) and 8.2(c), respectively. Such an eco-
nomic impact, along with the impossibility to resolve incompatible interests in an automatic way
(by deﬁnition), highlights the operational need for ASes to timely detect, understand, and assess
interest violations. Unfortunately, this current commercial and research tools do not address this
need. In order to ﬁll this gap, we make several contributions:
First, we provide a characterization of interest inconsistencies not leading to BGP anomalies
(Section 8.1). In particular, taking the perspective of a single AS X , we distinguish between
interest violations affecting outbound and inbound trafﬁc. The former category is related to the
BGP routes that neighboring ASes send to X . For example, if a single neighbor advertises a
deaggregated preﬁx p on a speciﬁc inter-domain link withX , this will attract all trafﬁc fromX to
p to that link, independently of the policies (and the interests) of X . Conversely, inbound interest
1We refer to incompatible policies also as incompatible interest in the rest of the chapter
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(a) AS4 performs selective advertisement
with (more-speciﬁc) preﬁxes 1.0/9 and
1.128/9, in order to lead trafﬁc heading to
preﬁx 1/8 to its link with AS2. This con-
ﬂicts with the interest of AS1.
1.128/9 &  
1.0/9 
1/8 
1.128/9 &  
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(b) AS1 ﬁlters the incoming preﬁxes 1.0/9
and 1.128/9 from its transit provider
(AS2), and sends trafﬁc to its peerAS3 us-
ing covering preﬁx 1/8. AS3, however, is
affected, as it still has routes based on the
more-speciﬁc preﬁxes 1.0/9 and 1.128/9.
1/8 
1.128/9 &  
1.0/9 
1.128/9 &  
1.0/9 
1.128/9 &  
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(c) AS3 could decide to ﬁlter the more-
speciﬁc preﬁxes 1.0/9 and 1.128/9. This
policy is incompatible with the one of its
customer, AS4.
Figure 8.2: Trafﬁc state and interest fulﬁllment for 3 different policy conﬁgurations.
violations are typically reﬂected in the policies applied byX’s neighbors on routes propagated by
X . For instance, ﬁlters and partial modiﬁcations applied by neighbors to X’s routes can change
the ingress points of trafﬁc traversing X .
Second, we develop algorithms to (I) detect outbound and inbound interest violations; and
(II) measure their impact, especially in terms of affected trafﬁc volumes (Section 8.2). Our al-
gorithms exploit the variety of data sources on the Internet trafﬁc, typically available to network
operators. In particular, we show ways to detect interest violations by combining multiple BGP
views (internal and external to the given AS) and trafﬁc data.
Third, we build upon our algorithms to design and prototype a warning system, which raises
alarms for the most critical interest violations (Section 8.3). Our warning system is intended to
support network managers in their strategic business decisions, and to contact their counterparts
in other ASes (e.g., to modify business agreements). Since interest violations may coincide with
unfulﬁlled peering contracts (possibly due to misconﬁgurations), our system also offers technical
support for veriﬁcation of commercial agreements.
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Fourth, we leverage our warning system to measure interest violations and their impact on
traffic in a European Tier-2 and a national academic network (Section 8.4). This original mea-
surement campaign shows (I) the effectiveness of our algorithms to detect (the most) business-
affecting interest violations; (II) the practical feasibility of our system; and (III) the unexpectedly
high frequency and relevance (e.g., in terms of impacted traffic) of interest violations in the real
world.
8.1. Interest violations from the Perspective of a Single AS
Incompatible interests among different ASes can translate into interest violations affecting
one or more ASes, that is, states in which the ASes are not technically or economically satisfied
with the distribution of their inter-domain traffic. In this section, we define interest violations
with detail, and analyze their impact on a single AS. Further, we classify interest violations into
outbound or inbound, depending on the traffic flow they affect, and describe realistic examples for
each class. Our examples also show that (I) our classification covers all type (inbound, outbound
and transit) of traffic traversing the considered AS; and (II) interest violations may be due to a
variety of economic reasons, and be realized through different technical means.
8.1.1. Outbound interest violations
We now focus on outbound interest violations, which we define as follows. An AS X is
subject to an outbound interest violation if X is prevented from sending certain traffic through an
intended inter-domain link. That is, BGP forces the traffic to a given destination to exit X via an
inter-domain link l1 while X has interest to send it to l2 6= l1.
Figure 8.3 shows a simple scenario in whichAS1 is affected by an outbound interest violation,
as a result of the incompatible interest between AS1 and AS2. The two ASes are connected in
different locations, over multiple physical links. However, they disagree on which inter-domain
link should be used for the traffic from the source S to the destination prefix 1/8. The dashed
(red) and the solid (blue) arrows respectively indicate that AS1 would like to forward such traffic
through R1b, while AS2 prefers to receive this traffic at R2a.
Disagreements like the one in Figure 8.3 realistically happen in the Internet [71]. For instance,
if S is closer to R1b and the machines hosting prefix 1/8 are closer to R2a. In this case, the
incompatible interest is the result of the adoption of the hot-potato policy from both AS1 and
AS2, according to which ASes tries to reduce the internal path followed by Internet traffic (e.g.,
for resource consumption minimization).
In the example, the inter-domain link preferred by AS2 is eventually used, forcing AS1 to
send outbound traffic against its economic interests. This interest violation is due to AS2 selec-
tively announcing paths to more specific prefixes, on the (R1a,R2a) link. Note that AS2 has
plenty of ways to (try to) enforce its interest, e.g., it can also set different BGP attributes (e.g.,
AS-path or MED) in the announcements that it propagates on the two inter-domain links [150].
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Figure 8.3: Incompatible inter-domain trafﬁc interests resulting in an outbound interest violation
for AS1.
All those cases can be categorized as “inconsistent advertisements”, and are traditionally consid-
ered a bad practice in private peerings [137] [71], as they typically violate business agreements
formalized by the contracts. With the proliferation of peerings using IXP route servers [154], the
peering ecosystem has become more informal, increasing the likelihood of occurrence of such
situations.
Of course, AS1 can take actions targeted to prevent the interest violation to occur. For exam-
ple, with respect to the example in Figure 8.3, AS1 can ﬁlter the more speciﬁc preﬁx announced
by AS2 on the (R1a,R2a) link. However, the actions that AS1 can take to avoid the violation
depend on the speciﬁc techniques used by AS2 to attract the trafﬁc on its preferred link. More-
over, the safety (from an inter-domain routing viewpoint) and the legality of AS1’s reaction may
depend on speciﬁc circumstances, e.g., speciﬁcs of the business agreement between AS1 and
AS2. For this reason, we consider the technical solutions to react to an interest violation outside
the scope of this work.
Inconsistent advertisements between two neighboring ASes only represent a simple example
of outbound interest violations. AS1 in Figure 8.2(a), for instance, also suffers from a outbound
interest violation, since the more speciﬁc preﬁxes force it to send trafﬁc to AS2 instead of AS3.
In that case, the conﬂict is with AS4, a remote AS. Moreover, observe that outbound policy
violations do not necessarily affect outbound trafﬁc only. In particular, they can also affect transit
trafﬁc, that is, trafﬁc which the considered AS did not originate but has to transfer from one of
its neighbor to another. As an illustration, the interest violation to which AS3 is subject for the
transit trafﬁc from AS1 to AS4 in Figure 8.2(b) is an outbound one. In fact, in that case, AS3
is forced by the global inter-domain conﬁguration to send such trafﬁc to AS2 while it has an
economical interest to send it directly to AS4.
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Figure 8.4: Incompatible interest resulting in an inbound interest violation for AS1.
8.1.2. Inbound interest violations
In BGP, any AS can be seen as a source of announcements, each advertising a speciﬁc route
to reach given destination preﬁxes. As such, every AS can tweak the advertisement so that it can
exert (some) control on incoming trafﬁc. For this reason, one may think that inbound trafﬁc is not
affected by incompatible interests (except in the case of misconﬁguration).
In this section, we show that, unfortunately, inbound interest violations are structural to the
BGP routing system: They are not only due to conﬁguration errors, but depend in general on the
policies enforced by all the ASes of the routing system. We deﬁne inbound interest violations
in a complementary way with respect to the outbound ones. In particular, we say that an AS X
is subject to an inbound interest violation if X is prevented from receiving certain trafﬁc over a
given inter-domain link. That is, BGP forces the trafﬁc to a given destination to enter X from an
inter-domain link l1 while X has interest to receive it to l2 = l1
An example of inbound interest violation is displayed in Figure 8.4. As in the previous exam-
ple, we take the perspective of AS1, and consider the trafﬁc to preﬁx 1/8 in AS1. For this trafﬁc,
AS1 has an economic advantage in receiving it at R1b (solid blue path). However, this clashes
with the interest of AS3 to send such trafﬁc directly to AS1 (dashed red path in the ﬁgure). Note
that, as the previous one, this example is also realistic. On one hand, the path preferences of AS1
can descend from an economic advantage for it to balance incoming inter-domain trafﬁc load
between its two border routers (i.e., depending on the destination preﬁx). On the other hand, the
interests ofAS3 are likely as illustrated in the ﬁgure, ifAS3 is a service provider ofAS1 (getting
money for the trafﬁc exchanged on their direct inter-domain link) and is a settlement-free peer of
AS2 (with free of charge trafﬁc exchange agreement).
In Figure 8.4, the incompatible interests eventually leads to selecting the direct path between
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Figure 8.5: Incompatible interests between two customers of the same provider.
AS3 and AS1. Indeed, after noticing that a less speciﬁc route is received on its preferred link,
AS3 discards (e.g., ﬁlters) the more speciﬁc advertisement received from AS2. While implicitly
ignoring the preferences of AS1, AS3 may indeed not be forced to consider all AS1’s announce-
ments, e.g., by contractual obligations.
Observe that AS1 can still try to pursue its interest, by withdrawing the less speciﬁc route
propagated to AS3 and announce only two disjoint preﬁxes. However, as a side effect, such a
choice may lead to a less robust conﬁguration, in which AS3 has no available routes to forward
trafﬁc towards 1/8 if the inter-domain link between AS1 and AS2 fails. An alternative for AS1
would be to revise or renegotiate the contract with AS3. Since these kinds of decisions depend
on factors and needs, which are not only (strictly) technical, we restrict to a system for timely
detecting and assessing the impact of interest violations.
Finally, note that transit trafﬁc can also be subject to inbound interest violations. Consider
the example depicted in Figure 8.5. AS3 has interest to receive the trafﬁc from source S in AS2
to a given destination 1/8 using router R1b. Nevertheless, AS1 may have economic beneﬁts
in forwarding the trafﬁc from AS2 to AS3, e.g., if both AS2 and AS3 are customers paying
for transit through AS1. In the example, AS3 indicates into the BGP announcement to AS1
(e.g., with pre-agreed communities [60]) that AS1 should not propagate the announcement to
AS2. Since AS1 may be forced by contractual agreements respect such an indication, it ends
up not propagating to AS2 the announcement from AS3, which results into an incoming interest
violation at AS1.
8.2. Detection of interest violations
Interest violations can have signiﬁcant detrimental effects on the inter-domain trafﬁc of a
network. Yet, operators typically do not check for them. One of the main reasons why interest
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violations are rarely monitored is that they are hard to detect by manual inspection. Indeed,
discovering them requires mining and correlating huge amounts of data coming from different
data sources, like BGP configurations, control-plane messages, and data-plane traffic statistics.
In this section, we propose algorithms to detect interest violations and assess their economical
and technical impact. We designed those algorithms to have the following features.
We designed different algorithms to exploit peculiarities of inbound and outbound vio-
lations. Interest violations affecting outbound and inbound traffic are intrinsically different. We
provide distinct detection algorithms that match each of the two cases. For the outbound case,
we can rely on control-plane information only. Indeed, knowing the received route and deci-
sion process used by routers, we can compare the received routes with the missing ones to detect
outbound interest violations, infer their cause, and estimate their impact by analyzing what-if sce-
narios. For the inbound case, in contrast, we cannot assume that policies of external ASes are
known. Hence, rather than relying on control-plane messages, we use data-plane information to
detect unexpected ingress points for given flows.
Our algorithms estimate the impact of detected interest violation. The gravity of an in-
terest violation generally depends on the traffic affected by it. Informal conversation with net-
work operators confirmed that interest violations affecting certain traffic flows (e.g., to popular
or critical destinations) would be more important than those affecting others. Moreover, interest
violations taking place after link failures may be considered less problematic than those occur-
ring during normal network operation. Our algorithms include metrics to estimate such an impact
for each detected violation. To this end, we correlate the prefixes affected by interest violations
with the traffic destined to them. As a positive side effect, this allows us to pinpoint the most
practically relevant interest violations. Moreover, we classify interest violations based on their
qualitative impact (reduction of route diversity, possible occurrence in the case of failure, etc).
Our algorithms can be customized according to specific needs of operators. This in-
cludes both new interest violations types and impact estimation. Prominently, the algorithms can
be easily extended to include more or different metrics on the impact of interest violations. In ad-
dition, while we focus on the standard BGP implementation [153], our algorithms can be slightly
modified to take into account different inter-domain routing protocols or implementations. For
example, in the following, we assume that routers run the standard BGP decision process [72],
however our algorithms can be easily adapted to modified versions of such decision process, as
those used to implement routing policies on iBGP sessions [182].
We now detail algorithms for outbound and inbound interest violations in Section 8.2.1
and 8.2.2, respectively.
8.2.1. Detection of Outbound Violations
For a given AS, the exit points of inter-domain traffic flows depend on the routes received from
neighboring ASes; the selected routes among those ones; and the intra-domain routing (i.e., IGP
or iBGP) configuration. Operators have control of the two latter parameters, and the neighboring
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Algorithm 1: Detection of outbound interest violations.
input : 1. Missing paths (MissingPaths)
2. Current BGP paths per prefix (CurrentBestPath function),
3. Outbound Traffic per Prefix (OutboundTrafficDemand).
4. Preference of AS (ASPreference function)
output: For each missing path returns the Impact type(s) (contained in CurrentLabels) and Impact level
(ImpactMetric).
/* Go over each missing path and analyze its impact. Each Missing path is composed
by an NLRI (NLRI) and a set of path attributes (MP). */
[1]for (MP,NLRI) ∈MissingPaths do
/* Store the current best path (CBP) and backup path (CBaP) for NLRI. */
[2] CBP = CurrentBestPath(NLRI);
[3] CBaP = CurrentBackupPaths(NLRI);
/* Calculate the best paths if the missing path (MP) were received for NLRI.
Store this best path in NBP. */
[4] NBP = BGPBestPathAlgorithm(CBP ∪MP );
/* 1) Violation detection: Perform the classification tests and apply labels.
The next part can be modified to fit the requirements of each operator. */
[5] CurrentLabels = ∅;
/* If the preference of any AS in NBP (NewPreference) is higher than the
preference of the current path (CurrentPreference), apply label
NeighbourPreferenceImprovement. */
[6] NewPreference =Max({ASPreference(AS) | AS ∈ GetNeighboringASes(NBP )});
[7] CurrentPreference =Max({ASPreference(AS) | AS ∈ GetNeighboringASes(CBP )});
[8] if NewPreference > CurrentPreference then
[9] CurrentLabels = CurrentLabels ∪ {NeighbourPreferenceImprovement};
/* If the current NHs (CurrentNHs) is a strict subset of the new NHs (NewNHs)
under the missing paths, apply label IncreaseNHDiversity. */
[10] CurrentNHs = GetNHs(CBP );
[11] NewNHs = GetNHs(NBP );
[12] if NewNHs ) CurrentNHs then
[13] CurrentLabels = CurrentLabels ∪ {IncreaseNHDiversity};
/* If there is currently a single active path for the prefix, and the missing
path improves the preference of the back-up AS, apply label
IncPrefofBKforSingleActivePath. */
[14] if |CBP | == 1 then
[15] NewBackupPaths = BGPBestPathAlgorithm(CBaP ∪MP );
[16] CurrentBKPreference =Max({ASPreference(AS) | AS ∈ GetNeighboringASes(CBaP )});
[17] NewPreference =Max({ASPreference(AS) | AS ∈
GetNeighboringASes(NewBackupPaths)});
[18] if NewPreference > CurrentBKPreference then
[19] CurrentLabels = CurrentLabels ∪ {IncPrefofBKforSingleActivePath};
/* If we find a path (CoveringP, CoveringNLRI), in which CoveringNLRI covers
the NLRI, and if (CoveringP, CoveringNLRI) is propagated to other
non-customer ASes, apply label UnexpectedTransit. */
[20] if (∃ (CoveringP , CoveringNLRI) which:
[21] CoveringNLRI Covers NLRI and
[22] IsPropagatedToNonCustomerneighbors(CoveringP ) then
[23] CurrentLabels = CurrentLabels ∪ {UnexpectedTransit};
/* */
/* 2) Impact assessment: Assess impact of interest conflict for the paths that
match at least one classification. */
[24] if CurrentLabels is not ∅ then
[25] ImpactMetric = OutboundTrafficDemand(NLRIP ) ;
[26] Register (P,NLRI) with labels CurrentLabels
[27] and Impact ImpactMetric
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ASes only influence the announced paths.
To detect outbound interest violations, we designed an algorithm that compares received
routes with the set of missing ones, i.e., those expected but not received. In this comparison,
we automatically assess whether and how much the traffic would differ if the missing paths were
announced to the network. For instance, if a network detects that is not receiving a route from a
settlement-free peer, the algorithm checks how the traffic of the prefix is currently being routed.
If the traffic is currently being routed through a transit provider, and its volume is significant, the
algorithm would detect this case and rank it high. In a case of inconsistent advertisement (Figure
8.3), the algorithm checks whether the inconsistency of the neighbor is reducing the next-hop
diversity of the network, and rank it based on the outbound volume of these prefixes.
The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. Its input consists of (1) the set of all current
best routes; (2) the list of missing routes (expected but not received from neighboring ASes); and
(3) statistics of outbound traffic per prefix. The last input is used to assess the impact on the
network of the missing paths. We discuss several methods that operators can use to collect these
inputs in Section 8.3.
The algorithm is based on two macro-steps, explained hereafter.
8.2.1.1. Violation detection
The purpose of the first part of the algorithm is to compare how the traffic distribution of the
network would improve, if the missing paths where actually received. In this part, we classify
missing paths into different categories, each representing different types of network impacts (a
missing path could be in none or even in more than one category). Based on private conversations
with operators, we identified four main effects of interest violations on outbound traffic. We detail
them in the following. Anyway, note that the additional categories can be added to our algorithm
by applying additional comparisons between missing and received paths.
Neighbor preference violation. A missing path is added to this category if its an-
nouncement would lead to the selection of a more preferred neighbor. In Algorithm 1, we
use function ASPreference to compare the preference of the operators among neighbor-
ing ASes. In simple implementations, however, the comparison can be easily performed
by checking the Local Preference that operators normally consistently apply to each neigh-
bor [90]. If the operator decides, this same procedure could be extended to cover links
instead of neighboring ASes.
Next-hop diversity violation. Missing paths are added into this category if the exit
point of the missing path is equally preferred to the current best paths, but it increases the
number of next-hops (NHs) available to outbound traffic. This is important for operators
who want to bring traffic balance to their network, by providing a large diversity of exit
points (this case is important when the operator connects to various IXPs). Note that in-
8.2 Detection of interest violations 101
consistencies advertisements are a subset of this case, however, an operator might prefer to
classify them in their separate category.
Back-up path violation. Missing paths are added into this category if the missing
path comes from a neighbor more preferred than the one of any of the current back-up
paths, when there is a single active path. The idea with this category is to cover cases in
which a single link failure would let traffic be sent to less preferred neighbors.
Unexpected transit violation. Missing paths are added into this category if they
are generating transit flows between two non-customer ASes (unexpected transit flows).
This is a special case of Neighbor preference violation paths, and is the problem experi-
enced by AS3 in Figure 8.2(b). Network operators must avoid transporting traffic between
non-customer neighboring ASes, as this does not provide any economical benefit [85]. To
do this, operators do not advertise routes coming from non-customer neighbors, to other
non-customer neighbors. However, an operator might receive a route to a prefix p from a
customer, which it propagates to neighboring ASes, while, it receives from non-customer
neighbors a route for a prefix p’, more specific than p. Since routers in the network forward
packets based on the more specific prefix (p’), the network might start transiting traffic
between non-customer neighbors [28]. The missing routes from the customer towards the
more-specific prefixes (p’) are the ones added to this category.
8.2.1.2. Impact assessment
The final step in the algorithm is to measure the level of impact of each missing path. This
value depends on the amount of outbound traffic and on its classification. Each operator could
select their own impact metrics based on their needs. We follow a basic approach and use the
outbound traffic demand of the each prefix in the peak hour of the network. Operators could also
employ more complex metrics such as bit-mile calculations, or metrics that estimate the potential
revenue reduction due to the missing path. We decided to not implement such metric as setting
its parameters is difficult to achieve from a researcher point of view.
The missing path, the categories, and impact value for each discovered case become descrip-
tive features of the interest violation. These features can be used by the alarm system (Section
8.3) to highlight cases that should be analyzed individually by operators.
Note that, since the algorithm is based on re-simulating the BGP decision process, it always
correctly provides outbound policy violations, provided that the input is correct. In Section 8.3,
we discuss different approaches to collect such input data in real networks.
8.2.2. Detection of inbound Violations
The distribution of inbound inter-domain traffic into a network depends on the paths an-
nounced and the policies of the other ASes. Since each AS independently sets their own poli-
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cies, an operator looking to balance their inbound traffic can only try to persuade the selection of
others by tweaking the paths that they announce. The algorithm in this section aims at detecting
neighboring ASes whose policies work against those tweakings. In Figure 8.2(c), for example,
the algorithm, running at AS4, would identify the traffic for prefixes 1.128/9 and 1.0/9 coming
from AS3, when this is not the intention of AS4.
Since operators rarely know the policies of external AS, and considering that they can be very
complex, it is almost unfeasible to analyze the inbound violations by using control plane data
available from external looking glasses. Therefore, we rely only in local data plane information
to detect these cases. This type of test is simpler than the one in Section 8.2.1, but it provides less
information.
Algorithm 2: Detection of inbound interest violations.
input : 1. Inbound flow (InboundF low) , with attributes InboundF lowAttributes (containing attributes such as
SourceIP , DestinationIP , Bw over the peak hour, etc.) arriving over link L.
2. Inbound policy contained in a function IsF lowUndesired.
output: Returns the inbound flows that are conflicting with the policy of the operator, together with their impact level
(ImpactMetric).
/* For each inbound flows InF on each link L. */
[1]foreach Link L do
[2] foreach InboundF low, with attributes InboundF lowAttributes (SourceIP , DestinationIP , BW , etc.) do
[3] if IsF lowUndesired(InboundF lowAttributes, L,Bw) returns True then
[4] Register InboundF low, L,Bw;
Algorithm 2 describes our method to detect inbound traffic violations. Shortly explained,
the algorithm searches for inbound traffic that, based on the policy of the operator, should not
be received on each link. We provide in the rest of this section a extended description of the
algorithm.
8.2.2.1. Input
To identify the undesired traffic, we need to know its characteristics in terms of origin AS,
origin prefix, or destination prefix. Therefore, the traffic description must be grouped under these
characteristics. In other words, traffic data must be divided in traffic flows. Based on this, the
algorithm takes two basic inputs:
Inbound Inter-domain policy. For our algorithm, the policy is defined as a function
IsF lowUndesired, which based on the attributes of inbound flows, defines whether the
flow should enter the network through the link L. Operators can build this policy using
automatic or manual methods. In simple scenarios, the function looks for source prefixes
of ASes for which inbound traffic should not be detected. For example, operators usually
do not expect traffic from customers or peering ASes in transit providers links, or traffic
from ASes to which propagation is being remotely filtered through special communities
[60]. More involved examples could lead the function IsF lowUndesired to calculate
complex metrics, such as the bit-mile of the flow [148], in order to define whether the flow
is undesired or not.
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Inbound traffic statistics. The algorithm requires disaggregated information of the
inbound traffic of the network. Specifically, operators should provide statistics of inbound
traffic flows per prefix for individual ingress links of the network.
8.2.2.2. Undesired flow detection
The algorithm cycles over each inbound traffic flow received over each external link. The
function IsF lowUndesired is then used to check whether the flow should be present in the link
or not, based on the policy of the operator. In a simple implementation, the function would, for
instance, check whether the origin AS of the flow is not connected through a more preferred peer.
An example of this case is when traffic from a peering content provider is coming through the link
of a transit provider. Operators implementing more complex traffic engineering would perform
more checks. For instance, in cases in which they are doing prefix deaggregated, they would
check if there are inbound flows to prefixes with more specific masks announced in links different
from the one being analyzed.
8.2.2.3. Impact assessment
After an inbound interest violation is detected, the algorithm assesses the impact of the flow
in the network. We follow a similar approach to the outbound case: we account for the actual
traffic of the inbound flow in the peak hour of the network. We stress again that operators could
use more complex metrics such as bit-mile calculations, for this end.
Finally, the event is stored using the tuple (externallink, Flowattributes,
amountofinboundtrafficoftheflow). Operators can query this information to isolate
the more important cases and study them in detail.
8.2.2.4. Final remarks
Similar to the outbound case, the inbound interest violation detection algorithm is correct,
given that the input of the system is also correct. Since this algorithm only uses data-plane in-
formation, operators should probably gather more information before actually judging whether
the problem lies outside the AS. For instance, a routing leak [106] or a router misconfiguration
could generate an invalid flow. Although the algorithm could detect these problems, we stress
that its philosophy is to relay in other mechanism, such as [54] [69] to isolate these cases and deal
with them. The algorithm should just tackle the cases of real inbound interest violations in which
external ASes are not following the actual announcements performed by the network.
8.3. System architecture
In this section, we describe our inter-domain interest violation warning system. This system
is designed with the purpose of detecting, ranking, and creating alerts for inter-domain interest
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Figure 8.6: Inter-domain interest violation warning system architecture.
violations. We ﬁrst describe the general architecture of the system, and then discuss each of its
components.
8.3.1. General Architecture
Our warning system relies on four basic modules, as depicted in Figure 8.6. A data collection
module gathers the required input data by interfacing with internal network devices or data col-
lectors. The logging module communicates with other monitoring or management systems, e.g.,
triggering warnings or outputting data in a convenient format. Finally, the analysis and central
database modules implement the logic to detect, rank, and store the violation warnings. Follow-
ing the inter-domain framework presented in Chapter 6, the data collection module will be part of
the data collection procedures of the framework, and the rest of the modules would fall into the
validation and simulation procedures.
By relying on those four modules, this architecture decouples the implementation of viola-
tion detection algorithms (analysis module) from external interfaces, hence facilitating algorithm
implementation. Moreover, the system is easy to adapt to different networks by changing the
external modules (data collection and logging) to speciﬁc requirements.
We now provide more details on each module.
8.3.1.1. Data collection module
This module provides a standard interface for our system with respect to input data sources.
Abstractly, it isolates the complexity of all those interfaces, thus simplifying the implementation
of the rest of the modules.
A key ability for detecting interest violations consists in correlating different types of data.
These data can only be fetched by interacting with multiple monitoring systems (e.g. BGP col-
lectors, network controllers, trafﬁc monitoring, routers), and protocols (e.g. JSON, XML, CSV,
etc.). We describe possible data extraction methods in Sec. 8.3.2.
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8.3.1.2. Analysis module
The analysis module is the heart of the system. This module implements the algorithms
described in Section 8.2 using the network data obtained via the data collection module. Operators
can tune the analysis module’s parameters to fit the behavior of the algorithms to their needs (e.g.
incident classification, frequency of operation, etc.). Observe that our algorithms can be easily
parallelized. For example, different missing routes in the outbound violation algorithm as well as
traffic flows in the inbound violation algorithm can be processed in parallel, since their analysis
does not required any share information.
8.3.1.3. Central Database
The central database stores the output of the violation detection algorithms. As discussed in
Section 8.2, this output contains fine-grained attributes to generate detailed violation reports. In
particular, for every detected interest violation, it includes its class (inbound or outbound), its im-
pact according to the implemented metrics, the category to which it belongs (neighbor preference
violation, next-hop diversity violation, etc.), and additional information (for example, attributes
of the missing route in the case of outbound violations).
8.3.1.4. Logging Module
The main purpose of this module is to log any warnings obtained from the analysis. The
logging information could be used directly by operators, or can be sent to other management
systems (e.g., a general warning system or an SDN controller) deployed in the network. The
purpose of this component is to isolate the other modules of our architecture to external systems,
and to translate the corresponding information into specific formats. This module could include
the necessary code to generate reports for different network management roles, or could serve as
an interface to external log management systems to perform this task. Operators can configure
the information included in the logs generated by the system, including thresholds to generate
alarms.
8.3.2. Implementation
We developed a Proof of Concept (PoC) of the system described in the previous section using
a server with 16 cores and 32GB of RAM. Python was used to implement the algorithms and the
logic of the data collection and analysis modules. We employ MySQL to store the data required
for the system and to implement the Central Database module. The logging module generates
summary files on CSV format that are later used to generate reports. The reports contained mul-
tiple figures that we plotted using the MatplotLib [101]. We will look at these reports in the next
section.
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The main challenge for the implementation of the system is the ability to collect the necessary
input data required to run the algorithms. In Chapter 6 (Section 6.2), We discussed different
methods that operators can use to gather most of these input. We extend this description here, for
the specific case of the interest violation detector.
8.3.2.1. Traffic data
Traffic statistics are needed for both inbound and outbound violation detection. ISPs normally
gather traffic statistics to perform different applications. We can leverage this data for the interest
violation system. The system requires granular statistics of the inter-domain traffic, thus forcing
the use of traffic flow type of collectors, such as those supporting Netflow and sflow.
8.3.2.2. Received BGP routes
One of the inputs of the outbound violation detection algorithm is represented by the BGP
routes received by edge routers for every destination prefix (see Section 8.2.1). In order to perform
a complete network analysis, all paths received from external neighbors need to be collected.
We describe Several methods can be used for this purpose in Section 6.2.1. (I) the usage of
custom scripts, e.g., based on router CLI commands and screen scraping; (II) the configuration
of iBGP sessions with add-path [179] (or similar features to propagate all BGP routes) between
edge routers and a route collector (such as [121]) [50]; (III) the usage of monitoring protocols like
BMP [161] and (IV) the configuration of selective port mirroring on edge routers, as proposed
in [183].
8.3.2.3. Intended internal policies
The inbound violation detection algorithm requires knowledge of network policies (see Sec-
tion 8.2.2).
For outbound traffic, the algorithm needs the preference of operators for the traffic leaving
the network. For many companies this could be calculated automatically by checking the default
local-preference given to neighboring ASes. For cases in which this does not work, the preference
could be given manually.
For inbound traffic, the algorithm needs to know the attributes of the traffic that should not
arrive over specific inter-domain links. Different sources of information can be used to obtain
this data automatically. The peering relationships of the network can be used to build a starting
policy for unexpected or unwanted inbound traffic. In a typical set-up, for instance, an operator
does not want traffic from settlement-free peers, or its customers, on transit links. The peering
relationships to neighboring AS can be obtained using router configurations, BGP data, or by
fetching information from Internet Routing Registries (IRR), when available. In cases in which
ASes are allowed to steer inbound traffic over links with the same AS, using BGP communities
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or MED, operators would like to check if their neighbor is respecting their commands. This
information is reflected in the configuration of the routers.
8.3.2.4. Missing paths
The outbound interest violation algorithm takes missing paths as input. We recall that missing
paths are those, which are supposed to be received, but are actually not received due to policies
of external ASes (see Section 8.2.1). Our system currently focuses on two general and practically
relevant classes of missing paths, i.e., inconsistent advertisements and incomplete sets of paths.
Inconsistent advertisements identify BGP messages that are ranked differently from the re-
ceiving AS, because of different attributes, although they refer to the same destination prefixes,
and are received from the same neighboring AS (on different inter-domain links). Inconsistent
advertisements frequently correspond to missing routes, since not all of them have the same pref-
erence contrary to what typically expected [40, 71, 137]. Note that inconsistent advertisements
do not necessarily correspond to a contract violation, especially in cases in which the AS peers
often to open IXP route servers [34]. In any case, they have an effect of the selected egress point
for inter-domain traffic. For this reason, we consider them in the outbound violation detection
algorithm. In particular, we gather inconsistent advertisements comparing the routes announced
by each peer on different physical location, as in [71].
Incomplete sets of routes represent cases in which a neighboring AS does not announce routes
to some prefixes while it was supposed to. Of course, determining incomplete sets of routes
depends on operators’ expectations. While expectations on the route set received from BGP
neighbors can be case-specific, our system currently focuses on two basic expectations that are
commonly shared by the large majority of operators [40]. Namely, we check that (I) transit
providers announce routes to all destination prefixes, and (II) peers propagate all routes originated
by the peer itself, and its customers routes (Note that our tool supports partial peering, in the sense
that we can define the subset of customer routes that the ISP is expecting to receive). To perform
those checks, for each neighboring ASX , we compare the routes received fromX with those that
X announces to other ASes, leveraging public BGP collectors, like Routeviews [131] and RIPE
RIS [155] ones, and AS relationship datasets, like the one provided by CAIDA [24]. ISPs can also
rely on their own data sources or on services from commercial companies [1] to acquire this data
or complement public data sources. The estimation of the relationships of external ASes can be
complicated, and not entirely reliable. As we described in the previous section, the output of our
algorithm is correct, given that the input is also correct. Operators should always check whether
an interest violation warning triggered by the system can be the result of a incorrect estimation of
the relationship of two external ASes.
The algorithm used to find incomplete sets of routes is detailed in Algorithm 3. For every
neighboring AS X , we consider the list of prefixes in which X appears in the AS-PATH of some
BGP route. We then compare the list of prefixes obtained from BGP routes received by the local
ASes with the one extracted from external BGP sources (e.g., RIS and Routeviews). If X is an
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eBGP peer, we only need to analyze the routes where the successive AS in the AS-PATH is X or
one of its customers.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm used to obtain the incomplete set of routes.
input : External BGP paths.
output: Incomplete paths.
/* Only analyze those paths where a peering AS is seen: */
[1]foreach Path P , with ASPATH containing a neighboring AS Neigh do
[2] if Neigh is a transit provider; or Neigh is a peer and the path arrives from one of the customers of Neigh then
[3] PathAttributes← BGP attributes from P ;
[4] BestPaths← Current Best paths of the network towards GetNLRI(P );
[5] BackupPaths← Best paths of the current network towards GetNLRI(P ) when BestPaths are removed;
[6] if P is better than any path in BestPaths or BackupPaths then
[7] Return P ;
8.4. Evaluation
In this section, we present the results obtained after deploying a prototype of the warning
system in the network of two service providers. We used our system in an offline mode, for a-
posteriori analyses of interest violations. In the following, we first describe our datasets in Section
8.4.1. We then discuss interest violations detected by our system for outbound and inbound traffic
in Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3, respectively.
8.4.1. Data-sets
Our datasets are provided by the following two networks.
1. Tier-2. This dataset consists of the BGP routing tables and traffic data from an European
Tier-2 network for the month of June 2014. Its network spans several countries, and ex-
changing prefixes with around 900 neighboring ASes. The routing tables are taken directly
from the border routers of the network using Command Line Interface (CLI) commands.
Hence, we avoid the existence of hidden BGP paths in our monitoring system, which can
trigger false alarms in some of our test (in a running system, a more automatic technique,
such as BGP ADD-PATH or BMP, would have been employed to obtain the same informa-
tion) [177]. Concerning traffic data, we have the aggregated traffic per destination and per
source prefix flowing through the core routers of the network.
2. Academic Network. The academic network encompasses around 20 nodes, has connec-
tions to two transit providers, and peers with several neighboring ASes over private links
and exchange points. We have the BGP routing tables and traffic data from the Spanish
academic network (RedIRIS) for the month of March 2013. The BGP tables are obtained
directly from each of the border routers. The traffic data consists of Netflow dumps from
the routers of the network. Netflows dumps allow us to obtain the total traffic aggregated
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over different characteristics, such as ingress/egress interface; source/destination prefix or
transport protocol.
We employ the Tier-2 data-set to illustrate the outbound traffic algorithm, and the academic
network data-set to show results for the inbound traffic algorithms. We use the Tier-2 data-set of
the outbound part, due to large path diversity that this network possesses, which can provide a
rich set of results for this type of traffic. We move to the data-set of the academic network for
the second part, as the granularity of the traffic of the Tier-2 data-set is too coarse to perform the
algorithms of the inbound traffic (e.g. cannot be divided in ingress traffic, per origin prefix, per
physical link).
8.4.2. Outbound traffic measurements
Starting from the Tier-2 dataset, our system first searched for missing paths using the pro-
cedures described in Section 8.3.2.4. We found 645 peers with 654,779 missing paths affect-
ing 232,193 prefixes. 78,876 of these prefixes were affected by inconsistent advertisement, and
192,545 were affected by incomplete paths. Not all of these missing paths are meaningful for
our analysis. Our system indeed runs the algorithm described in Section 8.2.1 to identify which
of these paths lead to interest violations, assess their impact, and classify them correctly. After
feeding the missing paths to the algorithm, we found that 439,273 of them (i.e., about 67%) have
some kind of impact to the network. Those paths globally affect 144,622 prefixes. The collection
and processing of network data dominates the overall execution time of the system, as it takes
almost 10 hours to be completed. After network data is indexed, the algorithm can run in around
1 hour.
Moreover, we queried the Central Database module storing the output of the previous algo-
rithm, in order to find the cases with a larger operational impact. In the following, we analyze the
results of our queries, by providing an overview across all interest violations and a case-by-case
analysis of the most impacting violations.
8.4.2.1. Results overview
We aggregated results according to different dimensions.
First, we group interest violations by neighboring AS and the impact type. Results are shown
in Figure 8.7. The X-axis ranks the different grouped interest violations based on their impact,
while the Y-axis shows the amount of traffic impacted by each violation. Since we are not able to
show exact traffic values for confidentiality reasons, we use a non-disclosed value, in the order of
Mbps, to scale the graph. Figure 8.7 exhibits many interesting things. Primarily, it shows that in-
terest violations do have impact on a significant amount of traffic: Globally, the impact of interest
violations summed up to more than 1.5Gb of traffic per second! Moreover, note that distribution
of interest violations with respect to their impact is quite skewed. In total, 740 grouped interest
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violations were found, but only 84 (approximately 11%) had an impact larger than zero. The im-
pact of violations on traffic is also skewed. Indeed, the top 10 violations account for 85% of this
traffic. Finally, both frequency and impact of different types of violations are uneven. Generally
speaking, the unexpected transit violation is the less common, with only 3 cases in the top 50
of most impacting violations. Nevertheless, this type of violation has the overall greatest impact
(the first and third most impacting violations are of this type). Neighboring preference violation,
next-hop diversity violation, and backup path violation complete the top-50 of cases with 9, 18,
and 20 times, respectively.
Observe that different interest violations in Figure 8.7 can belong to the same neighboring
AS. We found that from the top 50 cases with more aggregated traffic from the figure belong to
41 different neighboring AS.
To show the impact of violations due to specific neighbors, we plot detected violations aggre-
gated only on a per neighboring AS basis in Figure 8.8. The X axis ranks the neighboring ASes
based on the impact of their interest violations respectively induced by them. The Y axis shows
the impact of violations in terms of affected traffic, using the same scaling process as in Figure
8.7. We found outbound interest violations for about 471 neighboring ASes, for which 66 had an
impact larger than zero. Even the distribution of ASes responsible for violation-impacted traffic
is highly skewed. Indeed, the top 10 ASes account for 87% of the total impacted traffic.
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Figure 8.7: Outbound interest violations for the Tier-2 network, grouped by neighboring AS and
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Figure 8.8: Outbound traffic affected by interest violations for every neighboring AS.
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8.4.2.2. Case-by-case analysis
Figures 8.7 and 8.8 show that few violations and few ASes are responsible for most of the
interest violation traffic. We now take the perspective of an operator, and delve into the violations
with the highest impact, in the hope of understanding causes and possible solutions to them. In
particular, we focus on the violations caused by the top six AS (peers 45 to 50) in Figure 8.8.
The first and third AS of Figure 8.8 have a similar type of impact to the network. Their ef-
fects mostly correspond to the first and third interest violation in Figure 8.7, which are classified
as Unexpected transit violations. Both of these ASes are multi-homed customers of the Tier-2.
The detected violations are generated by the advertisement of more specific prefixes to another
neighbor with respect to the prefixes sent to the Tier-2 network. More concretely, in those viola-
tions, at least one prefix p is advertised to the other transit provider but not to the Tier-2 network,
which is left with a less specific prefix p′ covering p. We assume that this is likely done for
redundancy purposes. The Tier-2 receives those more specifics from non-customer neighbors.
Note that, although the Tier-2 has a direct path towards these prefixes, the more specific prefixes
force the traffic towards these non-customers. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to solve this
situation [28]. Filtering the more specific prefixes could be, in some cases, considered as a con-
tradiction to their policy from the point of view of the customers2. This information, however,
could be very useful for network managers and planners. If the customers decide, for instance,
to not change its behavior, the company could account the expenses that these unexpected transit
traffic causes in the network, and add them to the business model of the customer.
The effect of the second AS of Figure 8.8 corresponds in most part to the second impact
of Figure 8.7, a violation of type Next-hop diversity violation. This particular AS is a service
provider with multiple points of presence in different countries in Europe. By looking at the
missing paths creating this violation, we find that all of them are due to inconsistent advertisement.
Figure 8.9 depicts the distribution of this type of missing paths for this peer. The top figure depicts
the number of missing paths per ingress link in the network, while the lower figure weights each
missing path with the amount of outbound traffic carried by the prefix. This peer is connected
to the ISP via three different links. Each bar corresponds to the amount of inconsistencies in
terms of number of prefixes (up) or the outbound traffic (down). We see from the figure that the
neighboring AS is attracting most of the traffic to the private link by doing selective advertisement.
Note that half of the total prefixes are correctly announced through the IXP1 (top figure), but these
prefixes do not attract much traffic (down figure). The two sessions suffering from the missing
paths are through two different European IXPs. We also observe that the missing paths are “not
covered”, which means that the neighboring AS does not announce a more general prefix covering
those routes. The neighboring AS could be incurring in inconsistency advertisement because it
does not want to transport traffic from the two IXPs to these specific destinations. Depending on
the contractual situation between the Tier-2 and this neighboring AS, the Tier-2 may contact the
2The customers could use the inbound detection algorithm to detect if a provider is ignoring the more specifics.
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Figure 8.9: Inconsistencies from an individual peer. The dashed lines identify the total number of
prefixes or total outbound traffic for this neighboring AS.
neighboring AS to enforce pre-agreed policies. In case the missing paths are due to route server
path hiding [104], the two ASes may decide to establish a direct BGP section between each other.
The fourth AS of Figure 8.8 is the one causing the fourth interest violation of 8.7, which is
of type Neighbor preference violation. To understand the reasons of this case, we need to take a
deeper look at the data from this neighboring AS. The neighboring AS is a settlement-free peer
of the network, which hosts a top-30 Alexa site, and is a source and destination of a considerable
amount of traffic for the network. The missing paths causing the violations for this case are of
type incomplete. In other words, these are paths that we detect that the neighboring AS possesses,
yet they are not announced directly, but are received by the Tier-2 through its transit providers.
These missing paths are originated and announced to the neighboring AS by another AS that,
after a quick examination, indistinctly belongs to the same organization. The neighboring AS
could be filtering the paths because it wants to avoid transporting traffic to these prefixes from
the Tier-2. Independent of the root cause, it is evident that the neighboring AS has valid routes to
them. By detecting this case, the Tier-2 could analyze whether it could demand the neighbor to
announce this routes directly, in case when the peering agreement explicitly includes this on its
terms [40] [137].
Finally, the fifth and sixth ASes from Figure are suffering from Backup path violations. These
two ASes face a similar type of violation, due to a common customer. The problem, specifically,
is that both ASes are not advertising paths of this common customer. The two neighboring ASes,
and the customer AS, also happen to be settlement-free peers of the Tier-2, but connecting to
the network through only one physical link (an IXP). In case of a failure of this IXP, there is
the risk of sending the significant amount of traffic that the prefixes of this customer AS attracts,
through transit providers. The reason why these two peers do not send these prefix is not yet
determined. It can be that customer AS is performing selective advertisement, or that the two
peers simply decided to not announce their prefixes. Our tool, however, still serves as a way of
pointing network managers to this case, in order to obtain the attention needed, to prevent a big
impact in the network in case of a failure.
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8.4.3. Inbound traffic measurements
To evaluate the inter-domain interest violation warning system for inbound traffic, we use the
Academic network data-set. The inbound traffic analysis is conceptually simpler than the out-
bound traffic counterpart. The algorithm basically loops over the ingress flows per source prefix,
and decides whether those flows fit into the interest of each operator. The core of the algorithm
is to obtain, in a semi, or automatic matter, the interest of each network. For the case of the
academic network, we reverse-engineered the applied BGP policy directly from the configuration
of the routers, by correlating default Local-preference values to the type of neighboring AS. The
result was a very basic policy targeting to enforce two key sub-interests 1. receive peer’s traffic
only over peer’s links. 2. receive peer’s customer’s traffic only over peer’s links.
8.4.3.1. Results overview
Figure 8.10 summarizes the cases in which peer’s traffic is found over transit provider’s links,
hence violating sub-interest 1. We found cases for 33 peers, 16 with more than 1Mbps. The X
axis ranks each settlement-free peering ASes based on the amount of traffic originating in those
AS found in transit links. The Y axis measures directly that traffic in Mbps. The top 3 ASes
account for about 75% of the total affected traffic.
Figure 8.11 summarizes the cases in which peer’s customer’s traffic is found over transit
provider’s links, that is, those violating sub-interest 2. We found traffic of more than 500 peer’s
customers over the transit links of the network (in the figure, we just show the cases with more
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than 5Mbps). The X axis ranks the customers of the settlement-free peers based on the amount of
traffic originating in those AS found in transit links. The Y axis measures directly that traffic in
Mbps.
8.4.3.2. Case-by-case analysis
Although the philosophy of the tool is not to provide root causes for the undesired traffic, we
can use some additional information to provide assumptions on the reason of this traffic. Regard-
ing violations of sub-interest 1 (see Figure 8.10), the top three settlement-free peers with more
traffic on the transit links are content providers. This type of companies performs Traffic Engi-
neering practices that differ from those of access or transit networks. Indeed, content providers
use different sources of information, such as the DNS system [147] or cache location [108], to
select the source host and the path towards the end user. This behavior many times neglects
BGP data, making it thus possible for them to send traffic ignoring the direct connections [108].
Given these circumstances, the Academic-network could decide to expand its infrastructure with
these content providers [108], or explore other collaboration techniques, as described, for instance
in [147] to reduce the amount of traffic of these companies over its transit links. The next three
companies with most traffic are NSPs. These companies could operate under outbound TE prac-
tices in which they prefer to send some traffic to the academic network through indirect ASes, for
instance due to back-haul transport costs, or other technical details. However, this are just specu-
lations as there is no clear reason why there is traffic from these peers over the transit links. The
Academic network would be required to examine each case, probably contacting each network
individually.
In contrast to sub-policy 1, violations to sub-policy 2 (Fig. 8.11) are harder to analyze be-
cause of the (routing) distance of ASes causing them to the academic network. Still, there might
cases of undesired policies from the direct neighbors: for instance, they can perform intermediate
filtering [124]. The undesired traffic can also be due to the outbound traffic policies of the origin
networks. Note that many of the top contributors are content providers, for which the same anal-
ysis of the last case applies. Concretely, these companies might select the paths from the caches
connected to the transit providers of the Academic network, instead to the ones available through
the settlement-free peers. Operators and peering managers can use this data to potentially look
for new peering agreements that can reduce the inbound traffic through transit providers.
8.5. Related Work
Routing divergence. Several authors have studied the effects of routing conflicts in the In-
ternet. These works have examined the conditions in which uncoordinated policies can cause
the BGP algorithm to diverge [94] [157] [53]; and to propose systems that can detect these
cases [80] [54], or prevent them [157]. The interest violations that we analyze in this work do not
fit in this category, as they focus only in the policy interest of the operator under a stable state.
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In other words, we analyze cases in which BGP converges, but where one or more ASes do not
obtain the state that they originally intended.
BGP security. Although our warning system could detect the effect of forged BGP routes,
we encourage operators to have dedicated systems to detect these cases. Multiple proposals have
emerged to secure the Internet [100] [102]. In recent years, the IETF standardized the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [22]. RPKI uses a public key system to validate some of the
information included in BGP updates.
External peering auditing. The distributed nature of the Internet makes it prone to situations
in which the behavior of a single system (either allowed or not) can affect many others. Many
authors have analyzed how to detect the cause of specific situations affecting ASes, even under
environments in which only partial information can be obtained. [71] describes the problem of
inconsistency advertisement from neighboring peers and how they could be detected using local
data. [78] uses data-plane data (traceroute) to find disruptions between what is announced in
the control-plane and the actual path of each packet. [194] proposes a cryptography system that
can test several properties of the received routes from neighboring ASes. [97] [173] [191] use
network information to pinpoint any AS behaving in an unexpected manner, or causing specific
route changes. [124] checks for prefix filtering that can limit the visibility of prefixes for other
ASes. These systems complement the information provided by the violation warning application.
Some of these systems (e.g. [71]) can feed our application with missing paths that can be used
to run the outbound traffic algorithm. Other systems (e.g. [124]) could help operators find root
causes for specific interest violations that with greatest impact on the network.
Internal configuration checking. Some interest violations can be explained, not by policies
of external ASes, but by mistaken configurations of internal devices. Route leaks, for instance,
can arise due to this problem, and can trigger the violation warning system (e.g. by detecting
traffic to transit prefixes arriving in a settlement-free peer link) [106]. Operators can implement
configuration checking systems that can avoid misalignment between internal policies and con-
figurations [69]. If the operators actively use Internet Routing Registry (IRR) to publish their
inter-domain policy, systems like [165] can be employed to check the policy against the BGP
updates.
Different inter-domain routing protocols. Due to the limitations and problems experienced
by the current Internet, different authors have proposed improved inter-domain network architec-
tures. These can either provide flexibility to the systems [152]; improve the behavior of BGP
by extending some aspects of the protocol [187]; or working with overlay protocols that provide
more features and control [67]. Our system operates abstractly in policy decisions from ASes, and
not directly in information generated exclusively by BGP. Therefore, the system can be adapted
to any of these inter-domain architectures.
Content providers and network neutrality. Content providers have established themselves
as the origin of a large proportion of Internet traffic. These companies have particular opera-
tional practices and policies concerning inter-domain routing, which can clash with the interest
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of eyeballs or transit providers, triggering warnings in our system. For instance, some content
providers have no backbone, and decide forwarding routes disregarding any policy reflected in
BGP announcements [108] [74]. Access and transit networks should be aware of these policies,
and use the warning systems as a notification system that can point operators to cases with a
large impact on the network. The operators can then tackle each case in conjunction with content
provider. Providers can use systems like the ones proposed in [147] [189] [79], which can be used
to establish a collaboration between content and access providers, in order to reduce incompatible
interests. A large part of the discussions around network neutrality have been generated by con-
flicting relations between access and content provider networks [64]. Although specific details
of agreements fitting network neutrality clauses is beyond the scope of this work, we envision
that our system could be use by both sides of this relationship. The warning system cold provide
useful information to specific situations that do not fit points of any peering agreement, such as
missing prefix announcement or disrespect for inbound policy.
8.6. Summary
In this chapter, we studied inter-domain routing configurations in which the (economic) in-
terests of one or more ASes are violated. Taking an AS-centric perspective, we (I) classified
possible interest violations; (II) proposed algorithms to detect them and assess their impact; and
(III) described a warning system providing operators with critical input on business-impacting
interest violations. We used our system to perform real-world measurements. Our results show
that interest violations do occur in practice and can affect a non-negligible amount of traffic (a
couple of Gbps in one of our cases). The main conclusions from this chapter are:
Focus on the interest violations with larger impact. In our measurements, we found a large
amount of interest violations of different types. We believe this situation might be common for
many other ASes in the Internet. Due to the partial information that one can obtain from external
policies, it might be hard to detect the root cause of all cases. This requires operators to focus on
each case individually, analyzing data or making calls to find the reason behind them. As this is
operative intensive operation, network managers should focus on the cases with larger network
impact.
Interest violations are not always solvable. Violations caused by routing leaks or forged
advertisement can be detected and solved, however other interest violation might lead to one
AS being discontent with the final traffic distribution. Network managers suffering from interest
violations should understand each case, in order to evaluate the steps to deal with them. Some
operators might, for instance, decide to continue with the violation, but incorporate the missing
revenue in their service’s pricing model.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Network operators must cope with continually increasing traffic volumes and more stringent
service levels agreements while at the same time striving for cost reduction. Increasing the number
of inter-domain peering links offers operators a direct way of off-loading transit traffic, increasing
resiliency and reducing the transit bill, while shortening the path to the content consumer. In
the last years, the massive increase of settlement-free peering links has transformed the Internet
infrastructure into a flatter network, of which IXPs become central entities. Indeed, our own
observations, and those of other authors, have shown that this amount of peering links would
not be feasible via dedicated private connections. IXPs provide the technical means to support
these connections, and, complementary, provide a space to discover new peering opportunities.
Remote peering has also emerged as a new interconnection service that allows ASes to efficiently
join various IXPs.
The benefits of joining multiple IXPs do not come for free, as they also come with man-
agement overhead. Concretely, the large number of peering relationships, frequently informally
established or with no previous contact, forces operators to monitor the behavior of external ASes,
which can be affecting their own policies. Operators should thus manage their inter-domain traf-
fic using procedures adapted to an environment in which external ASes have dynamic policies,
and networks that are prone to errors. This management procedure not only concerns the traffic
control under a given infrastructure, but also those processes related to network expansion, or
peering management.
The goal of this thesis was to provide methods for operators to manage their inter-domain
traffic in such an environment. For this purpose, we divided the thesis in two first parts. We first
explored the IXP-centric Internet ecosystem. We characterized different IXPs around the world,
leveraging public information to analyze the evolution of several of their characteristics. In the
second part of the thesis, we took the perspective of an individual AS operator. We defined a
framework for the management of inter-domain traffic, highlighting the difficulties behind ob-
taining the data required for this purpose, and the need of policy validation. In addition, using
real network data, we provided examples of applications of this framework.
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IXP Characterization. By studying the characteristics of various IXPs, we observed the
differences between various types of IXPs. On the one hand, most IXPs focus on covering par-
ticular geographical domains. The Brazilian and Russian IXPs (PTT and MSK) are examples of
exchanges serving large areas; yet, PTT shows the largest growing rate in term of members, while
MSK size has been stable in the last years. In general, other regional IXPs, such as the Slovakian-
IX, which we examined with detail in Chapter 4, are also experiencing member stagnation, as
they already attracted the companies that might be willing to peer in their particular domains. On
the other hand, the three large European IXPs, AMS-IX, LINX, and DEC-IX share very similar
characteristics of size and traffic level. We use the number of unique members and control plane
information to show the member overlapping of most IXPs. In fact, a few isolated IXPs are com-
posed by a large percentage of ASes peering at a single exchange. Member overlapping affects
companies and IXPs alike. For the first, it reduces the opportunity for traffic off-loading after
having already joined a couple of IXPs. For the second, it can discourage companies to join them,
limiting their footprint to the companies that can easily reach them (normally the close ones).
Remote Peering. By using remote peering services, a company can join multiple IXPs with-
out extending their infrastructure or operational overhead towards new locations. Remote peering
thus helps operators reduce the entry cost to an IXP. Simultaneously, by embracing remote peering
providers, IXPs broaden their geographical footprint. Using active measurements from multiple
looking glasses, we evaluated the use of remote peering at several IXPs. We discovered mem-
bers using remote peering in more than 90% of the studied IXPs. We also discussed the impact
of remote peering for the Internet structure. Certainly, remote peering providers become central
entities in the layer-1 or layer-2 view of the Internet, while they go unnoticed with measurements
performed at layer-3. In a practical perspective, this means that a single remote peering provider
might connect the same ASes at different IXPs. Operators must be aware that remote peering can
hide single points of failure, since a problem in a remote peering provider could cause simultane-
ous failures in the links to different IXPs. ASes requiring high availability should ensure that this
is not occurring in the networks of critical settlement-free peers.
Inter-domain management framework. We described the difficulties related to the manage-
ment of inter-domain management in Chapter 6. First, we exposed the challenges of procuring
and analyzing the data required for this process. The main challenges for this task is the large
volume of data, heterogeneity of devices producing the data, and incompleteness or inaccuracy of
data. The second challenge is the difficulty of simulating changes in labs, given the undetermined
nature of external policies; the non-deterministic behavior of BGP in some network topologies;
and the size of the overall dataset needed to process. Operators are hence obliged to trial and in-
vestigate network changes over their own live network, monitor its actual effect, and react based
on the perceived impact. Third, the policies of external ASes are dynamic and might conflict with
the interest of the operators, and establish procedures that specifically deal with those cases.
Peering study using remote peering. We performed a peering study, evaluating potential
network expansions needed to improve the performance and profitability of the inter-domain as-
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pect of a real network. We assessed the transit off-load potential after connecting privately to new
peers, or publicly through IXPs. We showed how the off-loaded transit traffic decreases quickly
after joining a couple of large IXP, hinting at the use of remote peering to reach additional ex-
changes. Further, we discussed different methods for operators to quantify other benefits of peer-
ing at multiple sites, such as the increase of resiliency, and the reduction of internal transport cost.
Any type of verified information that operators can obtain from external peers, including their
relationships to other ASes or the prefixes they announce on IXP route servers, reduces the risk
of yielding incorrect results in a peering study.
Incompatible inter-domain policies. The distributed nature of the Internet makes it feasible
for different ASes to have incompatible policies. In those cases, the resulting inter-domain traffic
distribution might infringe the policies of one or more ASes. Assuming the position of one AS,
we describe how these policy violations can affect both traffic directions. Outbound traffic is
affected, for instance, when an AS does not receive the same paths from a neighboring AS at
their sessions in different IXPs. Inbound traffic is affected when external ASes select a path that
is less preferable for the network operation and business. We provide several algorithms that
operators can use to find these cases in their networks, and describe the implementation of a
system that warns operators when they occur. Using data from two real networks, we show that
policy violations are frequent, highlighting the need for operators to use such tools. We envision
our system to complement other validation tools, such as RPKI systems or route leaks detectors.
Despite the large efforts from researchers and manufacturers, network operators still lack the
tools to perform proper inter-domain network management. A few companies enjoy the inter-
nal resources needed to create in-house solutions for this purpose, but they are usually specific
for their networks. The commoditization of big data architectures; the support of open APIs by
network devices; and the expansion of an analytic and development culture among network engi-
neers provides an environment feasible for the procedures required for inter-domain management.
In parallel, the development of technologies like Segment Routing allows the granular control of
inter-domain traffic in a centralized way, facilitating the implementation of optimal traffic engi-
neering strategies. IXPs could also leverage these technologies to increase their efficiency, avoid
undesired effects such as Route Server path-hiding, and provide direct control on policy imple-
mentation to their members.
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